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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to examine the effects of ingroup and 
outgroup membership upon minority influence and in doing so address a 
number of unresolved issues resulting from previous research.
Research in this area is not only intended to resolve theoretical 
issues but relates to factors salient to minority influence in the 
"real world". For while there exist ingroup minorities (such as, 
environmentalists) there are also outgroup minorities (such as, black 
power).
^  model of minority and majority influence is proposed which is a 
synthesis of Moscovici"s (1980) Coversion Theory and Tajfel"s (1984) 
Social Identity Theory. _This new model proposes that when individuals 
are influenced they not only adopt the source"s advocated position but 
also recategorize themselves as part of the source"s group. As a 
consequence of this recategorization, individuals self-attribute the 
typical characteristics perceived to arise from the source"s group 
membership. Therefore, on public responses, influence will be related 
to the degree of change to individuals" social identity from 
self-attributing the source"s characteristics. The more undesirable 
the.ch'3racteristics of the source, the less likely public influence 
will occur (since individuals avoid nublicly joining an undesirable 
group). However, the more undesirable the source"s characteristics, 
the more distinctive they are (in terms of attitude and 
identification) and the more likely they are to cause "conversion" and 
have influence on the private (latent) level.
A number of hypotheses from this model are tested with experiments that
ii
o)o
examine the influencing abilities of ingroup and outgroup minorities. 
The findings support the proposed model.
The major findings are:
(i) on public responses, ingroup minorities tend to have more 
influence than outgroup minorities.
(ii) on private responses, the reverse pattern emerges, outgroup 
minorities tend to have as much, if not more, influence than do 
ingroup minorities.
(iii) the superior influence of ingroup minorities over out group
minorities on public responses can occur when the categorization' ...
process is based on a relatively trivial dimension but only when there 
is a basis to self-attribute desirable characteristics. When there is 
no basis to self-attribute desirable characteristics then there is no 
difference between ingroup and outgroup ininority.>irifluence. /
111
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis focuses on certain theoretical issues which were 
unresolved by previous research into minority influence. Interest in 
this area of research stems directly from earlier research on majority 
influence. The study of majority influence is closely linked to the 
notion of conformity while the study of minority influence is 
associated with the process of innovation.
It is important at the outset to point out that in this thesis I am 
concerned with the work of experimental social psychologists. 
Experimental work, as we shall see, focusses on situational aspects, 
for instance, the size of the majority, the context in which 
judgements are made or influence processes attempted. In this work, 
relatively little attention_i_s paid to personal attributes such as 
sex, age, attitudes and other predispositions. There is other work in 
social psychology which is particularly concerned with personality 
development and personality attributes which also offers explanations. 
for majority influence. For instance, Adorno et al."s famous work on 
the Authoritarian Personality (1950) seeks to explain in 
psycho—analytic terms how people develop personalities which make them 
prone to adopt authoritarian beliefs, become rigid and dogmatic, and, 
by implication, conform to the majority. The focus of attention in 
Adorno et al"s work is on personality development and explanations are 
couched in terms of dispositional concepts rather than derived from 
situational aspects and contexts. Work on the authoritarian 
personality and other work, such as Rokeach"s research into dogmatism
(I960) or Eysenck's (1954) work on personality factors, is mainly 
based on psychometric measures (interviews, projective tests, attitude 
scales and so on) and will not be considered here. Furthermore, while
XI
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such work may contribute towards understanding majority influence, it 
has not been used to explain the impact of the minority.
All research has in-huilt biases in terms of its theoretical starting 
point and its associated preferred methodology and it is as well to 
recognise this and to make it plain that in this thesis the main 
emphasis is on experimental work which, almost by definition, favours 
explanations in terms of contextual/situational aspects.
Whilst research traditions may arise purely from intellectual 
curiosity, social psychologists" choice of research areas have 
frequently been closely linked to contemporary real-life concerns. 
Research on conformity, for instance, arose initially out of dismay at 
the extent of conformity to the views of pre-World War Two dictators 
and the impact of the mass media on political beliefs. It may not be 
accidental that many of the social psychologists who initially turned 
to the study of conformity, persuasion or, by contrast, such topics as 
democratic leadership, were European refugees settled in the U.S.A..
Before reviewing the work of the major contributors in the area of 
majority and minority influence it is necessary to set down some 
definitions of key concepts. When discussing research into majority 
and minority influence it will become apparent that researchers tend
to employ different definitions of both these terms. The main problem
is that there tends to be a discrepancy between the definitions 
applied at the theoretical level and at the experimental level.
There are at least three dimensions which have formed the basis for 
distinguishing between minorities and majorities.
1) Numerical — it is possible to define a minority as the numerically
o’ ! ,
)smaller entity and the majority as the numerically larger entity 
within a group. This is often the conceptualization held by the lay 
D person. Such a view ignores what is said by the minority and majority
and relies upon relative numbers which, however, can be affected by 
the context in which they occur.
s
2) Norms - a norm may be considered to be a code for socially 
acceptable behaviour. It is possible to define a majority as a group
D which holds the normative position and the minority as the group
which holds the anti-normative position.
3) Power - in this context the term power is being used to refer to 
the ability to exert influence. In this conceptualization one may 
think of the majority as having power and the minority as lacking
2) power. This analysis is based on the observation that minorities are
groups which typically lack power in society, are discriminated 
against and hold low social positions. Although it is true that many
2) minorities lack power this may be a consequence of their status rather
than a defining feature.
O) The above three dimensions are often used to define a majority and aminority. To summarize we can define a majority as a group who holds 
the normative position, and/or is usually the numerically larger 
group and/or possesses power, while a minority can be defined as a 
group (or individual) who holds an anti-normative position, and/or is 
usually the numerically smaller group and/or has little or no power. 
From these definitions it can be seen that it is impossible to define 
a minority or a majority without reference to each other, in fact it 
could be claimed that they are the opposite sides of the'same coin.
xiix
)Whilst social psychologists have been interested in social influence 
for many decades a recent research tradition has grown amongst 
European social psychologists. The aim of this tradition has been to 
question much of the earlier American social psychology and stress the 
"social" nature of Social Psychology. The largest research area 
within this new European tradition has concerned itself with 
intergroup relations and the concept of social identity (Tajfel,
1984). Researchers in this area have convincingly argued that 
individuals possess a social identity which incorporates knowledge of, 
and emotional ties to, the groups they belong to. In order to 
maintain a positive social identity, individuals tend to favour their 
own group at the expense of an outgroup. The result of this process is 
that individuals tend to over-evaluate characteristics belonging to 
their own group and under-evaluate those belonging to the outgroup.
The motivation to engage in such discriminatory behaviour need not be 
based upon well founded differences between groups, for they can occur 
upon the most trivial differences.
From the above definitions of majority and minority, it is apparent 
that they may be considered also as ingroups and outgroups. Indeed, 
research which will be discussed in this thesis shows that minorities
)
tend to be evaluated with negative connotations compared to majorities 
in the same way in which outgroups are devalued compared to ingroups.- 
This is an important departure from previous conceptualizations, for I
)
am suggesting that the dynamics which occur between majorities and 
minorities can be expressed in terms of intergroup relations. The aim 
of this thesis is not to justify such a comparison, although this is
)
implicitly dealt with in the arguments presented, but to explore the 
role of categorization (that is the process of assigning oneself and 
others to different groups) upon social influence and, in particular.
XIV
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upon minority influence. The decision to concentrate upon minority 
influence has not been coincidental for the study of minority 
influence provides an opportunity to examine social influence from the 
point of view of the outgroup. Such questions as: Under what 
conditions can minorities influence the majority? Are there 
differences between ingroup and outgroup minorities? Does the 
relevance of the categorization dimension affect social influence? 
are some of the issues which are at the heart of the thesis.
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part one consists of four 
chapters which discuss the research concerning majority influence 
(chapter 1), minority influence (chapter 2), theories of social 
influence (chapter 3). The last chapter in the first part contains a 
review of the effects of social categorization upon social influence 
and a theoretical outline of an intergroup perspective of social 
influence processes (chapter 4). The second part of the thesis 
describes the results of 10 experiments designed to test hypotheses 
derived from the intergroup perspective. These experiments are 
discussed in four chapters (chapters 5-8). The third and last part 
consists of one chapter which discusses the*results of the experiments 
and considers issues arising from the research (chapter 9).
XV
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PART ONE: THE LITERATURE REVIEW
CHAPTER 1 : MAJORITY INFLUENCE - THE PROCESS OF CONFORMITY
O
1.1 Early studies of Conformity
1.1.1 The work of Solomon Asch
The first major investigation into conformity was conducted by Solomon 
^(3 Asch in the early 1950* s. The impact of this research has been so
great that it warrants detailed consideration. Since Asch employed 
the same basic design throughout all his experiments, this is 
described below. This account is taken from Asch (1956) and the page 
references for these quotations refer to that volume.
Typically 7-9 American male college students participated in a task / 
involving the discrimination of lengths of lines each of which was 
numbered. The subjects were required to judge.which one of the three 
lines was of the same length as another line (the standard). Out of 
eighteen trials the number of errors was only 0.7% of the total number 
of responses, in fact 35 out of the 37 subjects made no errors at all. 
This shows that the task was unambiguous in nature and that nearly 
everyone knew the correct answer.
Asch then employed the following manipulation - all of the subjects 
except one (the naive subject) were confederates of the experimenter 
who were instructed to give certain predetermined responses. Subjects
)gave their reponses verbally and seating was arranged so that the 
naive subject always gave his response last but one. On the first two 
trials the confederates (the majority) gave the correct response, 
however out of 12 of the remaining 16 trials all the confederates made 
the same erroneous response (the critical trials). The confederates 
made two types of errors, moderate or extreme errors according to the 
amount they deviated from the correct resp onse.
Let us imagine the situation facing naive subjects when confronted 
with an erroneous majority. In the experimental room he is required 
to make an unambiguous judgement which under normal circumstances 
would require little effort. In the first two trials he observes that 
the other members of the group are giving the same réponse as he does, 
that is the ’normal* or expected response. At this stage nothing 
unusual has happened because the naive subject would expect everyone 
of sound vision to be competent at the task. Then, suddenly, all the 
other subjects start giving obviously wrong response. The naive 
subject becomes confused, he attends to the lines more closely to see 
if he is wrong, he looks at the experimenter in the hope of a rational 
explanation. This is the dilemma facing the naive subject - does he 
yield to the group and also give an erroneous response or does he 
(3 stick to the correct response ?
When confronted with an erroneous majority Asch found that the naive 
subjects agreed with it on 36.8% of the trials. In other words the 
naive subjects conformed to the erroneous majority on approximately 
one third of the trials whilst giving the correct reponses on the 
others. Asch has termed the latter as independence, that is, as 
resisting conformity.
Q)
Another interesting finding was that when the majority made a moderate 
error, all the errors of the subjects were also moderate but, when the 
majority made extreme errors (that is, when they chose the line which 
was least like the standard line), about 20% of the subjects’ errors 
were moderate and therefore different to the majority. This shows 
that, when faced with an extremely erroneous majority, some subjects 
may have avoided being as extreme as the majority and so gave a 
moderately erroneous response. This is an interesting situation for 
the subject has neither given a correct answer nor has he agreed with 
the majority, therefore, it is hard to see whether the subject was 
conforming or being independent.
Immediately following the experiment the subjects were interviewed in 
an attempt to find out their reasons for their behaviour. The 
interview data revealed that there were different types of yielding 
(that is, agreeing with the majority) and independence (that is, not 
agreeing with the majority). The following quotes are subjects’ 
responses to interview questions quoted in Asch (1956).
There were two forms of independence. The first form was independence 
of strength where subjects retained their own response and withstood 
O group pressure with little difficulty. Asch reports a subject who
even enjoyed disagreeing with the majority, ”I was getting almost a 
sadistic pleasure out of being different” (p.37). The second form was 
independence without confidence where subjects were overwhelmed by 
doubt and were convinced that they were wrong and that the majority 
was right. However they did not yield to the majority because they 
believed that they were required to respond as they actually saw the 
task. In other words, they believed they had to obey the experimental 
instructions and respond how they saw the lines irrespective of the
o)
response of others. This reasoning is demonstrated in the following 
quotes: "In the light of the opinions of the others I’d say I was 
wrong, but I answered as I saw" (p.40) and "the experiment required an 
accurate answer" (p.40).
Of those subjects who yielded to the majority there were three types. 
The first form was yielding at the perceptual level. This was the 
rarest type of behaviour and was characterised by the subject yielding 
to the majority without awareness. In other words they really 
believed the majority was correct. Asch (1956) reports on a subject 
that it ’’..... appeared that his lack of awareness enabled him to 
maintain an attitude of complacency and frankness, only mildly 
troubled by the suspicion that something unknown to him had occured" 
(p.42).
The second form of yielding was yielding at the level of judgment. In 
this situation the subjects believed that the majority may have been 
wrong but thought that since several pairs of eyes (belonging to the 
majority) are better than one (his own), it is he who may have been at 
fault and consequently had little confidence in his response. This 
can be seen in the following two quotes given by subjects: "The 
(3 majority was against me - I thought perhaps I was wrong" (p.44) and "I
gave the group answer against the card. Often mine still looked best, 
but I figured they were right" (p.43).
The third form of yielding was yielding at the level of action. In 
this situation the subject yielded but knew that the majority was 
wrong. The subjects desired to belong to the group and avoided 
conflict by agreeing with the erroneous majority. This can be seen 
from the following quotes; "Here was a group; they had a definite
o)o
idea; my idea disagreed; this might arouse anger" (p.46) and "I began 
to feel I was being pushed to an answer I didn't want to give".
It is quite clear from these explanations of responding that (a) 
subjects varied as to how they perceived and how they reacted to the 
situation and (b) that there was often a large discrepancy between the 
response subjects gave publicly in front of the group and their 
private beliefs as evident in the interviews.
1.1.2 The Work of Richard Crutchfield
Although the Asch research design has been extensively used as a tool 
of investigation it has a relatively low production of data compared 
to the effort required in achieving it. For each subject a large 
number of trained confederates are required (anything from 3 to 16) as 
well as approximately an hour of the experimenter's time to supervise 
the experiment and conduct the post-experimental interviews. If one 
considers that Asch often employed over 100 subjects in an experiment 
one can imagine the colossal organization that was required to conduct 
these studies.
As well as practical considerations there are a number of theoretical 
issues which are problematic in the Asch paradigm. Firstly, since 
Asch used different sets of confederates during the course of the 
experiments, there is the possibilty that some confederates may have 
been perceived as more influential than others. Secondly, it is 
impossible to control for confederates' behaviour over time. Although 
confederates only gave a short verbal response, other factors, such as 
tone of voice or body movements, may have had an effect.
: 0
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One method which overcomes many of these problems was devised by 
Richard Crutchfield and is known as the Crutchfield Apparatus. 
Typically, five subjects sit side-by-side but are separated from each 
other by partitions such that no visual contact can be made. In front 
of each subject is a series of 11 switches upon which the subject can 
indicate his/her answer to a number of judgements. The apparatus is 
also designed to convey information about the responses made by the 
other subjects by displaying them on a panel of five rows of 11 lights 
where each row corresponds to the response of each subject. Responses 
are made in turn with those of each subject being displayed on 
everyone's panel.
In fact, each subject is deceived, the panel of lights is controlled 
by the experimenter to give the illusion that the subject is part of a 
group. Crutchfield (1953) states "The entire situation is, in a word, 
contrived and contrived so as to expose each individual to a 
standardized and prearranged series of group judgments" (p.192).
These judgements can be made to appear to be in agreement or 
disagreement with the subject. The advantage of this method (compared 
to Asch) is that no confederates are used, each subject is a source of 
O  data and that it is possible strictly to control the information given
to each subject.
The results obtained by Crutchfield are interesting. On a simple 
logical task, such as the completion of a number series, 30% of 
subjects conformed to an erroneous majority answer (note, no subjects 
in the control condition, who had not been exposed to an erroneous 
majority, had given an incorrect answer). On ambiguous tasks, such as 
a number series which had no logically correct answer, conformity was
oo
as high as 79%.
1.1.3 Comparisons of Asch and Crutchfield Techniques
The major difference between the Asch and Crutchfield methods concerns 
the 'visibility' of the majority. In the Asch experiments the subject 
could see the majority whereas in the Crutchfield experiments the 
majority was not seen but implied. One could predict that the 
physical presence of the majority in the Asch paradigm might result in 
a higher rate of conformity than in the Crutchfield paradigm.
Levy (I960) tested such a hypothesis by employing the same line 
comparison task as Asch but, instead of subjects giving their 
responses verbally in front of the majority, they responded on a 
Crutchfield apparatus. Levy found that the subjects conformed to the 
majority on 19.1% of the trials which is lower than Asch (1956).
There was also evidence that subjects were more suspicious of the 
experiment than in the original Asch studies. Levy concluded that the
result ".... indicates that the laboratory situation created by
Crutchfield is far less effective than the original face-to-face 
situation created by Asch" (p.41). This is likely to be so either 
because people conform more on public occasions to avoid disagreement 
irrespective of their private views (as Asch has shown) or because a 
face-to-face group may be more convincing than a simulated group.
1.1.4 Modifications of the Asch Research Designs
Asch modified his basic research design to look at other factors which
3
might affsct conformity. In his 1956 paper he gives details of 
several of these 'minor' experiments. Asch was concerned whether the 
effects he had observed could be generalized to another unambiguous 
task. In one experiment subjects viewed two colour wheels and had to 
judge whether the comparison wheel was lighter, darker or the same 
brightness as the standard wheel. He found that the subjects agreed 
with the erroneous majority on 39% of the trials which is very similar 
to the line comparison task (approximately 37%).
In another experiment the subject was told that he had arrived too 
late but could still take part by writing his responses on a piece of 
paper instead of giving them verbally (therefore the majority would be 
unaware of his responses). In this situation the number of errors was 
12.5% which is significantly lower than when subjects had to give 
their responses verbally but is significantly higher than in the 
control condition.
Asch was also interested in the effects of breaking the majority's
) - " z'
consensus. He found that, if a confederate started to give the
correct response (and hence agreed with ths subject), conformity fell
to about 8% (Asch, 1951). If the confederate started to give a
)
Q  response which was different from the subject but which was also
incorrect, conformity was about 9% (Asch, 1955). This suggests that- 
breaking consensus is the most important factor in reducing conformity
)
and whether the dissenter agrees or disagrees with the subject makes 
no difference. The theoretical relevance of this will be discussed 
later.
1.2 Explanations of Conformity
1.2.1 Functionalist Approach
)
The most popular explanation of conformity derives from Festinger's 
(1950,1954) Social Comparison Theory and is often termed the 
) Functionalist Approach. The basic assumption of social comparison
theory is that individuals have a desire to evaluate their opinions 
and abilities. Persons prefer objective criteria (physical reality)
) as standards for self-evaluation. In the absence of adequate physical
reality, persons seek out other individuals as sources of information 
(social reality). In other words, individuals compare themselves with 
other individuals as a means of evaluating their opinions. There 
exist in groups, according to Festinger, 'pressures towards 
uniformity* which arise either from social comparisons between the 
) group members and/or from 'group locomotion' (that is, the desire to
seek group consensus in order to fulfil group goals).
) Applying the theory to social influence processes it can be seen that,
whenever there is a discrepancy within the group, communication by the 
group is directed towards reducing the discrepancy in order to restore 
) _ group uniformity. Group uniformity can be achieved either by the
deviate changing his/her opinions towards the group response or by the 
deviate being rejected by the group.
There is some evidence to support the hypothesis that deviates receive 
more communication than the other members of the group. In a much 
cited experiment, Schachter (1951) required groups of 5-7 subjects to 
discuss the topic of juvenile delinquency. He manipulated two 
variables, cohesion (high/low) and relevance of the topic 
(relevant/irrelevant). In each of the groups three members were
10
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confederates of the experimenter and responded to the group discussion 
in a predetermined way. One of the confederates began the group 
discussion by advocating an extreme position but gradually changed his 
attitudes to agree with the group (’slider*). Another confederate 
held the modal position of the group throughout the discussion 
(’mode*). Finally, the last confederate GOusistentl) ^  unpopular
view (’deviate*).
Consistent with Festinger*s theory, Schachter found that the ’deviate* 
was rejected more often in the high cohesive groups (since pressures 
towards uniformity will be greater in high cohesive groups than in low 
cohesive groups). Surprisingly, relevance of the topic to the 
individual had no effect on the rejection of the ’deviate*. Schachter
also found that the 'deviate* received four times more communication
I
from the other group members-than the 'slider' and seven times more 
than the 'mode*.
Although Schachter-'s results have been widely quoted as evidence for 
Festinger*s theory. Mills (1962) notes that the greatest total of 
communication to the 'deviate* occured in the low cohesion/irrelevant 
topic condition which, according to Festinger, should have the lowest 
pressures towards uniformity.
1.2.2 The Role of Dependency
According to Festinger, conformity occurs as a result of social 
comparisons in order to achieve group uniformity. There is, therefore 
the assumption of a desire in individuals to use Other people as 
sources of reference for their own behaviour or opinions. In other
11
Dwords, individuals are seen as dependent upon others as a means of 
s8lf-evaluation. The concept of dependency has dominated studies of 
D social influence to such an extent that Moscovici (1976) has stated
that "The French say 'cherchez la femme'; social psychologists say 
'look for dependence, and everything will be explained'" (p.19).
D
Typically researchers have distinguished between two types of 
dependency, institutional and instrumental. Institutional dependency 
D is associated with power dimensions and may result from the qualities
of individuals (for example, leaders) or may be collective (for 
example, the effect of the majority). Instrumental dependency is 
associated with the gratification of certain needs. Jones and Gerard 
(1967) have differentiated between two forms of instrumental 
dependency (they refer to it as social dependency). First, effect
3 dependency ".... in which one person relies upon another for the
direct satisfaction of needs" (p.711). Second, information dependency
".... one person relies upon another for information about the
) environment, its meaning, and the possibilities of action on it"
(p.741).
O) _ As a consequence of using the group as a source of evaluation,individuals become dependent upon it as a source of information 
(information dependency) and/or as a means of satisfying psychological 
or material needs (effect dependency). To a certain extent these two 
forms of dependency are interrelated and cannot be theoretically or 
practically separated. However, they do help us to understand the 
reasons why individuals conform.
1.2.3 Dependency and Majority Size
12
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If dependency is the cause of conformity then one would expect 
conformity to increase as the majority size increases. This follows 
from the reasoning that the greater the size of the majority the more 
individuals will become dependent upon it as a source of information.
In general; evidence does not favour the majority size hypothesis.
Asch (1951) found that majorities larger than three do not 
significantly increase the rate of conformity. In fact, Rosenberg
(1961) found a significant decrease in conformity when the majority 
size increased from three to four. In contrast, Gerard, Wilhelmy and 
Conolley (1968) found a linear relationship between conformity and the 
size of the majority. However it has been noted that in the Gerard e^ 
al. study there was no significant increase in conformity beyond a 
majority size of four (Wilder, 1977).
Wilder (1977) provides an interesting perspective to the studies which 
have examined the relationship between majority size and conformity.
He proposes that it is neccessary to examine the way in which 
individuals categorise the members of the majority and he suggests 
that it is the number of social entities an individual perceives 
rather than the number of individuals which is the determining factor.
He defines a social entity as ".... an individual or group of persons
who are perceived to be a unit, distinct from others present" (p.254). 
Consistent with this analysis. Wilder found that conformity increased 
as the number of social entities subjects perceived in the majority 
increased whilst varying the number of individuals in a single entity 
had little effect.
The results of studies on majority size and conformity do not present
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a clear picture and there is little evidence that conformity increases 
above a majority size of three. In conclusion one can state that the 
experimental data only provides partial support for the majority size 
hypothesis. It could be argued that the relationship between majority 
size and dependency is a tenuous one and can be affected by many 
things. In the next section I consider a well known study on 
conformity which provides a better test of the role of dependency.
1.2.4 Forms of Social Influença
' i
In an influencial papsr, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) have distinguished
between two forms of social influence, normative social influence ^  -------------------------
which is defined as ".... an influence to conform with the positive
!
expectations of another" Cp._629 )_ and informational social influence
which is defined as " an influence to accept information obtained
from another as evidence about reality" (p.629). It can be noted that 
these two forms of„social influence correspond to effect and 
information dependency considered in the last section.
Deutsch and Gerard hypothesized that normative social influence should 
be greater, and hence cause a higher rate of conformity, when 
individuals believe that they are part of a group than when they do 
not. This follows from the reasoning that when individuals form a 
group they will conform to the expectations of the group (possibly as 
a method of achieving group cohesion). Also, normative social 
influence should be reduced, and hence the rate of conformity, if 
individuals believe that their responses cannot be identified by 
others (since they do not feel any pressures to conform).
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To test these hypotheses, Deutsch and Gerard employed Asch's line 
comparison task with a naive subject being confronted by three 
2) confederates who all gave the same erroneous response. There were
three conditions. The first condition was a replication of Asch's 
experiment and known as the 'face-to-face situation*. The second 
^ condition was the 'anonymous condition' where subjects were separated
by partitions and responded on a Crutchfield Apparatus. Although the 
responses of the other subjects appeared on the panels they were led
 ^ to believe that ".... because of a complicated wiring setup the
subject's number had no relation to his seating position" (p.631). In 
other words, it would not be possible to identify the source of each 
 ^(2) response. The third condition was the 'group situation' which was
identical to the 'anonymous situation' except that they were told that
"We are going to give a reward to the five best groups - the five
 ^ groups that make the fewest errors on the series of judgments"
(p.631). The reward was tickets to a Broadway play. The aim of this 
manipulation was to increase the feeling that individuals were 
 ^ participating in a group activity.
O
The results confirmed their hypotheses (number of errors are given in 
 ^ brackets). First, conformity was greater when individuals formed a
group ('group situation' - 12.47%) than when they did not (anonymous
situation - 5.92%). Second, conformity was less when subjects 
believed that their responses could not be identified ('anonymous 
situation' - 5.92%) than when others were aware of their responses 
('face-to-face situation'- 7.08%). The latter finding is similar to 
Levy's study discussed earlier in this chapter (see section 1.1.3), 
namely that the Asch paradigm is more effective in producing 
conformity than the Crutchfield paradigm (note that subjects responded 
on a Crutchfield Apparatus in the 'anonymous situation').
15
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The results of these experiments suggests that dependency is the basis 
of conformity, where individuals are dependent upon the majority 
either for information to verify their position (informational social 
influence) or for the psychological benefits others can supply 
(normative social influence).
1.3 Alternative Explanations for Conformity
It was stated earlier that the Functionalist approach was the dominant 
explanation for conformity for many years. In fact, it was not until 
research directed attention away from conformity to minority influence 
in the late 1960's that the Functionalist approach was questioned. As 
a result of this change in emphasis an explanation of conformity based 
on response consensus emerged which is not based on dependency. This 
explanation is important because it forms the basis of the dominant
explanation for minority influence. y'
" /
1.3-1 Consensus Hypothesis
The majority consensus hypothesis states that majorities are able to" 
achieve conformity only when they are unanimous. It has already been 
noted earlier that Asch found that when one of the majority started to 
give different responses, that is, broke consensus, the rate of 
conformity fell. Other experiments have found a similar effect.
Mouton, Blake and Olmstead (1956) conducted an experiment where 
subjects were required to judge the number of metronome clicks they
16
could hear through an earphone. The clicks were presented at a rate 
of 180 per minute. The experiment consisted of nine trials which was 
composed of three sets of trials containing 14, 32 or 49 clicks.
Before responding the subjects beared the response of four other 
subjects through the earphone. In fact, these responses were 
 ^ constructed by the experimenters and delivered via a tape recorder
such that each subject heard the responses of a bogus majority before 
responding themselves (this procedure is similar to that used by 
 ^ Crutchfield). Out of three of the nine trials, all the bogus subjects
gave the same incorrect response (unanimous majority) while on another 
three trials they each gave different incorrect responses 
 ^ Q  (non-unaninmous majority). The experimenters found that subjects
conformed more when faced by a unanimous majority than by a 
non-unanimous majority which is consistent with the consensus 
« ■ hypothesis.
Let us look more closely at this experiment as detail often proves to
bs illuminating. In the non-unanimous condition there was
-- ' / 
disagreement amongst the bogus subjects who formed the majority. Two
of these subjects gave the incorrect response and the other two gave
the correct response. The fact that the non-unanimous majority did
not have as much influence as the unanimous majority might not have
been due to the breaking of consensus but due to the fact that two
subjects gave the correct response. By giving the correct response
the confederates may have been giving support to the naive subjects.
This experiment therefore did not resolve the issue, that is, whether
the non-unanimous majority reduces conformity because it broke
consensus or because it gave the correct response thus providing
social support for the naive subject.
17
o) ,
o
1.3.2 Conformity and Social Support
If social support of a partner is crucial in reducing conformity then 
that partner would have to give the same response as the subject. 
However, if merely breaking consensus is important then it should make 
no difference whether the person who breaks consensus gives the same 
or a different response as the subject. Some results noted earlier 
are relevant. Asch found that if one of the confederates gave a 
correct response (that is, broke the majority’s consensus) conformity 
fell from the usual 32% (unanimous majority) to about 5% (Asch, 1951). 
Also, Asch (1 9 5 5) noted that, if a confederate gave a response which 
was different from the majority but was also incorrect, then 
conformity nevertheless fell to about 9% which was similar to when the 
confederate gave the correct response. Asch concluded that breaking 
the majority consensus was the determining factor since it made little 
difference whether the dissenting confederate gave the correct or
incorrect response. This conclusion should be treated with caution
'—  /
because the experiments were conducted with different prearranged
patterns of responding by the confederates;
Allen and Levine have conducted a number of interesting experiments on 
the effects of social support on conformity. Typically, these 
experiments employed groups of five subjects who are required to make 
judgements concerning visual, information and opinion items on a 
Crutchfield Apparatus. Allen and Levine (1968) found that on visual 
items both veridical (correct response) and erroneous dissent 
(incorrect response but different from the majority) significantly 
reduced conformity as compared to a majority consensus condition which 
supports Asch’s findings. However, the same pattern did not appear on
18
information and opinion items.
1.3.3 Explanations of the Social Support Effect
) Evidence shows that breaking majority consensus is a determining
factor in reducing conformity and two possible reasons have been 
suggested for this. The first explanation suggests that individuals 
) conform to the group because they do not want to feel isolated and
rejected (for example, Schachter, 1951). If it is true that 
individuals conform so as to avoid social isolation from the group,
) O  then one would expect that it would be crucial to have the public
presence of a partner in order to reduce conformity (and hence the
feeling of isolation). Allen and Bragg (1969) quoted in Allen and
) Levine (1971) tested this hypothesis. They found that private social
support (given before the subject responded and not known to the rest 
of the group) was equally as effective at reducing conformity as
) public social support (given in front of the group), thus
disconfirming the social isolation explanation.
) The second explanation utilizes Festinger’s theory of social
comparisons. Festinger suggests that individuals have a desire to 
evaluate their opinions through comparing themselves with others. In 
) this analysis individuals who break from the majority provide the
subject with an independent assesment of reality. Allen and Levine
(1971) hypothesize that ".... one important function of social
) support is to provide an independent confirmation of the individuals
own appraisal of (or contact with) the physical and social world when 
the. other group members supply anomalous information" (p.50).
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Allan and Levine (1971) tested the hypothesis that social support 
would only be successful in reducing conformity if it was perceived as 
valid and hence a legitimate assessment of reality than when social 
support was invalid. Naive subjects were required to make a number of 
judgements concerning visual, informational and attitudinal items on a 
Crutchfield Apparatus. Before responding, subjects were informed of 
the bogus responses of four other subjects which were incorrect on 
some of the trials. The experiment was designed so that the fourth 
bogus response (that is, the one before the naive subject responded) 
dissented from the erronous majority and gave the correct/popular 
response. Therefore subjects were led to believe that they were 
responding last in a group of five and that the person responding 
before them did not conform to the erronous majority.
In one condition the confederate who provided social support "....
entered the research room wearing eyeglasses with extremely thick 
lenses that distorted the wearer's eyes, and gave the impression of 
severly limited visual" ability" (p.52). The confederate reinforced / 
the impression of a limited visual ability by failing to read a sign 
on the wall. Even so the experimenter stated that the person could
still participate and that he could " answer any way you want;
randomly maybe". It was thus made quite clear that this person's 
answers were not valid (invalid social support condition). In another 
condition the same confederate gave social support but did not wear 
glasses and appeared to have normal vision (valid social support 
condition).
They found that both social support conditions (valid and invalid) 
reduced conformity compared to the unanimous condition (that is, with 
no social support). However, the valid social support reduced
20
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conformity significantly mors than did ths invalid social support
.jT -
Which confirmed the main hypothesis of the experiment. The findings 
were consistent across the three types of judgements (visual, 
informational and attitudinal) which seems surprising as the factor 
affecting validity of judgement only concerned vision and therefore 
one would not expect the validity of informational or attitudinal 
issues to be affected. However, as the experimenters noted, 
informational and attitudinal items were projected onto a screen and 
therefore would need visual acuity to understand them.
1.4 Conformity and Culture
Since conformity is a social phenomenon then one would expect it to be 
affected by the culture in which individuals live. An interesting 
series of experiments which has examined the effects of culture on 
conformity has been conducted by Milgram (1961).
1.4.1 Ths work of Stanley Milgram
: -- ' ■ /
In a series of experiments Milgram compared.the levels of conformity 
between French and Norwegian students. In a modified Asch paradigm, 
(2) subjects were presented with two acoustic - tones and were required to
indicate which tone was the longest in duration. Before the naive 
subject responded he heard the responses of five confederates who gave 
a wrong answer on 16 out of 30 trials. Milgram found that the 
Norwegian subjects conformed to the erroneous majority on 62% of the 
critical trials while the French subjects conformed on 50% of the 
critical trials, this difference being significant. At first sight 
these rates of conformity seem unusually high (note Asch found 
conformity rate of 36%); however, the lack of a control condition.
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where subjects respond in the absence of a majority, does not give a 
baseline response to which the experimental conditions can be 
compared.
Milgram then employed two clever manipulations designed to either 
increase or decrease lav el of conformity. In one experiment the
subjects were told that the results would be ".... applied to the
design of aircraft safety signals" (p.48), thus leading subjects to 
believe that their responses would have implications for the safety of 
others. Milgram predicted that individuals would be less likely to 
conform to an erroneous majority when they believed that the 
consequence of their response was important. His prediction was 
confirmed; conformity decreased but Norwegians (56%) still conformed 
more than the French (48%).
In another experiment the naive subject was criticised by the majority 
when he gave a different response. The Norwegian subjects were told
that "Skal du stikke deg ut?" (are you trying to show off?), while the
/
French subjects were told "Voulez-vous vous faire démarquer?". As 
predicted, criticism from the majority, increased conformity but the 
national difference persisted (Norwegians 75%, French 59%). It should 
be noted that the Norwegian and French subjects received different 
statements which may not be entirely equivalent. "
In all the experiments reported by Milgram the Norwegian subjects 
conformed more than the French subjects. This difference is unlikely 
to be due to an unrepresentative sampling procedure because Milgram 
went to great lengths to obtain subjects from each region of each 
country. Furthermore, the results are unlikely to be limited to the 
use of students as subjects since Milgram found that 40 Norwegian
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industrial workers responded similarly to the Norwegian students.
Milgram suggests that the results may be due to cultural differences 
between the two countries. He states that "Norwegians have a deep 
feeling of group identification, and they are strongly attuned to the
needs and interests of those around them .... it would not be
surprising to find that social cohesiveness of this sort does go hand 
in hand with a high degree of conformity" (p.51). While ths French
show " .... far less consensus in both social and political life
  the high value placed on critical judgement often seems to go
beyond reasonable bounds; this in itself could account for the 
Q  comparatively low degree of conformity we found in the French" (p.51).
O
1.4.2 Comparison of Results Across Time
Other evidence claiming a cultural effect on the conformity process 
has been reported by Larsen (1974). In an experimental replication of 
Asch and using American subjects he found a conformity rate of only 
19.8% compared to Asch (1956) 36.7%. Larsen claims that the
 ^ difference is due to the fact that when Asch conducted his experiments
during ths 1950's "McCarthyism was active, a period known for its
unobtrusive students" (p.363). In other words, Larsen claims that 
subjects in the Asch experiments (1950*s) experienced a culture which 
emphasised conformity behaviour to a greater extent then did those in 
his own experiment (early 1970*s). Further research added more weight 
to his argument. Larsen et al. (1979) found that after the Vietnam 
war, when students became less politically active and concerned with 
preparing for a career, conformity rates were very similar to those 
found by Asch. Larsen assumes that the post-war Vietnam culture is
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)comparable to that of the 1950's in the extent to which it favoured 
conformity.
However, these results were not consistent with those of Perrin and 
Spencer (1981) who found that amongst British University students 
there was almost zero conformity on the Asch paradigm. In fact, only 
response out of 396 trials was in agreement with the erroneous 
majority. However, they found conformity similar to the level found 
by Asch when the subjects were probationers and the majority were 
probation officers or when the subjects were unemployed West Indian 
youths and the majority was their peers. This, Perrin and Spencer 
suggests, shows that conformity is due to ingroup cohesion where
individuals conform to a group they value so as to remain part of that
group.
Dorns and Van Avermaet (1981) criticize Perrin and Spencer by stating 
that a failure to replicate the Asch effect does not necessarily imply
the absence of conformity, it may be that the Asch paradigm is no
  _ /
longer suitable for investigations into conformity. They cite
evidence from their own research conducted between 1975/81 in Belgium
which employed a modified Asch paradigm which showed conformity levels
(2) similar to Asch, although some have argued that this 'modified'
paradigm is not comparable to the original Asch experiments (Spencer -
and Perrin, 1981 ).
O
1.4.3 Comparisons of USA and UK rates of conformity
Recently Nicholson, Cole and Rocklin (1985) have suggested two 
possible reasons why Perrin and Spencer found lower conformity amongst
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British subjects with the Asch paradigm. First, it could be due to 
historical différences (1950’s vs 1980's), that is a time effect, or 
second, cultural differences (UK vs USA subjects). To test these 
hypotheses,■British and American students took part in a replication 
of the Asch experiment. However, instead of showing the lines on a 
card (as Asch did) the lines were displayed on a television monitor 
and were half the size employed by Asch. This method, claimed the 
experimenters, is comparable to the Asch situation.
They found that there was no difference between the American and
British subjects (which disconfirms the cultural hypothesis). Also,
the conformity rate of the American and Brtish subjects (8.58%) was
^gnificantly lower than that found by Asch (36.7%) which confirms the
historical hypothesis. Finally, they claim that the conformity rate
displayed by the American~and~British subjects was significantly
greater than zero which is inconsistent with the results of Perrin and
Spencer who found zero conformity in their experiment (although it
engineering
should be noted _that their subjects were _ students who
presumably were experienced at estimating lengths of lines). The 
authors attempt to explain the latter finding by suggesting at the 
time the experiment took place in May, 1983, Britain was involved in 
the Falklands war which may have increased the feeling of cohesion and 
hence the rate of conformity compared to before the war when the 
Perrin and Spencer experiment took place.
The Nicholson et al. experiment can be criticised on at least three 
counts. First, Asch employed a majority consisting of 7~9 
confederates whilst the Nicholson et al. study only used three, hence 
differences in results could be due to differences in majority size 
(assuming that subjects will perceive more social 'units' as a
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Dfunction of majority size, see section 1.4.4). Second, Nicholson ^  
al. displayed the lines on a televison monitor whilst Asch used a 
piece of card. Although the mode of presentation may not have made a 
difference, Nicholson et al. halved the size of Asch's lines so they 
would fit onto a screen. Reducing the size of the lines also reduces 
2) the comparative differences between them and hence increases the
ambiguity. This is problematic as Asch had previously found that 
reducing the difference between the lines increased conformity.
2) Third, it is unclear in the Nicholson et al. study exactly what the
difference is between historical and cultural factors. I would argue 
that, to a certain extent, these concepts are interchangeble: thus,
2) Q  are historical differences not also cultural differences ?
O
1.4.4 Evaluation of Studies Investigating Culture and 
Conformity
In conclusion, these studies suggest that conformity can be affected 
by culture but they do not provide clear evidence to suggest a causal 
relationship, I would like to suggest that such a relationship would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate experimentally. 
Comparisons across experiments are problematic because variables, such 
as majority size, have not been held constant. Finally, it is dubious 
whether a cultural explanation of conformity would be of value from a 
heuristic point of view. It is worth noting that this body of 
research has not been integrated into a theoretical perspective. 
Presumably a cultural explanation of conformity would emphasize ths 
role of the social environment and be essentially sociological in 
nature. Without dismissing the importance of such a perspective, this 
does not answer the basic psychological question of why people conform
26
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and through what processes
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CHAPTER 2 : MINORITY TNFLUENCE - THE PROCESS OF INNOVATION
2.1 From Conformity to Innovation
)
The first chapter considered how majorities have influence through the 
process of conformity. In this chapter I will discuss how minorities 
) Q  can have influence through the process of innovât ion. Nearly all the
research conducted into social influence during the 1950's and 1960's 
had focused on conformity (Allen,1965), that is, how the majority 
2 influences the individual. Such a perspective characterises influence
processes as being unilateral in nature (that is, always flowing from 
the majority to the individual). This perspective forms the basis of 
2 the Functionalist approach which utilizes the concept of dependency as
the only cause of influence, individuals being seen as dependent upon 
the majority for information to evaluate their own opinions and/or for 
2 the psychological benefits others can supply (see section 1.2.1).
In the Functionalist model deviancy is seen as dysfunctional and the 
2 aim of social influence processes is seen as getting deviants to agree
with the majority. If this cannot be achieved then the deviant will 
be expelled from the group or ignored. Implicit in this system is 
2 that the majority norm always persists. But are norms consistent over
time or are they continually changing ? The answer to this question 
is, of course, partially subjective although most people would 
\ recognise that accepted attitudes have changed over time, for example.
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consider ths difference between pre-war and present day attitudes 
towards pre-marital sex.
Moscovici and his colleagues were the first to recognise the 
limitations of the Functionalist approach (Moscovici, Lags and 
Naffrechoux,1969; Moscovici and Fauchoux,1972; Moscovici,1976). They 
refer to this earlier research as having a 'conformity bias' which 
fails to consider whether the individual (or minority) can influence 
the majority. As an alternative to the Functionalist model, Moscovici 
has proposed a Genetic model which suggests that both a minority and a 
majority enjoy a reciprocal influence relationship. The Genetic model 
thus envisages social influence processes as being bilateral in 
nature.
The theoretical differences between the Functionalist and Genetic 
models will be expanded upon later in chapter 3. At this stage it is 
important to examine what each model proposes as the source of 
minority influence. Although, in principle, minority influence is not 
possible in terms of the Functionalist model, an explanation has been 
proposed by Hollander (see below section 2.2.21).
2.2 Sources of Minority Influence
2.2.1 Behavioural Style as a Source of Minority Influence
If a minority can influence the majority its source of influence is 
unlikely to be the dependency of the recipients of the influence 
attempts, as, by definition, the minority lacks many of the attributes 
necessary to exert pressures towards conformity (for example, power.
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status, size). As an alternative, Moscovici et al. (1969) have 
suggested that a minority's influence is rooted in its behavioural
style which refers to the ".... way in which the behaviour is
organized and presented .... to provoke the acceptance or rejection
of a judgement ....  the fact that it maintains a well defined point
of view and develops it in a coherent manner" (p.366).
A key aspect of behavioral style is consistency, "By insisting on [an] 
answer" suggest Moscovici et al. "a minority will not only engender a 
conflict, but will intensify the conflict, because it poses its own 
judgments and opinions as having the same value, as being equivalent 
CD to those of the majority" (p.367). By being consistent the minority
becomes 'visible' in the group and blocks group locomotion 
(Festinger,1950), thus creating two types of conflict: one cognitive 
(from an increase in response diversity) and the other social (from 
the threatened interpersonal relations in ths group). The outcome of 
this conflict is to make the majority question and then possibly 
reject its own position and infer that the minority is correct.
O
Moscovici has often drawn upon historical figures to back up his 
) ^  theory, for example, individuals such as Galileo, Hitler, Marx, Freud
or Jesus all espoused positions which were considered deviant at the 
time but subsequently had profound influence. As the Genetic model 
suggests the key to their influence may have been due to the fact that 
they consistently stuck to their position even when physically abused. 
One wonders if they would have had as much influence if they had 
sometimes suggested that they might have been wrong.
2.2.11 Early Studies of Minority Influence
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In the development of research into minority influence two researchers 
have played a prominent role namely, Serge Moscovici and Charlan 
Nemeth. In this section we shall examine some of their early 
experiments which laid the foundation for future research.
2.2.111 The Work of Serge Moscovici
)
We have already considered the contribution Moscovici has made in 
turning attention away from the study of majorities to the study of 
) O minorities. In this section we will examine some of the empirical
research he has conducted to support his position. The Moscovici ^
al. (1969) experiment is often cited as the first study of minority 
) influence but in fact this accolade is held by an earlier study by
Faucheux and Moscovici (1967). This experiment has almost been 'lost' 
in the research literature and is rarely quoted (probably because it 
) was writen in French, although it is translated into English in
Moscovici and Faucheux,1972). Some attention will be given to this 
experiment because it demonstrates an important point.
Faucheux and Moscovici showed subjects a series of drawings which 
varied on four dimensions (size, colour, shape and line). They were 
then shown a series of 64 drawings and they were told that while for 
each drawing there would be four possible answers (as there were four 
dimensions) they were required to give the answer which was most 
appropriate for that particular drawing. Groups of four or five 
subjects gave their answers orally and also wrote them on a piece of 
paper. In the experimental groups a confederate always gave the 
'colour' answer. Since there were 64 trials with four possible
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answers one would expect that if the subjects were responding at 
random then each response should be selected 25% of the time (in this 
case 16 trials). In the control condition, when no confederate was 
present, the number of ’colour’ responses was 15.28 which is close to 
the expected figure if subjects respond randomly. However, in the 
experimental conditions, where a confederate always responded 
’colour’, the number of ’colour* responses by the subjects was 20.89 
which is significantly higher than in the control condition.
The point I would like to raise concerning this experiment is whether 
or not it constitutes a study of minority influence. Since the 
subjects were informed that all four responses were correct (and the 
task was not ambiguous) then they may not have believed that the 
confederate was holding an anti-normative position and therefore being 
deviant. A further, problemtjhat with a a total of only 14 subjects 
(8 in the experimental groups and 6 in the control groups) statistical 
testing becomes difficult.
One of the first experiments to quite definitely demonstrate that a 
minority can influence a majority was conducted by Moscovici, Lage and 
Naffrechoux (1969). They presented to a group of six female subjects 
slides which were objectively blue and only differed in their light 
intensities. The subjects were required to report aloud the colour Of 
the slide (either blue or green) and an estimate of its light 
intensity on a five point scale. Under these conditions subjects gave 
only 0.25% ’green’ responses to the slides, thus showing that nearly 
everyone saw the slides as blue. However when the group contained 
two confederates (a minority) who were instructed to respond ’green’ 
to every slide, the naive subjects gave 8.42% ’green’ responses which 
was significantly higher than the control condition (no confederates).
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oIn another condition, the confederates were inconsistent, that is, 
they responded 'green' to 24 slides and 'blue' to 12 slides (in a 
randomized order). Naive subjects under these conditions gave 1.25% 
'green' responses which was not significantly different from the 
control condition. The experimenters claim that these results show 
that a minority can influence a majority and that it is a consistent 
minority which is influential; when inconsistent the minority exerted 
no influence.
2.2.112 The work of Charlan Nemeth
The experiments by Moscovici et al. were important in demonstrating 
that it is the maintenance of the minority's position which helps it 
to exert influence. They concluded that it is the minority's 
consistent behaviour which causes a conflict within the majority 
because it portrays its own judgements as being equivalent in value to 
that of the majority's. However the idea of maintenance of position 
appears to be more subtle than mere repetition of responses. Nemeth, 
Swedland and Kanki (1974) have suggested that it is not the repetition 
Psr se which allows the minority to be influential, rather it is the 
O perception that the minority has a position of which it is convinced.
They hypothesized that this perception of the minority's position 
should not be dependent upon the minority being repetitive but by it 
creating a consistent pattern of judgements.
To test these ideas Nemeth et al. employed a similar paradigm as did 
Moscovici et al. (discussed above in section2,2.111). except that they 
used male subjects. In some of the conditions the confederates were 
not repetitive in their responses but said 'green' on 50% of the
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trials and ’blue’ on ths other 50/S of ths trials. In one condition 
this was randomized (random condition), in two other conditions the 
responses were patterned according to the brightness of the slides, 
that is either 50/S 'blue' to the lighter slides or 50^ 'blue-green' to 
the darker slides or vice versa (correlated conditions). They found 
that the correlated conditions produced the most influence and that 
they were significantly more effective than a 100% 'green' response 
(consistent minority). Furthermore this result was significantly 
different from the control condition (no confederates). This suggests 
that it is the patterning of judgements which may be the basis of
minority influence. The experimenters concluded that ".... the
minority must be seen as having a position in which they believe, one 
of which they are firmly convinced. It is such attributions which 
cause the majority to focus on the minority position, to question 
their own majority position" (p.61).
The results-of the Nemeth et al. experiment, at first sight, seem to 
be contradicting those of the Moscovici et al. experiment since the 
latter study found no effect for an inconsistent minority while the 
former did. However, the confederates in Moscovici's inconsistent 
) ^ 2^  condition gave their responses in a randomized order; had they
patterened their responses as in the Nemeth experiment, they might 
have been influential.
O
2.2.12 From Conflict to Attribution
While Moscovici et al. stressed the role of conflict in causing 
minority influence, Nemeth et al. have emphasised the attributional 
consequences of behavioural style. The synthesis of these ideas was
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achieved in a paper they jointly authored (Moscovici and Nemeth,1974). 
In this paper the definition of behavioural style has changed to take 
into account the role of attribution behavioural styles are a
purposeful arrangement of verbal and/or nonverbal signals which 
furnish information about the internal state and the intentions of the 
person who displays them" (p.234). Since a minority is, by 
definition, distinctive (in the sensed that it holds anti-normative 
views) these signals should result in inferences concerning personal 
causation (Kelley,1967). In other words individuals will infer that
the minority is ".... operating from their own belief system or
peculiar personality" (p.243).
The above definition of behavioural style suggests that there may be 
several important individual behavioural styles but the one which 
appears to be the most important and has received the most attention 
is consistency. Consistency does not imply the mere repetition of 
responses but the patterning of responses to cause the majority to
infer that the minority is certain and sure of its position. In fact,
. /
response repetition may lead to attributions of dogmatism which may 
block social influence processes. -
2.2.121 Non-Verbal Behaviour as a Behavioural Style
One important aspect of the definition provided by Moscovici and 
Nemeth is the inclusion of non-verbal signals as a potential 
individual behavioural style. To my knowledge only one experiment has 
investigated the effects of non-verbal cues on minority influence.
This experiment was conducted by Nemeth and Wachtler (1973) and 
examined the non-verbal cues associated with seating arrangements. In
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this experiment five male subjects sat around a table and acted as a 
jury. They were given a summary of a case to read concerning a person 
who was suing an insurance company for injuries caused while at work. 
The facts of the case were weighted so as to encourage subjects to 
award high compensation to the individual. In fact, when subjects 
were alone they awarded on average $14,500 (the maximum allowed by law 
was $25,000). In the experimental groups, one of the five subjects 
was a confederate who consistently advocated that the individual 
should receive only $3,000 compensation which was much lower than the 
normative award and therefore can be considered to be a minority 
position.
Previous research on jury trials has shown that seating position can 
affect an individual's ability to exert influence. It has often been 
found that the person who sits at the head of a rectangular table 
talks the most and exerts the most influence (presumably because they 
are perceived as leaders). Nemeth and Wachtler reasoned that, if a 
person was seen to choose to sit in the head seat he or she will be 
perceived as being.more confident and have more influence than someone 
who did not choose the head seat but was assigned to it. The 
(2) difference between these two conditions is that in the former the
confederate is seen to want to sit in the head seat (chosen head seat 
condition), in the latter it is a chance happening (assigned head seat 
condition). Nemeth and Wachtler stress the importance of the 
non-verbal cue of being seen to choose the head seat as contributing 
to the confederate's behavioural style. i
The results confirmed their hypotheses; the confederate only 
influenced the subjects when he choose the head seat; when he was 
assigned to the head seat there was no difference from the control
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condition (no confederate present). They also found, in a subsequent 
experiment using the same jurors, that naive subjects who had been in 
the chosen head seat condition gave a smaller compensation than those 
naive subjects in the assigned head seat condition. This shows that 
the influence exerted by the confederate in the chosen head seat 
condition generalized to a similar jury case in which no confederate 
was present.
The results of the post-experimental questionnaire gives a good 
account of how the subjects perceived the confederate. The 
confederate, irrespective of condition, was seen as more consistent, 
independent, active, central, strong-willed, as a leader and more 
confident than the naive subject. However, the confederate was seen 
as less reasonable, fair, perceptive, warm, cooperative, liked, 
admired and wanted as the naive subject. Although the confederate was 
seen as confident and committed they were not liked or admired by the 
subjects. Finally, the confederates who chose : the head seat were 
seen as more confident than the confederate who was assigned the head 
seat demonstrating the effect the non-verbal behaviour had on the 
perceived behavioural styles.
2.2.13 Behavioural Styles and Negotiating Styles
The research considered in this chapter so far strongly suggests that 
the source of minority influence is located in its ability to cause 
the majority to attribute a consistent behavioural style. Since 
minorities are often rejected by the majority (because they are viewed 
as deviant) the minority has to negotiate its influence, that is, 
influence does not occur straight away but over time. There is
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evidence that minorities have more influence on later trials than on
■<
earlier ones (for example, Nemeth et al.,1974). The concept of 
negotiation also suggests that the image of the minority is an 
important factor in determining the attributions made (by the 
majority) and hence the resulting influence. This last point forms 
the core of chapter 4.
The experiment by Nemeth et al. (1974) considered in section 2.2.112 
demonstrated that a patterning style of responding, where influence is 
not dogmatic but allows other responses to be considered, can be mors 
effective than mere repetition. This is likely to be so because a 
patterning or negotiating style, while maintaining confidence and 
certainty, allows the target of influence 'room to breathe'.
2.2.131 The Work of Gabriel Mugny
Mugny was one of the first psychologists to recognise the importance /'
/
of the concept of negotiation to the process of minority influence by 
making a theoretical distinction between negotiating and behavioural 
style. Mugny (1975) reasoned that "..... there is a dichotomy in the 
behaviour involved in interaction. There is the behaviour which the 
minority adopts in relation to the 'majority norm' and there is the 
behaviour which it adopts with respect to the 'population' which it 
wishes to influence" (p.210). Mugny proposes two styles of 
negotiation. A rigid style is one in which "..... its demands go 
beyond the bounds of possible acceptance by the population, a style 
which refuses to compromise on any point whatsoever" (p.211). A 
negotiating (referred to in later papers as a flexible or fair style) 
is one which "..... is more flexible and adapts to the population.
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accepting certain compromises" (p.211),
Mugny reasons that, if consistency is held constant, then one would 
expect a flexible style to have more influence than a rigid style 
because the latter blocks the process of negotiation due to its 
refusal to accept compromise. In Mugny's experiment, subjects 
completed a questionnaire concerning the Swiss army before and after 
hearing a talk by a person who portrayed an extreme ant-militarist 
position (the minority). The negotiation variable was manipulated by 
delivering sentences which contained the same information in slightly 
different ways. For example, a rigid minority would state "..... we 
think that means such as 'conscientious objection' are false, 
personal,'petit-bourgeois' and quasi-reactionary. As we have said 
before, we think that it is necessary to fight the army from within"
(p.217). The flexible minority would state " we think that
conscientious objection which is collective and organized is a good 
and valuable way of fighting the army. I simply wanted to say that we 
also think it important to contend against the army from the inside" 
(p.217). As predicted the results showed that the flexible minority 
had more influence than the rigid minority (in fact, the latter had a 
slightly negative effect).
After the experiment the subjects were given a list of 40 adjectives 
which were grouped into four categories ('consistent', 'inconsistent', 
'flexible' and 'rigid') and were asked to tick each adjective which 
applied to the source of influence. The results showed that there was 
no difference in the number of 'consistency' and 'inconsistency' 
adjectives chosen for flexible and rigid minorities. However, the 
flexible minority received more 'flexible' adjectives than the rigid 
minority while there was no difference on the 'rigid' adjectives.
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Although the value of a theoretical distinction between negotiating 
styles can
and behavioural .be recognised, it could be argued that the
two concepts are not mutually exclusive and that it is difficult, if 
not impossible in. practice, to hold one constant while varying the 
other. Mugny would argue that he held consistency constant by the 
fact that there was no difference between the rigid and flexible 
minorities on the number of ’consistency* and 'inconsistency* 
adjectives chosen. However, this argument should be treated with 
caution as the number of adjectives chosen may be a poor indicator of 
how the subjects perceived the image of the source of influence, 
especially if one considers the well known 'halo-effect'.
T 2.2.2 Dependency as a Source of Minority Influence
2.2.21 Hollander's Theory of 'Idiosyncrasy Credits*
Hollander ( 1958l,.1964) proposes a two stage process by which an •'
individual can influence the group. First, the individual must 
conform to group expectations in order to achieve "idiosyncrasy
credits" which Hollander (1958) defines as "....  an accumulation of
positively disposed impressions residing in the perceptions of 
relevant others; it is defined operationally in terms of the degree to 
which an individual may deviate from the common expectancies of the 
group" (p.120). Credits are also by displaying competence and
assisting the group in achieving its goals (similar to Festinger's 
concept of group locomotion). Sacond, when enough credits have been 
accumulated the individual is then in a position to deviate 
successfully and influence group members. In short the theory states 
that, having first conformed to the group, the individual acquires
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oenough positive impressions (that is, credits) to allow him/her to 
deviate successfully from the group. Such an explanation is, of 
course, couched in terms of conformity and dependency (note that there 
is a similarity between Hollander's and Levine's analysis of minority 
influence, see section 3.2.14) .
Hollander (I960) claims some experimental evidence in favour of his 
position. In his experiment five subjects were given a 7x7 matrix 
which contained various payoff rewards. The subjects were required to 
choose a row which gave the highest pay-off in conjunction with the 
column chosen by the experimenter. Since the subjects did not know 
the column the experimenter would choose before they made their row 
choice, the level of pay-off was largely random. One of the subjects 
was, in fact, a confederate who deviated from the group either before 
« . trial 1, 6 or 11 (there were 15 trials). Whichever row the
confederate picked, the experimenter would choose the column which 
gave the maximum payoff. Therefore subjects were exposed to 
successful non-conformity (in that the deviant's row choice received 
the highest possible payoff) either from the beginning, middle or end 
of the experiment. Before the confederate deviated, he gave the 
typical group response (based on previous responses). As predicted, 
(2) Hollander found that the longer the confederate waited to deviate (and
hence the more credits he or she had accumulated by first conforming " 
to the group) the greater was his or her influence.
Wahrman and Pugh (1972) have noted a number of problems in the 
Hollander study, the most important of which is the apparent 
confounding of the duration of conformity by the duration of 
non-conformity. Hollander controlled the length of non-conformity to 
0, 5 or 10 trials, but, since the experiment ended after 15 trials.
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the length of conformity varied, that is 15, 10 or 0 trials
respectively. In a partial replication of Hollander's study, Wahrman 
(1972)
and Pugh/found that subjects were strongly influenced by
non-conformity which was ".... greater than, or at least equal to,
the influence exercised by confederates who delayed non-conformity 
while contributing competent behaviour to the group's joint effort"
(p.3 8 0). In other words, deviating from the beginning was mors 
influential than first conforming to the group (and acquiring credits) 
followed by deviating.
Wahrman and Pugh suggest that the difference in results between their
own study and that conducted by Hollander, could be due to the use of
different subject populations. While Wahrman and Pugh used "liberal
arts majors", Hollander employed engineers who may have been more
, . stimulated by the matrix since their studies involve more mathematical
knowledge than that of arts courses. Wahrman and Pugh claim that this
difference may have led subjects to view the experiment in different
ways, with the effect that their own subjects may have "....
)   -
surrendered from the beginning any thought that they would master the
matrix and were willing to accept the influence of anyone who thought
he had half a chance" (p.384). On the other hand, Wahrman and Pugh
)
(2) suggest that Hollander's subjects may have "..... resented the early
confederate's behaviour and given that they had greater 
self-confidence decided to show him that they could get along without
)
his suggestions" (p.384).
2.3 Experiments Comparing Behavioural Styles Versus 
Dependency as Sources of Minority Influence
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2.3.1 Early Versus Late Non-conformity
According to Hollander's theory a minority must first conform to the 
group before it can successfully deviate from that group and influence 
the group members. In contrast, Moscovici has suggested that early 
conformity to the group is not a prerequisite for successful minority 
influence; in fact, minorities tend to be more successful the earlier 
they begin non-conforming (note that the Wahrman and Pugh experiment • 
considered in the last section supports Moscovici's prediction). It 
is quite clear that there is a difference in predictions; Hollander 
predicts that minority influence will be greater with late 
non-conformity (which follows initial conformity) while Moscovici 
advocates early non-conformity as the most successful strategy.
Bray, Johnson and Chilstrom (1982) have tested these different 
predictions. In their experiment groups of four male college students 
were required to come to a unanimous agreement on four separate 
problems. The problems were very different; the first problem 
concerned whether the University should remove the health fee and make 
students pay for each visit to the health clinic, the second problem 
was a complex word puzzle which required subjects to calculate the 
number of sexual contacts in a hypothetical group; the third problem 
was about reducing the frequency of publishing the campus newspaper; 
and, finally, the fourth problem concerned stopping the University 
providing students with free tickets to athletic events. The first,
third and fourth problems were opinion items and subjective in nature
'
while the second problem had a correct answer.
Out of the group of four subjects one was a confederate who argued a 
minority position (the confederate always spoke last). The
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confederate either initially conformed to the group decisions on the 
first and third problems and then deviated on the fourth (the 
Hollander strategy) or he deviated on the first, third and fourth 
problems (the Moscovici strategy). Influence was measured by the 
extent subjects agreed with the confederate on the fourth problem. 
Another variable the experimenters were interested in was competence, 
this was manipulated by the confederate either solving or not solving 
the word puzzle in problem two.
The results showed that the Hollander strategy had more influence than 
the Moscovici strategy. Surprisingly, there was no main effect for 
(2) competence. However, it was found that the Hollander strategy was
more effective when the confederate was competent than when he was not 
competent.
The experimenters noted a number of problems in their design. They 
point out that using a minority of one may have led subjects to 
attribute the minority's behaviour to some idiosyncrasy (for example, 
a bias). There is a lot of evidence which suggests that there is an 
initial desire to attribute deviant behaviours to internal causes.
 ^^  Also, in Moscovici's experiments the confederates spoke first and
fourth in the group and not last as they did in the Bray et al. 
experiment. In an attempt to overcome these problems Bray et al. 
conducted a second experiment which used a similar procedure as the 
first experiment, except that the group contained six individuals, two 
of which were confederates who spoke in the first and fourth positions 
(this is the same set up as in the Moscovici et al. experiment 
considered in section 2.2.111). A further difference from the first 
experiment was that the experimenters employed groups of male and 
female subjects.
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oThe results of the second experiment were very interesting. They 
found that males were more influenced than females. Also, the 
Hollander strategy was mors effective than the Moscovici strategy but 
the difference was not very strong (P<0.08). Furthermore, the 
difference between the strategies was significant for males but not 
for females. The experimenters’ explanation for this sex difference .
- was that the female confederates may have had a "less assertive style" 
(p.8 7 ). In other words, females might have been influenced less than 
males because the female confederates did not display an assertive 
behavioural style.
Although Bray et al. found the Hollander strategy to have more 
influence it does not mean that the Moscovici strategy has no effect,
< • as they point out ".... comparisons showed that both the Hollander
and Moscovici models influenced subjects’ opinions significantly 
, relative to control individuals who did not receive any influence
attempt" (p.8 7 ). /
) . . . ~ - /
To summarize, initial evidence by Hollander (I960) supported the 
dependency perspective. However, a partial replication by Wahrman and
) (2) Pugh (1972), discussed in section 2.2.21, found early non-conformity
lead to more influnce than late non-conformity - the opposite to 
Hollander! A recent experiment by Bray et al. (1982) which compared
)
both strategies found more evidence for a Hollander strategy but could 
not rule out the Moscovici strategy. It appears that evidence in this 
area is mixed and does not exclusively support any one perspective.
)
Whilst a number of researchers have compared Hollander’s theory with 
that of behavioural styles, Moscovici (1985) has raised serious doubts 
over such a comparison: "Hollander’s hypotheses are concerned with
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leadership and not with minorities; they deal with innovation from the 
point of view of authority., This is not the case with our hypotheses. 
Therefore the two are not, as they have been represented, alternative 
models of minority influence" (p.39)
2 .3 . 2  Behavioural Style Versus Cohesion
 ^ It was noted earlier that the Functionalist model was unable to
account for minority influence because this would require the unusual 
situation of a majority being dependent upon the minority (see section 
 ^(2) 2.1). However, Wolf (1979) has attempted to explain minority
influence in terms of dependency by claiming that it is possible to 
view both the majority and the minority as being dependent upon the 
 ^ group itself since "..... the group satisfies certain needs or to the
extent that members desire to remain in the group" (p.382).
This explanation is similar to Festinger’s concept of ’pressures 
towards uniformity’ except that individuals are dependent upon the 
group rather than the source of influence. The prediction is that
minority influence will ".... vary with the magnitude of the members’
dependence not upon the influence agent but upon the group as a whole" 
(p.3 8 2). This places importance upon group variables, such as^ 
cohesion and group membership as determining factors, rather than 
factors, such as behavioural style pertaining to the source of 
influence.
= , . ■ I
Wolf (1979) tested the prediction that a deviant would have more
influence when it was in a high cohesive group than when in a low
cohesive group (the implication being that cohesion increases group
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dependency). In her experiment, four female subjects were led to 
believe that they were interacting as a jury and that their task was 
 ^ to decide upon the compensation to be awarded to a plaintiff in a
civil suit. The facts of the case were weighted so as to encourage
th® subjects to award between 20,000 and 30,000 dollars. The
) , ■  ^: 
subjects, after hearing the case, wrote down the amount of
compensation they wanted to award on a note. To simulate
deliberation, the notes were shown to each member of the jury, there
 ^ were four rounds of note taking. In fact, the experimenters arranged
for each subject to receive notes which stated a compensation sum
linked to the subject’s own judgement; one note stated 3,000 dollars
 ^ O  more and one 2,000 dollars less than the subjects own judgement. The
fourth note was that of the deviate who always advocated an award of
3.000 dollars throughout the experiment. Therefore subjects were led 
 ^ to believe that they were members of a majority whose awards differed
by only 5,000 dollars whilst a deviate always maintained an award of
3.000 dollars.
) O
Three variables were manipulated. The possibility of rejection 
manipulation was achieved by informing subjects that the experimenters 
wanted to compare the deliberations of four-membered and 
three-membered juries. The elimination of the individual would either 
be by a random procedure (no posssibility condition) or by a group 
vote (possibility condition). Cohesion was manipulated by giving 
subjects false feedback from ’liking’ scores they had made of each 
other before the experiment. Consistency was manipulated on the 
fourth note by the deviate juror ending with "I still think that 3,000 
dollars is the fairest judgement’’ (high consistency) or with ’’I 
thought 3000 dollars was the fairest judgement, but now I’m not so 
sure’’ (low consistency).
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The results showed that the subjects in the high cohesive conditions 
reduced their rewards in the direction of the source of influence to a 
greater extent than subjects in the low cohesive conditions. The 
greatest influence was found in the high cohesive/ high consistency/ 
no possibility the high cohesive/ low consistency/ possibility 
conditions. Furthermore, the results were paralleled on four measures 
of latent influence which examined the cognitive-perceptual effects of 
the minority on the subjects judgements. It can be noted that the 
Genetic model would make a different set of predictions, a main effect 
would be expected for consistency and also a consistency/ possibility of 
rejection interaction since consistent behaviour, with the possibility 
of rejection, would increase the attributions of confidence and 
commitment. No main effect would be expected for group cohesiveness 
since the behavioural style of the deviate member was identical in 
each condition.
Wolf concluded that her findings could be interpretated in terms of a 
dependence model derived from Festinger's (1950) analysis of social 
groups. However, implicit in Festinger's model is that pressures 
towards uniformity are always resolved in the direction of the 
minority. Deviant members are forced to either adopt the majority 
position or be expelled from the group. Wolf argues for a third 
option, the majority moving towards the minority position.
Wolf provides an interesting idea of how dependency can cause minority 
influence although such a position creates many conceptual problems.
It may be true that in some situations dependency may be a causal 
factor, especially when such factors as cohesion and group membership 
are salient. For example, when group membership is so highly valued
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othat any influence is accepted in order to retain membership of the 
desired group. However, there is a problem of both experimentally and 
theoretically differentiating between dependency and behavioural 
style. It is important to note that it is the interpretation of 
behavioural styles which is crucial; therefore, why shouldn’t the 
lev3l of cohesion in a group or group membership affect the perceived 
behavioural styles ?
2.3.3 Behavioural Style Vs Status Characteristics
 ^(2) A paper published in the Social Psychological Quarterly by Lee and
Ofshe (1981 ) has stimulated a lively debate. Upon closer examination, 
the experiment reveals that it provides a comparison between 
) behavioural style and status as causal factors in social influence
processes (although it should be,noted that minorities usually lack 
status). This experiment will be considered in some detail as it 
) considers an explanation of minority influence which has not been
proposed before.
In the experiment Lee and Ofshe attempted to test two theories which 
make different predictions concerning the nature of the causal factor 
which determines social influence. The first theory is referred to as
the Theory of Status Characteristics which states that ".... each of
the known or observable status characteristics by which members might
be distinguished (age, race, gender, and occupation) is associated
;
through prior learning with beliefs about differences and qualities of 
intelligence" (p.74). In other words, from experience individuals 
believe that there is a positive correlation between status and 
intelligence which "..... leads each member [of the group] to the
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conclusions that the solutions by the higher social status members are 
more likely to be correct" (p.74).
Note that the above theory has similarities with Hollander’s theory of 
’idiosyncrasy credits’ (see section 2.2.21). While Hollander states 
that an individual has to conform first in order to aquire such 
credits, the status characteristics theory explains how such credits , 
(at least status) lead to influence.
The second theory which Lee and Ofshe consider, is termed the
Two-Process Theory. This theory suggests that ".... when internal
cues are weak or unclear (for example, confidence is low) individuals’ 
behaviour is regulated through responses to stimuli present in the 
environment" (p.76). When the stimuli are other people, individuals 
are guided by the behaviour of others (similar to Festinger’s theory 
of Social Comparison). One factor which can affect this process is
demeanour since ’’.... an assertive display by one party causes a
deferential response in the other parties to the interaction ....
part of which is agreement to the substance of the assertive party’s 
argument" (p.77). In other words, having an assertive demeanour 
causes other individuals to imply that the person is sure of him or
(2) herself and acts as a guide for other people’s behaviour. This, of
course, is similar to Moscovici’s concept of behavioural style.
/
It is important to note that the status characteristics theory and the 
two-process theory are dependent upon individuals having a low 
confidence in their behaviour. However, it has been shown that 
minorities can influence individuals when they were initially 
confident of their position (consider the Moscovici et al. experiment 
in section 2.2.111).
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In Lea and Ofshe’s experiment, male and female subjects were required 
to read a description of a jury case and make a judgement concerning 
the amount of award they would give an injured person. They then 
viewed a videotape which showed three males discussing the case in 
which two of them argued for awards of at least 15,000 dollars whilst 
the third person argued for 2,000 dollars (these individuals were 
confederates of the experimenter). This case was the same as that 
employed by Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) in which the arguments were 
weighted to give a reward around the 15,000 dollar level. Therefore 
the person arguing for 2,000 dollars held an anti-normative position 
and was also numerically a minority.
The status variable was manipulated by displaying the occupation of 
the confederate on the video whenever they talked. Two sets of 
occupational labels were used reflecting differing degrees of status, 
for example, chemical engineer, draftsman and office boy. The 
demeanour variable was manipulated through changes in the minority 
individual’s non-verbal behaviour. Three levels of demeanour was 
employed; ’Deference - Demanding’ where the individual spoke with 
’’..... firm voice..... more loudly ..... few hesitations’’;
’Deferential’ where the individual ’’..... spoke more softly and slowly
..... greater hesitations pauses in speech .... frequently stumbled
over words ..... movements indicated nervousness’’, finally ’Neutral’
demeanour was ’’ intermediate rate and volume with an intermediate
number of hesitations’’ (p.78). The two individuals who always 
advocated 15,000 dollars always used the neutral demeanour. After •
viewing the video subjects made a second judgement concerning the 
award.
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)The experimenters found that occupational status had no effect on the 
minority’s ability to exert influence while demeanour did have an 
affect with the Defence-Demanding ' having significantly more 
influence than the Neutral and the Deferential. These findings led
the experimenters to conclude that ’’ status knowledge alone has
no significant effect on how much observers are influenced.
Variations in demeanour, however, significantly affect observers’ 
decisions" . This result is consistent with Moscovici’s analysis of 
minority influence.
A number of researchers have questioned Lee and Ofshe’s experiment 
which has led to heated controversy. Only the important criticisms 
will be considered in the following discussion. First, Greenstein 
(1981) has claimed that Lee and Ofshe have not met the conditions 
necessary to test the statics characteristics theory, namely, having 
subjects in "collectively - orientated groups" (note that subjects in 
• Lee and Ofshe’s experiment viewed a group discussion and did not take
part in one). Ofshe and Lee (1981) responded to this criticism by
—  ' /' 
stating that "To defend the theory, Greenstein must at least develop a
compelling argument that the manner in which status knowledge is
utilized is profoundly affected by the presence or absence of group
O orientation" (p.384). Second, Berger and Zelditch (1983) note that
part of the demeanour manipulation involved varying the confederates -
dress which might have affected the status variable. In other words,
variations in demeanor also varied status cues thus causing a
confounding between the two variables.
Third, both Berger and Zelditch (1983) and Nemeth (1983) have noted 
that the demeanour variable might have had more effect because it was 
more salient than the status variable. Also, there were other
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differences between the variables which might be able to account for 
the findings. Berger and Zelditch refer to status cues as being 
) ’indicative’ or implicit (that is, only an occupational label on the
screen) and to demeanour cues as ’expressive’ or explicit. In a 
similar vein, Nemeth refers to demeanour cues as being 
) multi-dimensional (that is, ranging over many variables, such as tone
of voice, dress) and to status cues as being uni-dimensional. Lee and 
Ofshe’s results could be due to either the ’overstacking’ of the 
) demeanour variable or other differences between the cues rather than
their theoretical significance. Ofshe and Lee (1983) counter this 
criticism by stating that the differences in cues reflected the 
) (2) salience of cues found in ’real life’. However, such an argument
ignores the basic rule of experimentation that whenever two variables
are being tested they should be equal in terms of salience and 
) expression.
Fourth, and perhaps the most important criticism, has been voiced by
) both Nemeth (1983) and Sherman (1983). These researchers have
questioned whether status and demeanour can be separated and whether 
inferences about status can be based on demeanour. It seems quits 
) reasonable to predict that high status individuals also have an
assertive demeanour.
The last criticism I would like to consider has not been noted by the 
researchers but has important implications for this thesis. It can be 
recalled that Lee and Ofshe used male and female subjects, therefore 
for the male subjects they always viewed a same sex minority but 
female subjects viewed a different sex minority. Such variation in 
group membership of the minority will be shown in chapter four to be 
very important in determining social influence. Umfortunately, Lee
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and Ofshe do not report any sex differences in their data.
2.4 The Hidden Impact of Minorities
When considering the impact of influencing attempts on attitude change 
it is often useful to make a distinction between change which occurs 
at the public level with that which occurs at the private level. In 
fact, it is possible to have any combination of change occuring at 
these two levels, that is public but not private, public and private, 
not public but private and neither public nor private. Obviously the 
last combination occurs when an individual totally resists influence 
and therefore no attitude change has occured (some researchers would 
refer to this as being independent). Kelman (1958) was one of the 
first psychologists to recognise the fact that influence can occur on 
these two levels and he has outlined three situations of attitude 
change. '
Kelman refers to public as opposed to private change as ’compliance’. 
Most people have experienced such a situation, for example, when 
people publicly agree with someone (often an authoritative figure) 
whilst retaining their true beliefs in private. Compliance is usually 
governed by the ability of the source of influence to either reward or 
punish the target of influence and this is therefore not a situation 
resulting from minority influence (as a minority usually lacks the 
ability to reward or punish). Kelman’s second situation is called 
’identification’ and this occurs when an individual publicly agrees
. '
with the group because he or she values the membership of that group, 
but private change is only temporary and dependent upon group 
membership. This a situation that can often be observed with groups
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of people who spend a long time together (for example, taking a 
college course) where a common belief system develops until the group 
parts. Identification is governed by the value individuals place upon 
being in the group. The third and final situation Kelman refers to is 
’internalization’ where attitude change has occured at the public and 
private level, in other words, a true permanent change has occured. 
Such a situation can be achieved by a minority but it would require an 
individual to agree publicly with a minority and risk being seen as 
’openly deviant’.
Kelman has outlined two of.the combinations of the public and private 
levels considered earlier; ’compliance’ - public but not private, 
’identification’ and ’internalization’ - public and private change 
(though private change is only temporary with identification). This 
leaves only one combination unaccounted, namely, not public but 
private change and, as we shall see, this is the combination which is 
the distinctive aspect of minority influence. Generally speaking, 
minorities tend to cause more private attitude change than public 
attitude change, in other words, minorities tend to have a hidden 
impact (cf. Maass and Clark,1984).
At this stage it is worth noting that the terms public/private have 
often been used interchangeably with manifest/latent. Although I will 
adopt this practice at the moment, it is important to note that they 
refer to different dimensions; public/private refers to the extent 
individuals are prepared for others to be aware of their response 
while manifest/latent refers to the ’depth’ of persuasion. These 
differences will be expanded upon later (see section 3.3.1).
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2.4.1 Evidence for the Hidden Impact of Minorities
) One of the first studies to demonstrate that minorities can have
influence upon a latent level was the Moscovici at al. (1969)
experiment considered in section 2.2.111. After the main part of the
 ^ sxperiment, the subjects were asked to take part in a second,
ostensibly unrelated, experiment (conducted by a different
experimenter), concerning the effects of training upon vision. The 
) subjects were shown 16 disks from the blue-green zone of the
Farnsworth Perception Test and asked, for each disk, to name the 
colour they saw. Three disks from each were unambiguous (that is,
) (2) they were clearly blue or green) while the other ten appeared
ambiguous. The experimenters found that subjects who had been exposed 
to a consistent minority in the earlier experiment, shifted their 
) perceptual threshold, that is, they called disks green that are
usually perceived as closer to blue. But interestingly, subjects who 
had not yielded to the minority were now more likely than those who 
 ^ so yield to call the disks green. This shows that the minority’s
influence went beyond the public level and changed their perceptual 
code (that is, a latent change).
)
O
Another group of experiments performed by Mugny demonstrates the 
ability of minorities to produce latent influence. Mugny (1982, 
experiment 3) required subjects to complete a questionnaire concerning 
pollution before and after reading a communication (the text) which 
was attributed to a minority source. Some of the items in the
questionnaire were referred to in the text and any change on these
■ ■ : !
items reflected ’direct influence’. However, some of the items in the 
questionnaire were not in the text but could be inferred from the 
position it portrayed; any change on these items would be ’indirect
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change’. Since indirect items are not related to the minority message 
 ^ any change would indicate a latent influence. Mugny found that on
direct items, flexible minorities had more influence than rigid 
minorities which is consistent with his earlier research which was 
y  considered in section 2.2.131. However, the same was not true on
indirect items, as on these items rigid minorities had the most 
influence. Furthermore the rigid minorities had more influence on 
) indirect items than either flexible or rigid minorities had on direct
items. The latter finding suggests that minorities can influence 
people’s attitudes on issues (or items) not explicitly linked to the 
) minority’s message but implicit in its position.
Comparisons between direct and indirect items are problematic because 
) different questionnaire items have been used and therefore any
differences might not be due to differences in direct or indirect 
influence but due to differences in the wording of the items. With 
) this limitation in mind, comparisons have nevertheless been worthwhile
because the predicted pattern has emerged from several studies across 
a number of different topics. Mugny explains his findings by 
) ^  suggesting that a rigid minority blocks negotiation (and hence it has
little direct influence) but influence is diverted onto indirect items 
where the link to the deviant minority is obscured.
O
■      ,
A number of different explanations have been advocated for the finding
that minority influence tends to be greater in private than in public. 
One such explanation is based on Festinger’s (1957) Theory of 
Cognitive Dissonance. According to this theory attitude change may
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follow involuntary counter-attitudinal public behaviour in an attempt 
to reduce dissonance. In other words, if individuals publicly espouse 
an attitude or engage in a behaviour they do not initially believe in, 
private change may occur in an attempt to reduce dissonance caused by 
an inconsistency between public and private beliefs or behaviours (or, 
^ as Festinger would call both these^  ’cognitions'). However, minority
influence tends to have little impact on the public level and 
therefore one would not expect a lot of dissonance to occur. Also,
^ minority influence has been found to cause attitude change at the
private level when subjects were not first required to make a public
rêé^'ons^^^^ example, Maass and Clark, 1983).
A second possible explanation for the hidden impact of minorities
could be based on the ’sleeper effect’. This is a pheneomenon first
'• observed with studies of communications, namely, that when a
communication is associated with a deviant source there is little 
immediate influence; however, over time, when the individual forgets
the deviant source of the communication, internalized attitude change'
) - ' / 
can occur. Such an explanation has not been rigourously tested but
there is some evidence that both a minority source and its message
 ^ tend to be remembered over time and not forgotten and this is
(3 therefore unlike the ’sleeper effect’ (Moscovici, Mugny and
Papastamou,1981 ).
,
A third suggested explanation has been reactance theory. According to 
this theory individuals may not be moving towards the minority but
reacting against, and hence moving away, from the majority. It is
)
therefore difficult to know whether the individuals are being 
influenced by the minority or moving away from the majority. Maass 
and Clark (1986) tested this hypothesis by exposing subjects either to
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Dthe simultaneous influence attempts of a minority and majority 
(minority present condition) or to the influence attempts of just a 
majority (minority absent condition). According to reactance theory 
the pattern of results should be the same in both conditions as 
subjects move away from the majority and the presence of the minority 
 ^ should have no effect. The results did not support the expectations
of reactance theory but supported the conversion explanation of 
minority influence which we shall be considering below.
As outlined in this section, the hidden impact of minorities 
phenomenon cannot be adequately explained by cognitive dissonance 
theory, sleeper effect or reactance theory. One explanation that does 
receive support has been proposed by Moscovici (1980) and is called 
conversion behaviour.
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CHAPTER 3 : MODELS OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE
3 3.1 Introduction to Chapter 3
In this chapter a number of theories are discussed which have 
3 (2) attempted to integrate research into majority influence (chapter 1)
with research into minority influence (chapter 2). During this 
discussion it will be neccesary to reconsider issues covered in 
3 earlier chapters. This is, to a certain extent, unavoidable but is
important because it then allows us to consider the suitability of 
these theories for explaining the effects of social categorization 
3 upon social influence. This task is done in the next chapter while
this chapter is devoted to theories of social influence processes.
^ The models of social influence can be divided according to whether
they advocate that minority and majority influence are caused by two 
separate processes (dual process model) or by the same process (single 
process model).
3.2 Models of Social Influence
3.2.1 Dual Process Models
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The main theory in this area has been proposed by Moscovici. (1976) 
which he calls the "Genetic^ model. Moscovici proposes that the 
source of both minority and majority influence is rooted in their 
behavioural styles, that is, the way in which they consistently stick 
to their position. Moscovici rejects the idea that dependency causes 
conformity, stating that it is usually a consequence rather than a
3
cause of the phenomenon. To support his arguments he cites evidence 
which suggests that consensus among the majority (that is, its 
behavioural style) is the most important factor in determining
D
conformity (see section 1.3.1). Moscovici (1976) gives two reasons 
why social influence processes are mediated by behavioural style 
rather than dependency "first of all because ..... behavioural style 
is specifically related to influence phenomena, whereas dependency is 
more closely linked with the power relations of social relations. 
Secondly, dependence upon an individual or a subgroup in the process 
of innovation may be a consequence of the influence process, rather 
than its cause" (p.110).
) -  ^ // 
How does behavioural style cause influence to occur ? In answering
this, Moscovici has drawn upon attribution theory and in particular
Kelley's (1967, 1973) model. Within Kelley's framework an individual
)
(22 can draw conclusions about an event from three sources of information;
consensus (similarity/agreement across individuals), consistency (how 
consistent/stable each individual's response is over time) and
)
distinctiveness (the extent to which individuals differ). When 
applying this to minority influence, it can be shown that, since the 
minority is perceived as distinctive (in that it is different from the
)
majority), their deviant behaviour will be attributed to the minority 
itself rather to an external cause. Furthermore the key element of 
behavioural style, namely, consistency also causes attributions to the
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person; for example, if one meets a person who/is bad tempered on 
several occasions one is more likely to attribute the cause of the bad 
temper to reasons within the individual (for example, as part of his 
or her personality) than to external causes (for example, that the 
person has just had a row with his/her spouse).
Unless the minority is seen as biased, the majority will attribute 
that the minority is committed and certain of its position. This 
^ point can be best understood if one considers the typical reactions
which occur when an individual is exposed to the influence attempts of 
a minority. Imagine that you are in a group of friends and you are 
^ (2) talking, let us say, about sex and the age of consent. All of a
sudden someone argues that the age of consent should be lowered to 
below 10 years of age. Imagine the shock and horror such a position 
provokes (this person would certainly be a minority and would be 
highly distinctive). Initially, people do not accept that the person 
really believes what he or she is saying, perhaps he or she is joking. 
^ In other words, there is a resistance to attribute what the person has
said to his or her own belief system. However, if this individual 
argues this position over time (that is, displays a consistent 
 ^ behavioural style), the other people in the group will start to
believe that the person does mean what he or she says.
3.2.11 Behavioural Styles
Throughout the discussion of research into minority influence much 
stress has been placed on the importance of consistency as a 
behavioural style. Although consistency appears to be thé most 
important behavioural style and the one which has received the most
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attention Moscovici (1976) has outlined four other behavioural 
styles; fairness, rigidity, investment and autonomy. The first two of 
these behavioural styles have already been considered earlier (see 
section 2.2.1).
Investment refers to the amount of effort an individual puts into 
trying to change someone's attitudes. Moscovici (1976) states that 
"If an individual or group take great pains to achieve some particular 
end two implications will be conveyed to others: (1) that they have 
great confidence in the opinion they have chosen and (2) that they 
have great capacity for self-reinforcement" (p.113). It seems 
intuitively plausible that any individual or group who campaign for a 
particular position for a long time and who put much effort into it, 
are seen as being committed to their cause. For example, consider the 
women CND campaigners at-_Greenham Common who undergo much discomfort , 
hardship and abuse in pursuing their cause; even if one does not agree 
with the CND movement one cannot help admiring the lengths (or effort) 
these women have gone to. : /
Autonomy is another behavioural style Moscovici has examined. This 
concept has two facets; first, it refers to the extent an individual's 
judgement is seen as a product of his or her own belief system rather 
than as due to outside causes; secondly, there is an objective facet
which requires " the ability to take into account all relevant
factors and to draw conclusions from them in a rigourous manner 
without being deflected by subjective interests" (p.114). This factor 
can easily be demonstrated whenever one sees a famous celebrity 
trying to sell a product in a commercial; the question which is raised 
in one's mind is whether the person is making an autonomous judgement 
or is being influenced by the fee being paid.
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3.2.12 From Behavioural Style to Cognitive Processes
The analysis of Moscovici's theory so far has revealed a paradox which 
needs to be explained, namely, how can a theory of social influence 
processes which advocates that behavioural style is the sole cause of 
influence also be a dual process model ? The answer to this question 
lies with how individuals deal with the conflict which is created by 
the source of influence's behavioural style.
Since the majority is initially believed to be correct (because, for 
instance, several pairs of eyes are believed to be better than one) the 
conflict it creates motivates individuals to engage in a comparison 
process where "They attempt to resolve this problem by concentrating 
on what they say and what the group says without turning their 
attention to the stimulus itself" (Moscovici and Personnaz,1980,
p.271). The result of this process is that majority influence on the
'—  /
minority tends to produce public without private change (as in the
Asch experiments where subjects publicly conformed to an erroneous
majority but retained their true beliefs in private).
On the other hand, a minority is initially believed to be incorrect - 
and the conflict it creates induces individuals to engage in a 
validation process which involves a reconsideration of the issues 
under question in an attempt to understand the minority's position.
The consequence of a validation process is that ".... as a result of
trying to see and understand what the minority saw or understood, the 
majority begins to see and understand as the minority would" (p.272). 
However, since individuals avoid publically agreeing with a minority.
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because' they do not want to appear 'openly deviant', there tends to be 
private without public acceptance (see section 2.4).
In summary Moscovici's theory suggests that a consistent behavioural 
style produces conflict which induces individuals to engage in 
differing cognitive processes depending on the nature of the source of 
influence. "It would be an overstatement but not a mistake" claims 
Moscovici (1980) " to say that in the face of a discrepant majority, 
all attention is focused on others, while in the face of a discrepant 
minority, all attention is focused on reality; that in the first case, 
the conflict is primarily a conflict of responses, and in the second 
case it is a conflict of perceptions" (p.215).
3.2.13 Main Points of the Genetic Model
(1) Social influence processes are conceptualised as being bilateral
in nature, that is, both majorities and minorities can be sources and
-  / 
targets of influence.
(2) Social influence processes are determined by attributions of 
Q  behavioural style. Consistency is the most important behavioural
style but four others can play a part; fairness, rigidity, investment 
and autonomy.
(3) Behavioural styles create conflict which result in different 
cognitive processes according to the nature of the source of 
influence. In the case of majority influence individuals engage in a 
comparison process resulting in public without private change, whilst 
with minority influence individuals engage in a validation process
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which results in private without public change.
3.2.14 Evaluation of the Genetic Model
2)
On the whole, the experimental evidence has supported the main tenets 
of the Genetic model. There is evidence that behavioural style is 
more important in causing conformity than dependency (see section 
1.3.1), that a minority is more influential when it displays a 
consistent behavioural style than an inconsistent behavioural style 
(see section 2.2.111). Also, evidence considered in a later section 
supports the differential influence hypothesis of the impact of 
minority and majority influence on public and private levels (see 
section 3.3.1). Furthermore,as Mhass and Clark (1984) have pointed
out, the theory has received support ".... across such diverse
experimental conditions, populations, dependent measures, discussion 
topics, and paradigms" (p.433).
However, the theory has received criticism from a number of
researchers. In their comprehensive review of the literature Maass
 ^22 and Clark (1984) raise five main critic^ms. First ; nearly all the
studies have used the "..... minimal group paradigm in which groups
are constituted for no other reason than a one-shot experiment"
(p.434). These artificial groups differ from 'normal ' groups in that
they have had no previous interaction nor expect any future
interaction. Furthermore the over-concentration on laboratory studies
has led to a total lack of field studies of minority influence.
: ■ / 
Second: there has been a lack of precise definitions of key concepts,
such as consistency. The disparity between theoretical arid
operational definitions of concepts may be one reason for the
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disagreement between researchers.
Third; research has taken a 'black—box' approach and has neglected 
intra— and inter-personal processes. Fourth; whenever intra— and 
inter-personal processes are considered they are usually treated as a 
post-experimental variable and analysed separately. For example, 
perceived confidence, believed to be a key component of majority 
influence, is usually measured after the influencing situation and is 
not analysed in conjunction with the influence data (for example, by 
means of a regression or structural equation framework). Fifth; the 
experimental research has "stimulated little theoretical controversy" 
(p.435).
The criticisms made by Maass and Clark draw attention to the way in 
which research into minority influence has been conducted and do not 
criticizethe theoretical foundations of the Genetic model. However, 
theoretical criticisms have been made by Levine (1980), Kelvin (1979) 
and Cramer (1975).
Levine s main critisms are concerned with whether conformity is caused 
by dependency or behavioural style. It will be remembered that 
22 Moscovici cites evidence that breaking consensus is more important in
terminating conformity than dependency. Also, if dependency is the 
main variable one would expect conformity to increase as the size of 
the majority increases but evidence does not support a linear 
relationship between conformity and majority size (section 1.2.3). 
Levine argues that the fact that a social supporter can reduce 
conformity is not direct evidence that dependency is irrelevent; it 
could be that the supporter reduces thereliance of the subject upon 
the majority for information about reality. He also points out that
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the reason why conformity does not increase above a majority size of 
three may be because the majority has reached its maximum ability to 
reward and punish the individual for not agreeing with it. The 
relationship between dependency and behavioural style is the main 
cause of criticism in the Genetic model. Kelman (1979) suggests that 
dependency and consensus (that is, behavioural style) are different 
levels of analysis and that one should consider the interaction 
between them.
Even more damaging to the Genetic model is Levine's claim that
dependency may be a cause of minority influence in that " the
minority's attributed characteristics cause the majority to become 
informationally dependent on the minority" (p.389). Moscovici would 
claim that dependency is a consequence rather than a cause of social 
influence. In his view the process which causes minorities to be 
influential cannot be dependency since the minorities lack anything 
which individuals can, initially, be dependent upon (for example,
power, status). However, it is possible that as soon as a minority
) - . ./ 
has caused influence, the minority acquires characteristics which lead
to dependency in others.
 ^22 In conclusion, although the Genetic model gives a good explanation of
the empirical research, its theoretical assumptions need to be 
clarified. Its main contributions are: first, it demonstrates that
)
any study of social influence processes needs to take into 
consideration the influencing abilities of minorities; second, it has 
drawn attention away from power relations (that is, dependency) and 
 ^ stressed an attributional analysis which takes into consideration
characteristics of the source of influence:third, it argues that the 
impact of social influence processes have to be examined at the public
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0and private levels.
3.2.2 Single Process Models
These models propose that majority and minority influence are 
determined by the same process. There are currently two types of 
single process models, namely, the Functionalist and Formal models
. /
/
3.2.21 Functionalist Model
This model was described earlier (see section 1.2.1) and so will only 
be summarized here. The model was formulated as a consequence of the 
research into conformity and proposes that the basis of social 
influence processes is dependency and that influence flows from the 
group (majority) to the individual, that is, in a unidirectional way.
If there appears a deviant individual in the group, then that
) - -
individual receives a lot of communication from other group members in 
an attempt to make the deviant conform to the group's expectations 
(what Festinger calls 'pressures towards uniformity'). Two things can 
O  happen, either the deviant conforms or he or she is rejected by the
group.
)
The Functionalist model has been extensively^^^^^^^^®^ by^Qg^o^ici.
In particular, the model is unable to account for the fact that
sometimes a minority (or deviant) can influence the majority. In such
circumstances dependency is unlikely to be the causal agent as
deviants do not normally dependency
(for example, power, status). In fact, as we shall see later.
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""individuals initially resist being influenced by a minority for fear 
of being categorised as a deviant.
Hollander (see section 2.2.21) has proposed an explanation of how 
deviants can have influence which is based upon the notion of 
dependency. He claims that once individuals have claimed sufficient 
idiosyncrasy credits', they are in a position to successfully deviate 
from the group.
3.2.211 Main points of Functionalist Model
(1) Social influence processes are unilateral in nature, that is they 
proceed from the group to the individual.
(2 )Dependency is the only cause of social influence processes and its 
purpose is to ensure social control.
(3) Deviancy ig seen as dysfunctional, pressures towards uniformity ' 
ensure that deviants either conform to the group or face rejection.
)
22 (4) The only circumstances under which a deviant can have influence
is by first acquiring idiosyncrasy credits" through first conformimg 
to the group's expectations.
/
/
3.2.212 Evaluation of the Functionalist Model
By advocating a unilateral view of social influence processes, the 
Functionalist model neglects the two way influence process which
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exists between individuals. Also, emphasis on dependency, as a source 
of influence, portrays humans as lacking autonomy and as being 'group 
dependent'. Such a view fails to account for those instances when 
deviates can have influence, for example, Jesus, Hitler, Copernicus, 
Freud, Gandhi etc. were all individuals who were initially viewed as 
deviants but subsequently had great influence. Although it could be 
argued that some of these individuals first conformed to society 
before they deviated and thus acquired "idiosyncrasy credits" (for 
example, Freud and Hitler) such an interpretation cannot apply to all 
such individuals.
3
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The Functionalist model gives a good account of conformity and 
particularly the relationship between dependency and power. However, 
it should be noted that Moscovici has argued against the notion of 
dependency being a causal agent ^  social influence processes.
In evaluating the Functionalist model it can be stated that it is too
restricted and provides only a 'blinkered' view of social influence. /' 
—  ' /  
Moscovici (1976) elegantly sums up this problem "A part of, or a level
of reality seems to escape the reach of these propositions [of the
Functionalist model]. More specifically, a large number of essential
problems or elements relating to social influence are thrown
indiscriminately into one category, or ignored altogether" (p.42).
The main aim of Moscovici's work has been to remove these blinkers.
3.2.22 Social Impact Theory
Social Impact Theory (SIT) is a general theory about how individuals 
interact in a group which has been developed by Latane and his
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colleagues (Latane and Nida,1980; Latane,1981). Social impact refers
to any of the great variety of changes in psychological states
'
and subj ective feelings, motives and emotions, cognitions and beliefs, 
values and behaviour, that occur in an individual, human or animal, as 
a result of real, implied or imagined presence or actions of other 
individuals" (Latane,1981, p.343). The basic assumption behind SIT is 
that social impacts are seen as the "..... result of social forces 
(like the physical forces of light, sound, gravity and magnetism) 
operating in a social force field or social structure" (p.343-344).
3.2.221 Three principles of SIT
SIT makes an analogy between social impacts acting within a force 
field and physical force fields, therefore it is not surprsing to find 
that its main principles draw heavily upon psychophysics. There are
three main principles. The first principle states that ".... the
amount of impact experienced by the target should be a multiplicative 
function of the strength, S, the immediacy. I, and the number, N, of 
sources present" (p.344). This can be represented as Total Social 
Forces = f(SIN) where strength refers to "salience, importance, or 
 ^22 intensity of a given source", immediacy refers to "closeness in space
or time and absence of intervening barriers or filters" and number to 
"how many people there are". In short the impct upon a target of 
influence is a combination of these three factors.
The second principle draws directly upon the work of psychophysics and 
states that the first source of influence will have the most influence 
while additional sources will have a marginally decreasing effect, 
that is, each addition in number will increase the overall impact by a 
factor less that the addition of the predecessor. This law is
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represented by I=SNt where I is the total impact, N is the number of 
sources, S is a scaling constant and t is a power exponential which 
_ has a value of less than one to denote that it is a marginally
decreasing function. In other words, one would predict that the first 
source of influence has the most impact while each addition to the 
^ source increases the amount of influence to a lesser extent than the
addition of its predecessor.
The third principle states that there exists a "..... type of force 
field or social structure in which other people stand with the 
individual as the target of forces coming from outside the group 
(p.349). In this situation increasing S,I or N leads to a "division 
or diminution of impact". This idea is not dissimilar to the 
diffusion of responsibility hypothesis which proposes that the larger 
the group the greater is^he^shiring of the responsibilty and thus the 
lower is the reponsibility felt by any particular individual. This 
principle is mathematically similar to the second principle except the 
exponent has a negative value (that is, I=SN-t).
/
/
As a general theory, SIT is very similar in form to theories in the 
 ^ natural sciences, with laws of behaviour which lead to direct
O predictions. Such is the scope of SIT that Latane (1981) has applied
it to ten areas of research from stage fright to enquiringfor Christ"! 
Far from being a theoretical puzzle, Latane believes that the general
)
theory has applications to real life problems "An understanding of how 
social impacts work, then, has strong implications for a social 
engineering approach to environmental design" (Latane and Nida,1980, 
p.5).
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3.2.222 SIT Applied to Majority and Minority Influence
Latane and Wolf (1981) have attempted to apply the principles of SIT 
to majority and minority influence. Their theory implies that 
majority and minority influence are determined by the same factors, 
that is, "..... a multiplicative function of the strength, immediacy, 
and number of its members" (p.439).
In the case of majority influence it is clear how influence occurs as 
majorities generally posses such factors as S, I and N.
3.2.223 Research into SIT
SIT proposes that majority influence should increase as a 
multiplicative function of S, I and N. This function should be linear 
in nature and should have as a gradient the root of N (which should be 
smaller than one). In other words, the more the majority possesses S, 
I and especially N, the greater will be their ability to influence 
others. The most important variable determining the amount of 
influence is N, such that each addition to N increases influence by a 
smaller amount than the addition of its predecessor (second principle
) of SIT see section 3.2.221).
(J
SIT's explanation of minority influence is not as simple as it is for 
majority influence. The reason for this is that the three variables 
employed by SIT are often not possesed by minorities. Almost by 
definition, minorities are lacking in the most important factor of N.
However, Wolf and Latane claim that "All else being equal, conformity
y \ : : . / \ . (
to the majority position should increase as a power function of
majority size and decrease as a power function of minority size". In
other words, if the majority is held constant, the influence of a
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minority will increase as a power function of N. Like majority 
influence, this power function is less than one but is negative, that 
is, each addition to the minority has less influence than the addition 
of the predeccessor.
In summary the model proposes that majority and minority influence are 
determined by the same process and are a function of the 
multiplicative impact of S, I and N. The most important factor is N 
and influence is determined by a power function of N which is less 
than one. In the case of majority influence the power function is 
positive while in the case of minority influence it is negative. 
According to the theory, majorities always have more influence than 
minorities since, by definition they have greater possession of S, I 
agd N. However, minority influence is possible although it may have 
to rely upon the impact of_S and I variables rather than N.
3.2.223 Research into SIT
Latane and Wolf have often relied upon reanalyses of previous research 
to provide support for their theory. In particular they have focussed 
on the relationship between majority size and conformity. According 
to SIT, conformity should increase as a function of majority size (N) 
such that the first few individuals should have the most impact with 
subsequent additions having a marginally decreasing effect. This is 
contrary to much of the Asch research which found that majorities of 
two or three had very little effect. Latane and Wolf (1981) have 
cited a number of experiments (including some unpublished work of 
their own) which shows that an equation with a power function of N 
less than one is a better predictor of influence than a straight line.
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It should be recalled that this issue has been considered previously 
with the conclusion that there are no consistent results concerning 
the relationship between majority size and 
conformity (see section 1.2.3).
Wolf and Latane (1983) conducted an experiment where subjects were 
exposed to the restaurant preferences of a number of people and were 
required to indicate how much they would like to eat at each 
restaurant. A number of variables were manipulated including 
majority-minority size, expertise, positive-negative information about 
a restaurant. Unexpectedly, negative information about restaurant 
preference had no effect. However, when the information was positive, 
the experimenters claim that the data support SIT. They found that 
majority influence increased as a function of N and S of the majority. 
Furthermore, majority influence increased as a power function of N but 
this was a negative function and not positive as expected by the • 
theory. The results for minority influence were not in support of
SIT. Although minority influence increased with size, the function
—  ' . /  
was not a negative one as predicted by the theory.
3.2.224 Main Points of SIT
(1) Social influence processes are proposed as being bilateral in 
nature, that is, majorities and minorities can be both source and 
targets of influence.
(2) Social influence processes are determined by a multiplicative 
function of S, I and N of the source of influence. Majority and 
minority influences conceptualized as being the same process.
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(3) The amount of impact experienced by a target will increase as a 
power function of the number of individuals within the source of 
influence. This function is less than one, denoting that the addition 
of every extra person to the source of influence will have a 
marginally increasing effect. This function will be positive in the 
case of majority influence and negative in the case of minority 
influence.
3.2.225 Evaluation of SIT
One of the advantages of SIT is that through its analogy with a 
'social forcefield', it highlights the fact that social influence is a 
 ^ two-way process between majorities and minorities. Previous models of
social influence have not emphasised this fact, preferring to consider 
majority and minority influence as separate phenomena occuring within 
 ^ groups. One of the consequences of social impact theory is that many
researchers recognise the need to conduct experiments where the
subject is simultaneously exposed to the influence attempts of a
) majority and a minority.
One of the problems with SIT is its reliance upon numbers to explain 
social influence. It is very easy to be seduced into thinking that 
numbers cause influence and the fact that majorities have more 
influence than minorities is because they contain more people. As
noted earlier, research does not support the hypothesis that there is
/
a relationship between majority size and conformity (see section 
1.2.3). Even more damaging to this theory is the evidence that 
majority consensus is more likely to lead to conformity than is the
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size of the majority size (see section 1.3.1).
Another reason why it is unwise to think of social influence in terms 
of numbers is the fact that it encourages the idea that the only 
difference between majorities and minorities is in terms of their 
numbers. There are two problems with this line of reasoning. First, 
definitions of majority and minority based on numbers are context 
specific, that is, they are determined by the number of people present 
in the social situation without recourse to the wider social system. 
Yet we are aware of what is considered to be majority and minority 
positions in a society independently of the attitudes held by those 
immediately around us. Second, explanations of social influence based 
on numbers are unable to explain many factors which can affect 
majority and minority influence, for example, social support (see 
section 1.3.2), culture (see section 1.4), non-verbal behaviour (see 
section 2.2.121), flexible/rigid style (see section 2.2.131). In this 
respect, the explanatory y power of SIT could be increased if attention 
was focused on the S and I aspects of the equation (however, Mullen, 
1986, has shown'that, in a meta- analysis of reseach, the effect of S 
and I is weak and often attributable to differences in the measurement 
of the dependent variables).
Perhaps the biggest weakness of SIT is that it only considers social 
influence which occurs at the public level and does not consider 
attitude change on a private level. As we have already seen, social 
influence processes tend to have different effects on public and 
private levels of influence (see section 2.4). This problem may be 
due to the fact that SIT attempts to identify the variables which 
cause social influence but does not try to explore the process by 
which this is achieved.
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Tanford and Penrod (1984) have conducted a meta-analysis of a large 
V number of studies in social influence and have developed SIT (they
term it Social Influence Model, SIM). SIM is very similar to SIT and 
therefore has not been considered separately. However there are three 
) main differences. First, SIT proposes that influence will be a
linear relationship with the multiplicity of S, I and N with the 
gradient determined by a power function of the N variable while SIM 
 ^ proposes an S—shaped function where increasing N initially increases
influence but then reaches a peak followed by a decrease. Second, SIT 
does not predict a maximum degree of influence, whereas SIM does.
 ^ 22 Third, SIM includes a number of additional parameters such as
individual differences in susceptibility to influence. Although these 
additions to SIM have improved its explanatory power compared to SIT, 
the aforementioned problems are still relevant.
),
)O
/
/
In conclusion, SIT (and SIM) have improved our understanding of the 
process of social influence by highlighting the fact that both 
majorities and minorities can be source and targets of influence. 
However, the reliance upon numbers determining inflijnce causes a 
number of problems especially in accounting for minority influence. 
More importantly, since these theories do not propose a process of 
social influence they are unable to explain why majorities and 
minorities often have different effects on public and private levels.
3.3 Dual Versus Single Process Models of Social Influence
So far in this chapter two theoretical perspectives have been 
examined, that is, those theories which consider minority and majority 
influence to be determined by the same process (single process models)
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oand those theories which consider them to be determined by different 
processes (dual process models). In this section research will be 
discussed which has attempted to test competing hypotheses deriving 
from these perspectives. In order to simplify presentation, research 
has been grouped into two broad categories: (1) those experiments 
which have examined the effects of minority and majority influence 
upon different levels of influence (the differential influence 
hypothesis) and (2) those experiments which have examined the 
cognitive processes underlying minority and majority influence.
3 (2) 3.3*1 The Effects of Minority and Majority Influence Upon
Different Levels of Influence
} Before discussing this research it is worthwhile to restate the
predictions of the single and dual process models. The dual process 
model, which is characterised by Moscovici's theory, states that 
3 whereas majorities tend to have greater public than private influence
(compliance behaviour), minorities tend to have greater private than 
public influence (conversion behaviour). In other words, the dual 
3 ^  process model would predict an interaction between the variable
minority/majority and level of influence. On the other hand, the 
single process model would not predict such an interaction but simply
3 that majorities would have more influence than minorities.
An important point to consider when examining these experiments 
) concerns the different ways in which influence has been measured.
Three types of measures can be identified: manifest/latent, 
direct/indirect and public/private. Since these are different types 
) of measures the experiments will be considered under these three
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headings. These various measures are relevant to my own research 
described in chapters 5 to 8.
3.3.11 Manifest and Latent Influence
Manifest and latent measures of influence represent the most popular 
types of measurements employed in research^’^ this area. A number of 
fields of research using these measures can be identified and these 
are discussed below.
3.3.111 The Green/Blue Colour Perception Experiments
la, one of the first studies into minority influence, Moscovici et al. 
(1969) found that a minoritXjwho_°°^^^^^^^^^^ responded 'green' to 
objectively blue slides, could cause naive subjects to respond 
publicly 'green' (see section 2.2.111). A second part of the 
experiment showed ^hat those subjects who had been exposed to a 
minority were more likely, as compared to those who had not been 
exposed to a minority, to see disks as green which are normally seen 
as blue (see section 2.4). Since the minority was absent from the 
second part of the experiment, the result shows that the minority's 
Influence.had caused a real change in subjects' perception. In this 
paradigm giving 'green' responses in the group situation represents 
manifest influence while calling disks 'green' after the group 
situation represents latent influence because the response 'green' was 
linked to the (now absent) minority's response.
Moscovici and Lage (1976) employed the same paradigm as Moscovici et 
3-1. (1969) except that they also had a majority influence condition.
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that is, four confederates giving the 'green' response with two naive 
subjects. The results supported the dual process model. Majorities 
2) displayed greater manifest influence than minorities while the reverse
was true for latent influence.
2) It is important to note that the experimenters analysed the results of
the minority and majority conditions separately and therefore it is 
not possible to determine whether there was an interaction between; the 
2> source of influence and the level of influence variables. Also, the
manifest and latent measures of influence are very different with the 
result that any comparisons between them is not legitimate since any 
^ 22 difference may be due to the type of measurement rather than the
manipulations.
^ Finally, the main reason why this research design has not been
extensively used concerns the relationship between manifest and latent 
measures of influence. In order to obtain valid latent measures,
 ^ subjects must not believe that there is a link between manifest and
latent responses. If a link is assumed, changes at the latent level 
may simply represent generalization from the'manifest level.
■y Moscovici and Personnaz (1980) have noted such a problem "Subjects who
had heard the strange and novel response "green" on several occasions 
during the first experiment may have simply employed it as their own 
in the second experiment, without the perception of the color being 
altered in the slightest" (p.272-3).
O
3.3.112 Chromatic Afterimage Experiments
As a result of the problem of generalization in the blue/green
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-^"^experiments, Moscovici and Personnaz (1980) employed an ingenious 
manipulation to ensure that subjects did not assume that there was a 
link between the manifest and latent measures of influence. The
3
research design they employed was similar to that used by Moscovici et 
al, (1969) in that subjects viewed objectively blue slides, except 
that they were exposed to only one other person who was a confederate 
and who consistently responded 'green". Subjects were informed that a 
'green' response was either given by 18,2% of the population (minority 
influence condition) or by 81,8% of the population (majority influence 
condition). The number of 'green' responses verbally given by the 
subject represented manifest influence.
The latent measure of influence was subjects' chromatic afterimage 
obtained when looking at a white screen immediately after viewing the 
slide. Normally the colour perceived immediately after viewing a 
coloured stimulus is the complementary colour of that stimulus. If 
there has not been a change in subjects' perception then they should
report seeing the complementary colour of blue (that is,
) -
yellow-orange), 'However, if the source of influence has been
successful in altering subjects' perception.they should report seeing
the afterimage as nearer to the complementary of 'green' (that is red
)
2^  ^ purple). Subjects were required to report the colour of the
afterimage on a 9-point scale from yellow to purple,
 ^ Since the colours subjects report for the latent measure of influence
are different from those used for the manifest measure of influence, 
subjects are unlikely to assume a link between them, thus overcoming 
 ^ the problem of generalization.
The dual process model would predict that majority influence would
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create more conformity on manifest responses than minority influence. 
This was not supported as there was no difference in the number of 
'green' responses given verbally by the subjects. This does not 
support the earlier findings of Moscovici and Lage (1976). However, 
consistent with the dual process model, minorities caused subjects to 
shift their judgement of the afterimage closer to the complementary of 
green than did majorities. At first sight it seems an extraordinary 
finding and counter intuitive that a minority can actually change 
individuals perceptual code even when the confederate gives an 
obviously wrong response, Moscovici and Personnaz repeated the 
experiment and found a similar result, a consistent minority was able 
to change the perceptual code of subjects such that they were more 
likely to see the afterimage of objectively blue slides nearer to the 
complementary colour of green. Such a phenomenon was not observed 
with majority influence.
Although the results of Moscovici and Personnaz's experiment show that 
a minority can cause more latent change than a majority, it does not / 
show that the minority's latent influence was greater than the 
manifest influence because the measures of influence are quite 
different. This problem was associated with the green/blue 
(2  ^ experiments discussed in the last section, that is, comparisons
between manifest amnd latent influence are not legitimate because they 
employ different techniques of measurement - any difference may merely 
reflect differences in the measures themselves rather than the 
influence process. This point is taken up below by Personnaz (1981), 
Other researchers have also challenged these findings,
Doms and Van Avermaet (1980) conducted a replication of theMoscoviei 
and Personnaz experiment with the same experimental materials and
84
ofound that both a minority and a majority produced conversion, that 
is, caused subjects to shift their perceptual afterimage to the 
complementary of green. Doms and Van Avermaet hypothesized that their 
failure to find a difference between the minority and majority 
influence conditions may have been due to the weakness of the 
minority/majority manipulation. In order to check whether this 
manipulation had been successful, they conducted a second experiment 
which was the same as the first experiment except that subjects were 
asked what percentage of people they thought would agree with their 
own response and with their partner (the source of influence).
In the minority condition the subjects thought that 70,5% would agree 
with their position and 24,5% with their partner (the minority) while 
in the majority condition they thought that 45% would agree with their 
position and 54% with their partner (the majority). It is quite clear 
that the subjects believed the manipulation and perceived their - 
partner to hold a minority or majority position according to the 
experimental instruction. The results of the second experiment were 
very similar to the first experiment with both a minority and a 
majority producing conversion. Therefore the results of the first 
experiment cannot be attributed to weaknesses in the source of
(2) influence manipulation.
Doms and Van Avermaet provide an explanation of their data which is 
based upon the work of Upmeyer (1971) who found that when exposed to 
discrepant information by a majority, subjects performed better in a 
discrimination task than those not exposed to the discrepant 
information. It is proposed that disccepantinformation (from a 
minority or a majority) motivates subjects to pay more attention to 
the task thus leading to more accurate responses. However, is
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perceiving the afterimage nearer to green of a blue slide a more 
accurate response ? According to Doms and Van Avermaet it may be 
possible because, before being exposed to influence, subjects judge 
the afterimage as red-rose which indicates that the slide is composed 
of green as well as blue aspects.
Sorrentino, King and Leo (1980) claim that these experiments show 
/ 'distortion of judgements' instead of perceptual distortion (as
^ Moscovici and Personnaz would claim). "Unlike perceptual distortion,
judgement distortion is not an actual change in perception. Instead, 
persons are simply confused by the reports of others, and conform to 
 ^ the group because they are no longer certain of their own perception"
(p,294). The problem stems, according to Sorrentino et al., from the
colour scale employed by Moscovici and Personnaz. Since the scale
 ^ runs from yellow (chromatic afterimage of blue) to purple (chromatic
afterimage of green) any deviations away from yellow would indicate a 
change in perception towards the complementary colour of green, in 
 ^ other words conversion.
To overcome this problem Sorrentino et al, suggest using a 'random' 
minority where subjects are presented an array of colours from which 
they choose which is closest to the afterimage. Their experiment 
consisted of three conditions, replication of Mosovici and Personnaz's 
minority influence condition, 'random' minority and control. Since a 
majority influence conditon was not used, the experiment is thus not a 
test of the dual process model. However, the experimenters found that 
none of the conditions produced conversion but that subjects'
/
suspiciousness of the experiment (measured in a post experimental 
questionnaire) played a role in the results. More specifically, all 
the subj ects who showed conversion were suspicious of the experiment•
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On the basis of this finding the authors provide an explanation of the 
results which suggests that suspicious subjects p^Y more attention
which, in turn, produces the perceptual effect of increased intensity.
D
Since the colour blue contains hues of green it is possible that an 
increase in intensity may make the green hues more salient thus 
leading to a complementary colour closer to green than blue. This
D
explanation is similar to that of Doms and Van Avermaet.
Thus we observe that three sets of authors have found different 
results and suggest conflicting explanations. Although the Moscovici 
and Personnaz’s research design has many flaws, one cannot disregard 
the ingeneous method it employs in measuring latent influence. We 
will now turn our attention to one more experiment in this area which 
tries to overcome many of the problems raised with the chromatic 
afterimage research design.
O
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Personnaz (1981) tried to overcome the problem of using different 
methods for measuring manifest and latent responses by using a
/'
spectrometer which is a device for measuring wavelengths of light. 
There were three measures of influence, manifest (number of 'green' 
responses given verbally), manifest spectrometer measure of slide and 
latent spectrometer measure of afterimage.
He found that although very few subjects gave 'green' responses 
verbally, it was given more frequently in the majority influence 
condition than in the minority influence condition thus providing some 
support for the dual process model. Interestingly, the spectrometer 
measurements of the slide showed that minorities caused subjects to 
modify their perceptions whereas majorities did not. Furthermore, the 
spectrometer measurements of the afterimage scores also showed that
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0 minorities caused subjects to modify their perceptions toward the
complimentary of green whereas majorities did not,
3
3.3.12 Direct and Indirect Influence
3 In our discussion of the models of social influence, it is important
here to return to the issue of direct and indirect influence which was 
discussed in relation to Mugny's work in section 2.2.131. As pointed.
 ^ out there, direct influence refers to attitude change which occurs on
a dimension which is explicitly linked to the source of influence and 
therefore is comparable to manifest influence. On the other hand,
) (2) indirect influence represents attitude change which occurs on a
dimension which is not explicitly related to the source of influence 
but is implicitly implied by its communication. In other words,
) , indirect influence represents—change towards the source of influence
on dimensions not explicitly expressed in the communication but which 
follow logically from its position.
) - ' _  - /  
Whilst measures of latent influence are designed to be similar to
those of manifest influence but with the aim that the subject is
) unaware of a link, direct and indirect influence are assessed byo
entirely different measures. However, since indirect influence tends 
to be measured on dimensions which are not directly derived from the
) source of influence, what these measures reveal may be analogous to
latent influence. In this section we consider three experiments which 
have examined the effects of minority and majority influence on direct 
( and indirect measures of influence.
Moscovici, Mugny and Papastamou (1981) conducted an experiment using
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the direct and indirect items first employed by Mugny (1975) discussed
in section 2.2.131. In this experiment subjects complete a
questionnaire concerning pollution before and after reading a text
which is portrayed as being either a minority or majority
position. Since some of the items in the questionnaire deal with
issues explicitly expressed in the text, any changes on these items
reflects direct influence. However, other items in the questionnaire
were not mentioned in the text but are related to the position it
advocated. Any changes on these items reflect indirect influence
since change is in the direction advocated by the text although on
different but related issues. Indirect influence therefore may be
*
considered a form of influence generalization.
The second experiment to be considered in this section was conducted by 
Aebischer, Hewstone and Henderson (1984). This study dealt with 
students' musical preferences. Subjects indicated their preference 
between pairs of recordings of hard rock/new wave and hard 
rock/contemporary music (note, that the subjects from this experiment 
were French who prefer hard rock music). After this they were 
informed of the results of a recent musical poll showing that either a 
minority or a majority showed a preference for new wave music. This 
was followed by once again indicating preferences between the pairs of 
music. In this design, changes in preferences to new wave music 
represented direct influence as this was indicated as the source of 
influence's preference. However, changes in preference to 
contemporary music would reflect indirect change because, although it 
is not explicitly linked to the preference of the source of influence 
it is related to it. The authors state "Contemporary music has a 
different rhythm from, but can be related to the sounds and harmonics 
of, new wave music; it differs completely from hard-rock" (p.25).
The results support the dual process model. While majorities caused 
more change on direct (manifest) than did minorities, the opposite was 
the case for indirect items (laten|^.
0The results aire interesting. While there was no direct influence (that 
'•) is, change from hard rock to new wave), a minority source caused more
indirect influence than a majority source (that is, change from hard 
rock to contemporary). The latter finding is consistent with the dual 
^ process model while the former is not though one would have expected
majorities to have more direct influence than minorities.
The third experiment to be considered here was conducted by Wolf 
(1985) employing a jury decison paradigm and discussed in section 
2.3.2. In this experiment subjects were required to reach a decision 
concerning the level of compensation to be awarded to a plaintiff. 
Subjects were given false feedback which suggested that there were 
either a majority or a minority in the group which argued a different 
 ^ ' • position from their own. .Direct influence was represented by their
final estimate of the level of compensation while indirect influence 
was measured by subjects rating the utility value of a low and a high 
compensation (thus subjects may not directly agree with the source of / 
influence but may positively value its level of compensation).
)O Wolf found that majorities caused more direct influence than minorities which is expected by the dual process model. However, 
there was no difference on the latent measures of influence. Although: 
the latter finding does not support the dual process model it cannot 
be takenas supporting the single process model, as one would still 
expect a majority superior effect on latent measures.
These three experiments have used different methodologies and have 
found differing results. Evidence for the dual process model has been 
found although it is incomplete, no experiment has found the complete
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oexpected pattern of results, that is majorities having greater 
influence than minorities on direct items while minorities having
greater influence than majorities indirect items.
3 . 3 . 1 3  Public and Private Influence
In the manifest/latent and direct/indirect methods for testing the 
dual process model much emphasis has been placed upon the fact that 
the latent level of influence is not linked to the manifest level, 
thus avoiding the problem of subjects making generalizations of 
responses from one measure to another. Although such a distinction is 
important it does have at least one major problem. First, since two 
different measures are employed, comparisons between them are 
illegitimate due to the fact that any variation may merely reflect 
differences in the measures themselves rather than due to the 
experimental manipulations. This is particularly important
because the dual process model makes predictions between the level of ,
  •  ^  /
influence variable, that is, majorities having more manifest than
latent influence (compliance behaviour) whilst minorities having more
latent than manifest influence (conversion behaviour). Bearing this
O  in mind it is true that neither the manifest/latent nor the
direct/indirect measures are capable of testing the basic tenets of .
the dual process model.
One way to avoid this problem is to have the same measure for both 
responses. This could be done by either asking subjects to give their
response in public, that is, so that other individuals will know their
attitudes, or in private, that is, so that no-one (not even the
experimenter) is aware of their position.
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Second, the problem of response generalization has been compounded by 
the fact that the experiments have taken the different measures as a 
within-subjects factor, that is subjects give both a manifest and a 
latent measure. In such a situation one cannot be sure that subjects 
do not form a link between the measures (especially when the latent 
measure seems to have no relevance to the experiment). This problem 
could be reduced if measures of influence are taken as a 
between-subjects factor, that is, subjects only respond at one level.
A number of experiments have attempted to test the dual process model 
using public and private responses as a between-subj ects factor.
Maass and Clark (1983b) have conducted an experiment into minority and 
majority influence which uses public and private responses. The 
experiment concerned attitude_s^  towards gay rights. Subjects were 
simultaneously exposed to arguments of a minority and majority which 
differed from their own position. In order to control for direction 
of argument, in some conditions the minority was pro—gay rights and y 
the majority anti—gay rights while in other conditions this was 
reversed. The arguments were presented as a summary of a five person 
discussion where there was a different position held by one person 
(minority) and the other four people (majority). The minority and 
majority both gave eight arguments in favour of their position; After 
reading the summary of the group discussion the subjects were required 
to complete a four item attitude scale concerning gay rights.
The results showed that subjects tended to move towards the majority 
position when they made their responses in public and towards the 
minority position when private responses were required. This pattern 
of results was replicated on a second experiment (Maass and Clark,
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1986). Although these results do not test Moscovici's theory directly 
(because it is impossible to determine the exact relationship between 
source of influence and level of influence), they do indicate that 
and majority influence are different processes. Therefore 
the results cannot be explained from a single process perspective.
In a similar conceptualization of public and private responses Mugny 
(1974-1975, 1976) has conducted a number of experiments with the 
^^^l®^“Lyer illusion. This illusion concerns the judgement of the 
length of two lines, one of which has arrows pointing inwards while 
the other has arrows pointing outwards. The line with the arrow 
Q  pointing outwards appears to be the longest when in fact they are the
same length. Mugny found that when exposed to majority influence 
subjects changed their responses in public but not in private, whereas 
the opposite occured with minority influence. This pattern is 
consistent with the dual process model.
— . _ /
3.3.2 Cognitive Processes underlying Minority
and Majority Influence
The last section dealt exclusively with the effects of minority and 
majority influence on manifest latent responses while in this 
section we are concerned with the underlying processes. It is 
possible to argue that the nature of the source of influence has an 
effect upon the level of influence without recourse to differential 
mediating processes. Such an argument is consistent with the single 
process model. However, dual process models of social influence, and 
in particulary that espoused by Moscovici, explicitly claim that 
ins^ jority and minority influence are mediated by different cognitive
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processes. These processes were discussed early in this chapter. In 
short, majorities cause individuals to engage in a comparison process 
where attention is focused on the majority, whereas minorities cause 
individuals to engage in a validation process where attention is 
focused on the topic. In other words, one would expect minorities 
^ Co cause individuals to analyse the topic under consideration to a
greater extent than would majorities.
Some evidence in favour of this was reported by Moscovici et al. ,
(1981), discussed in an earlier section, who found that subjects 
remembered more information from a persuasive communication when it 
represented a minority viewpoint than when it represented a majority 
viewpoint. This shows that minorities cause individuals to attend to 
and hence remember more about the position they advocate than do 
majorities.
O
^ 3.3.21 Differential Focus of Attention
As noted above Moscovici s theory suggests that majorities cause 
 ^22 attention to be focussed upon the majority members (interpersonal)
whilst minorities cause attention to be focused on the area under 
consideration (stimuli). Some research by Guillon and Personnaz 
 ^ (1983) has tested this idea. Subjects were required to give their
thoughts concerning a videotape recording of a discussion in which 
they either faced a majority or a minority. A content analysis of 
their comments showed that subjects who had faced a majority 
experienced high interpersonal conflict during the discussion whilst 
those exposed to a minority reported an increased cognitive conflict. 
 ^ Further evidence comes from Tesser, Campbell and Mickler (1983) which
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showed that subjects attended more to the stimuli when exposed one
-4"'
Other person than when exposed to three people. This should be 
treated with caution because it cannot be assumed that in this 
experiment one or three people represented a minority or a majority.
3.3.22 Divergent and Convergent Thinking and Minority and 
Majority Influence
Nemeth (1985, 1986) has presented a number of interesting experiments 
concerning the cognitive processes caused by minority and majority 
influence. Like Moscovici, she believes that minorities cause greater 
cognitive 'effort' than do majorities; however, there is a difference 
between them in how they view the nature of the thought processes. 
Nemeth claims that when exposed to minority views individuals are
".... stimulated to attend to more aspects of the situation, they
think in more divergent ways, and they are more likely to detect novel 
solutions or come to new decisions". This process is analogous to
creativity. On the other hand, majorities cause individuals to ".....
—  /'
focus on the aspects of the stimuli pertinent to the position of thé 
majority, they think in convergent ways ; and they tend toward adoption 
of the proposed solution to the neglect of novel solutions or 
G) decisions". There are two main differences between Nemeth's and
Moscovici's analysis. First, there is a difference in the focus of. 
attention by individuals; according to Moscovici, minorities cause 
attention to be directed at the stimuli under consideration while 
Nemeth claims that it is the majority which does this. Second, there 
is a difference in emphasis of the output of minority and majority 
influence; Moscovici emphasises the difference in cognitive activity 
while Nemeth emphasises differences in modes of thinking.
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oThree recent experiments have tested Nemeth's hypotheses. In the 
first experiment, by Nemeth and Wacht1er (1983), groups of six 
subjects were shown a series of slides which contained a standard 
figure and six comparison figures. The subjects were required to 
indicate which comparison figures had the standard figure imbedded in 
it. One comparison figure was very easy while the other five were 
difficult. Either two out of the six subjects (minority) or four out 
of the six subjects (majority) were confederates of the experimenter 
and were required to indicate that the standard figure was embedded in 
the easy figure and one other figure (which was either correct or 
incorrect). They found that subjects followed the responses given 
by the majority more than they did for the minority. Also, subjects 
who were exposed to a minority were more likely to find novel correct 
solutions than when exposed to a majority. This shows that subjects 
followed the majority response and did not analyse the other figures 
whereas the minority caused subjects to look for new and novel 
solutions.
More evidence for this interpretation has come from Nemeth and Kwan 
(1985a). In their experiment groups of four subjects viewed slides 
) ^  which contained a five letter string with the three middle letters in
capitals, for example tDOGe. They were required to name the first 
three letters they saw. After the first five trials they were given 
bogus feedback about the responses of the other subjects which 
indicated that either 3 out of 4 saw the word formed by backward 
sequencing (god) and one person saw the word formd by forward 
sequencing (dog) (majority condition) while others recieved the 
reverse (minority condition). They were then required to complete the 
task for ten sequences. They found that those in the majority 
condition followed the majority strategy whilst those in the minority
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ocondition adopted all possible strategies and found more solutions. 
Thus this experiment shows that the process of innovation, resulting 
from minority influence, can lead individuals to raise new and novel 
solutions to an issue. The final experiment to be considered here was 
conducted by Nemeth and Kwan (1985b) and concerned the green/blue 
colour slide experimental design. Subjects were placed in a cubicle 
with a confederate who consistently called blue slides green. Prior 
to this, the subject was told that previous research had shown that 
about 80% of people judge the colour as blue while 20% judge it as 
green (minority condition) or the reverse (majority condition). After 
the experiments, subjects were asked what words they associate with 
'blue' and 'green'. They found that those subjects exposed to a 
minority who had called the slides green gave more original 
associations (that is, less statistically frequent) to 'blue' and 
'green' than did those who had been exposed to a majority calling the 
slides green.
) The results of these experiments clearly show that the cognitive
processes which result from majorities and minorities are very 
different, with the former leading to a narrowing of the cognitive 
) 22 field to coincide with the majority (convergent thinking) while the
latter leading to a widening of the cognitive field to include new
interpretations (divergent thinking). However, no matter how 
y persuasive these experiments are it is important to show that these
differential cognitive processes actually mediate minority and 
majority influence. It is to this question which we turn our 
) attention in the next section.
3.3.23 Cognitive Activity as a Mediating Process
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A detailed investigation of the cognitive processes underlying 
minority and majority influence has been conducted by Maass and Clark 
(1983a), Their experiment was outlined in the previous section.
In the experiment subjects received a minority and a majority 
view-point concerning gay-rights (where the position was pro- or 
anti-gay rights was reversed). After reading the text they were asked 
to write down their own arguments to the position presented by the 
minority and majority. Two sets of six 'ideas spaces' were provided 
for this task. Subjects were also asked to rate whether the argument 
was pro-; neutral or anti-gay rights.
Their results are very illuminating. First, and contrary to their 
hypothesis, there was no difference in the number of arguments 
generated from a majority or a minority. Whilst there was an overall 
tendency for subjects to generate arguments in favour of the source of 
influence rather than counter-arguments, minorities were more likely 
to trigger the generation of pro-arguments while majorities were more 
likely to generate counter-arguments. This data shows that, while the
nature of influence does not make a difference in the number of ideas
22 generated (or in other words, cognitive activity) , they do cause
different types of ideas to be triggered. This suggests that there 
may not be a quantitative difference in the amount of cognitive 
activity between a majority and a minority (as originally claimed by 
Moscovici) but a qualitative difference in the process. This finding 
is consistent with Nemeth's model.
Finally, Maass and Clark turned their attention to the mediating 
effect of cognitive activity in relation to the level of influence. 
This is an important test as the dual process model predicts that
98
cognitive activity should mediate minority influence but not majority 
influence. This hypothesis was tested by using a number of multiple 
regressions separately for the public and private response conditions. 
In these regressions the influence scores were the dependent variable 
while the mediating variable (cognitive activity) was entered before 
and after the source of influence variable (minority/majority). As 
predicted, in the private response condition, there was a large drop 
in the significance of the source of influence variable when cognitive 
activity was entered first, as compared to when it was added second, 
showing that cognitive activity mediated influence. No such change in 
the significance of the source of influence variable was found when 
22 the cognitive activity variable was entered before or after it.
Furthermore, cognitive activity was found to account for 41.5% of the 
variance in influence in private responses but only 17% of the 
' • variance in the public condition.- This clearly shows that cognitive
activity mediated private responses but not public responses which is 
consistent with Moscovici's model.
/
Another experiment which has looked at the mediating effect of 
cognitive activity has been conducted by Maass, West and Clark (1985). 
Subjects were required to discuss the topic of Affirmative Action 
(that is, legislation to make organisations in West Germany employ a 
certain percentage of people from minority groups) in groups of six 
people. In some conditions two people in the group argued a minority 
position. Analysis of recordings of the discussion showed that the 
length of time speaking in favour of Affirmative Action correlated 
with private attitude change but not with public attitude change.
3.3.3 Evaluation of Research Testing Dual Versus Single
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Process Models
To summarize the research focusing on the differential influence of 
majorities and minorities, evidence is generally in favour of the dual 
process model. Although no experiment has shown the perfect 
relationship, the research clearly supports conversion behaviour (that 
is, minorities have more influence in private than they do in public) 
while the evidence is not so clear-cut regarding compliance behaviour 
(that is, majorities have more public than private influence). In the 
case of the chromatic afterimage experiments, virtually no superior 
public influence was observed with majorities compared to minorities. 
This could be due to the fact that the communication consisted of an 
obviously incorrect response (virtually no one in the control 
condition gave the same response). It is unlikely to find public 
conformity to an incorrect response even if it is alleged to be a 
majority position. This also raises the issue of the legitimacy of 
the source of influence when it was defined as a majority. In these 
experiments a numerical majority gave an anti-normative position which 
is normally considered to be a minority view. It is often argued that 
definitions of minority ' and majority should rely more upon their 
relative normative positions rather than numbers alone (see 
introduction to thesis). However, such arguments cannot detract from 
the fact that majorities did not lead to a private change whereas 
minorities did.
A further point worthy of consideration is that in some of the 
experiments the design hindered adequate testing of the dual process 
model. According to the model, hypotheses concerning minority and 
majority influence are couched in terms of differences across the 
level of influence. However, in the case of the manifest/latent and
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Ddirect •'/indirect experiments different measures were employed to 
measure each level of influence. Therefore comparisons between the 
levels are not legitimate (as they may reflect differences in the 
measures rather than due to the source of influence) thus making 
testing of the hypothese^roblematic. The only legitimate comparisons 
are those within the same level of influence. The above criticism 
not true of the public/private experiments as these employed the same 
measure for each level of influence.
Since the differential influence effects can be affected by many 
contextual factors, a number of studies have focussed on the cognitive 
processes underlying majority and minority influence. In a sense this 
T^^taking a step back from the level of influence to examine the 
antecedents to these effects. If different processes do underly 
majority and minority influence then this debunks the view that they 
are governed by the same process but have different manifestations on 
nontextual factors such as, level of influence. Therefore, the 
experiments that examine the processes underlying majority and 
minority influence provide a more stringent test of the dual process 
model than do those that focus on the differential pattern of 
influence.
iu all the experiments which have examined the cognitive processes 
underlying majority and minority influence have shown quite clearly 
that they are different (one wonders whether experiments showing no 
difference would be reported). This is strong support for the dual 
process model. However, the nature of the difference is a matter of 
controversy. While Moscovici resorts to a difference in cognitive 
effort , Nemeth argues that it is not so much a difference in 
quantity but of quality. This is an important area of enquiry and one
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deserving more attention.
The overwhelming bulk of evidence rejects the single process model of
social influence but supports the view that there are different
cognitive processes which have different manifestations upon various 
levels of influence.. The nature of these cognitive processes and
their precise effects upon different levels of influence is not clear
■■ 'cut. /
102
3i
3
3
3
3 O
)
CHAPTER 4 - SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE
4.1 Introduction to Chapter 4
It was stated at the beginning of chapter three that, in order to 
discuss theories of social influence, it is necessary to consider 
explanations which address both minority and majority influence 
because these two processes are so closely linked. We have seen that 
explanations in theories of social influence are typically located at 
the 'individual' level and therefore could not account for phenomena 
occuring at the 'social' level and in particular the effects of social 
categorization (that is, situations where there is a difference 
between the source and target of influence in terms of their group 
membership). In this chapter I will examine each theory of social 
influence in order to elucidate its suitability in explaining the 
22 effects of social categorization. * '
The aim of this chapter is to examine the effects of social 
categorization upon social influence and attempt to derive a theory of 
social influence which can adequately explain these effects and thus 
focus upon the 'individual' and 'social' level of explanation. In 
order to achieve this I shall first consider what is meant by group ^ 
membership and then examine a number of studies which have looked at 
the effects of group membership upon social influence. Following this 
I will consider the theoretical implications of the finding that
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3social influence can be affected by the social categorization of the 
source of influence and derive a model which attempts to address this 
issue.
4.2 Group Membership
4.21 Definitions of Group
As a starting point in an examination of group membership it is 
important to consider first what is meant by the concept of group.
,^efinitions of the concept of a group vary greatly and are affected by 
the theoretical perspective adopted by the researcher. In their 
influential book on researcbrinto groups Cartwright and Zander (1968) 
noted more than eight definitions of a group. Whereas.'', some of their 
definitions revolve around the issue of frequency of interaction (for 
example, a group is a number of people who meet frequently), others ' 
emphasize how members define themselves (for example, a group is a 
number of people who consider themselves to be a group).
A recent initiative in this area has been to consider group membership 
from the group members' perspective, in that a group is defined as a 
collection of people who categorize themselves as a group on some 
dimension. Turner (1982) has developed this further and has suggested 
a cognitive definition which asserts that a group is two or more 
people who share a common cognitive dimension. Cognitive dimension 
refers to any attribute that can vary along a continuum and whereby 
individuals can locate themselves and other members of their group and 
consequently those individuals who are not in their group (the latter
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are often referred to as the outgroup).
The above definition implies that the categorization of ourselves as 
members of a group automatically also implies the exclusion from other 
groups; for example, if I consider myself to be a psychologist I am 
not only aware of the group I belong to but also of those I do not, 
such as biologist, chemist etc.. Once this categorization is 
achieved, membership of my own group and other groups are overlaid 
with the positive-negative connotations associated with 
ingroup-outgroup membership. Put simply, my own group acquires 
ingroup status and is perceived as positive whilst other groups are 
perceived as outgroups and seen in negative terms.
As a consequence of categorizing oneself as belonging to a group (and 
, , by default excluding oneself from other groups), individuals attain a
group identification which incorporates information concerning the 
groups they belong to and those they do not. This analysis is couched 
in terms of social identity theory which I shall be considering in 
more detail later in this chapter. However, an important point to 
include here is that the dimension upon which individuals form their 
group membership can vary from one which is perceived to be an 
22 important dimension, such as a family, to one which is perceived as
being a relatively unimportant dimension, such as a group of fellow . 
travellers on a train. In this sense, a group can exist at different 
'levels' which differ in terms of the relative importance of the 
dimensions to the individual.
4.22 Different Types of Groups
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The term 'group' has been applied to many different settings and, 
therefore, it is useful to have some means of labelling different 
groups. An often used distinction has been between primary and 
secondary groups. Primary groups are small groups which interact 
frequently and where group members attach some importance to their 
membership, for example, a family or work group. Primary groups can 
either be informal in that their creation has been spontaneous, such 
as a group of friends, or they can be formal where certain rules apply 
to their activities, such as a working party. On the other hand, 
secondary groups tend to be much larger than primary groups and tend 
to be formal organisations, such as a factory.
It is not uncommon for individuals to belong to a number of different 
groups, for example, family, work or political groups, a race or 
' • nation. Not all these group memberships are salient to the individual
at all times, for example, when I am at work my membership to my work 
group is most salient, whereas this changes when I am at home (this is 
the conception of group membership most commonly employed in 
research). Hyman (1942) coined the term reference group. These are 
groups which are a reference point for an individual's values and 
opinions. In Turner's way of conceptualizing groups, reference groups 
G) are those which are perceived to be positively categorized on a highly
desirable dimension. This is an important concept which I shall return 
to later. An important point to bear in mind at this stage is that a 
person's reference group need not be one of which he or she is a 
member; quite the contrary, reference groups are often those to which 
individuals aspire to belong.
4.3 Research into Social Influence and Group Membership
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In this section I will examine some re.search which has looked at the 
effects of group membership upon social influence. Most of these are 
field (rather than laboratory) studies, that is investigations which 
occur in 'real life' situations where the researcher tends to have 
little control over the situation. Due to this limitation of field 
research it is often not possible to manipulate the nature of the 
source of influence (for example, examine majority and minority 
influence). Furthermore, the lack of control over the situation 
increases the chance that additional factors, other than those 
proposed by the researchers, determine the findings. However, for 
all the problems inherent in field studies they provide useful 
insights into the processes of social influence and have acted as a 
springboard for contemporary experimental research in this area.
The first study I shall examine is the well known investigation 
conducted by Newcomb (1952). Newcomb conducted his study during the
1930"s at Bennington college for women in the U.S.A.. The students /
—
who entered this college were typically from conservative families and 
held conservative views themselves. In contrast, the senior students 
 ^ and staff held more liberal attitudes. The college was keen to allow
students and staff to express their views about social problems in 
order to acquaint students with the contemporary problems of the world. 
Newcomb found that the initially conservative students shifted their 
attitudes towards those of the more liberal senior students and staff 
during their four years at the college. However, this did not happen 
to all the students but only to those who perceived the senior 
students and staff as a positive reference group; the attitudes of 
those who did not, remained unaffected. In a follow-up study, 
twenty-five years after the initial study, Newcomb et al. (1969) found
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that most of the women had retained the liberal attitudes acquired at 
college. This cannot be attributed to becoming more liberal with age 
^ as the women who attended the college were more liberal than a matched
comparison sample who had not gone to the college,
Newcomb's study shows that individuals' attitudes can be affected by 
the group membership of the source of influence and that the 
importance the target individuals (in this case the students at 
Bennington) attach to membership of that group can be critical in 
determining whether influence occurs. Furthermore, the follow-up 
study shows how strong social influence can be when associated with a 
^ (2) positive reference group.
The field studies by Newcomb (and others, for example Siegel and 
^ Siegel, 1957) can be complemented by considering the approach and
findings of an interesting series of laboratory experiments concerned 
with persuasion which was undertaken at Yale University by Hovland and 
^ his collègues (see Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953), The aim of this
research was to find out which factors affect persuasion. This 
research program is too large to consider in detail here so only those 
D parts relevant to the present discussion shall be presented.O
A number of the studies investigated factors pertaining to the source 
of influence with the consistent finding that a more credible source 
caused subjects to change their attitudes more than a less credible 
source even when they gave the same communication (for example, 
Hovland and Weiss, 1951), The manipulation of credibility often
Ï, /
overlaid out-group status, for example, Aronson and Golden (1962) 
found that white school children were more influenced by a speech 
concerning the usefulness of arithmetic when given by an engineer than
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by someone who washes dishes (it is not unreasonable to assume that 
someone who washes dishes is likely to be perceived as of low status 
compared to an engineer). Furthermore, the school children were more 
influenced by a white engineer (same colour as themselves) than a 
black engineer. This effect was more noticable for prejudiced school 
children than for those who were non—prejudiced showing that strength 
of discrimination (that is, setting oneself apart from an outgroup) 
had an effect,
From such studies it can be seen that group membership can 
affect social influence. However, the exact nature of these effects 
cannot be determined due to the difficulty of understanding the type 
of social influence which took place. For example, many commentators 
refer to Newcomb's study as one of initially conservative students 
, coming to conform to a liberal majority (because they valued their
group membership); however, this conclusion is problematic as there 
were many uncontrolled confounding factors. Therefore, there is a 
need to conduct controlled experiments where the nature of the source 
of influence can be defined in order to be able to determine its 
effects. However, before discussing this research I will first 
consider the theoretical implications of the finding that group 
membership affects social influence processes and, in particular, the 
ability of current theories of social influence to explain this 
effect. After this I will discuss a number of experiments which have 
examined the effects of group membership upon minority influence (the 
choice of minority influence is not a conscious attempt to exclude 
majority influence but I am unaware of any study which has looked at 
majority influence and group membership),
4.3,1 Theoretical Implications of the Effects of Social
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Categorization upon Social Influence
In this section I will consider the theoretical implications of the 
finding that social influence processes can be affected by social 
categorization and in particular that a source of influence which 
forms part of the ingroup of the target of influence tends to have 
more influence than a source of influence who represents an outgroup. 
As a starting point it is useful to consider how the models of social 
influence could account for this finding (the models are described in 
chapter 3). In discussing these explanations I would like to draw a 
distinction between explanations which rely on factors which are 
'internal' to the source of influence, such as personality, 
credibility, etc. and those which rely on factors which are 'external' 
to the source of influence such as, social context, persuasibility of 
target of influence•
According to Moscovici's Dual Process Model, social influence is 
determined by attributions which arise from the source of influence's 
behavioural style, such that the greater the ability of the source of 
influence to cause the target of influence to attribute that it is 
confident, consistent, committed, etc., the more likely that influence 
will take place (see section 3.2.1). The relationship between the 
perception of a positive behavioural style and the amount of influence 
is linear, as one increases, so does the other. A strict 
interpretation of this theory would advocate that a given 
communication would yield a similar perception of behavioural style 
regardless of its group membership and therefore should have a similar 
amount of influence. Of course, this is a very simple interpretation 
of Moscovici's model and he would argue that the perception of 
behavioural style can be affected by group membership, such that being
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opart of the ingroup enhances the perception of a positive behavioural 
style relative to an outgroup.
Although this is a reasonable argument it does not follow from the 
theory. It is quite clear from the model that the explanation of 
social influence is located at the 'internal' level, that is, the 
cause of influence is to be found solely within the source of 
influence whilst factors pertaining to the target of influence do 
not affect this process. Yet as noted above, in order for the model 
to explain the effects of social categorization it has to assume the 
mediating effect of factors outside the source of influence, that is 
the differential perception of the behavioural style by the target of 
influence. The addition of these 'extra' assumptions in order to 
explain the effects of social categorization violates the fundamental 
principle of Moscovici's Theory, namely that minority influence is 
solely located within the source of influence's behavioural style.
Much early research into social influence focussed on conformity and / 
as a result of this work the Functionalist model of social influence 
was developed. This model proposes that social influence is mediated 
through dependency whereby individuals are dependent upon the source 
(2) of influence either for information to verify their position and/or
for the psychological benefits the source can provide. The 
unsuitability of this approach for explaining social influence process 
(particularly minority influence) has been considered earlier (see 
section 3.2.21). This explanation may be able to account for the 
effects of social categorization if one assumes that ingroups cause 
greater dependency than outgroups which in turn leads to greater 
influence. However, this does not overcome the problem of explaining 
social influence process without- recourse to dependency.
Ill
3The final explanation of social influence which we shall consider in 
3 this section is that proposed by Social Impact Theory (SIT, see
section 3.2.22). According to SIT social influence is determined by 
the amount of 'impact' experienced by the target. This impact is a 
3 function of the strength, immediacy and number of the source of
influence. Like Moscovici's Theory, SIT tends to explain social 
influence with recourse to factors internal to the source of influence 
3 and consequently a similar problem occurs when trying to explain the
effects of social categorization. However, it is possible ingroup 
sources of influence have more 'strength' (that is, are more salient 
3 and important) than are outgroup sources of influence which increases
their impact and consequently leads to greater influence.
3 la each of the three explanations of social influence discussed above,
a number of problems have been identified which limit their 
explanation, of the effects of social categorization. The principal 
3 problem is that there is a tendency to explain social influence in
terms of factors located within the source of influence thus 
neglecting the effect of factors pertaining to the target of 
} influence. This raises two important points, first the limited
explanatory power of current theories of social influence and second, 
the need to take into consideration factors internal and external to 
the source of influence.
O
In this section I have dealt with theoretical models of social 
influence whilst in the next section I will consider the issue of 
which process of social influence is most suitable for explaining the 
effects of social categorization in general. In particular, attention 
will be focused on normative and informational social influence. The
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distinction has been made between these sections because these forms 
of social influence do not form theoretical positions by themselves 
rather they tend to cut across existing theories.
4.32 In Search of a Process
While in the last section attention was focussed on the type of 
^ theoretical model required to explain the effects of social
categorization, in this section attention is focussed on the most 
suitable process to explain the effect. As noted before these are 
^ (2) similar and related questions but are treated separately for ease of
presentation. It is worth restating the objective stated towards the 
end of the last section of the need to have an explanation of social 
^ influence which considers factors internal and external to the source
of influence. This objective will serve as part of the criteria in 
chosing a suitable process.
Most theories of social influence have postulated the two forms of 
social influence identified by Deutsch and Gerard (1955) (see section 
 ^^  1.2.4). They made a distinction between normative social influence
which is "..... an influence to conform with the positive expectations 
of another" and informational social influence which is " an 
influence to accept information obtained from another as evidence 
about reality".
Normative social influence can easily be applied to the effects of
/,
social categorization because one would expect an ingroup source to be 
seen to have more 'positive associations' than an outgroup source 
and/or that it can administer social approval. Likewise,
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informational social influence could be employed as an explanation 
since individuals tend to value and use information from ingroup 
^ members as better models of reality than information arising from an 
outgroup. However, the problem with these two processes are that they 
are firmly located within the dependency model. Therefore similar 
problems occur when applying them to explaining the process of 
influence as identified for the Functionalist model, discussed in the 
last section.
An alternative to normative and social influence which may be of value 
in explaining the effects of social categorization has been proposed 
Q  by Turner (1982) and termed 'referent informational influence'. The
advantage of this perspective is that it has been specifically 
developed to explain the effects of ingroup versus outgroup influence. 
The focus of this perspective is to understand the experience of being 
ii^ fluenced and the consequence of agreeing with a source of influence.
)O
4.3.21 Referent Informational Influence (RII)
The concept of referent informational influence (RII) was developed 
out of the the work into intergroup behaviour conducted at Bristol 
University by Tajfel and his collègues. The research led to the 
development of the highly influential Social Identity Theory which is 
based on the concept of social identity' (that is, our knowledge of 
and the emotional value we place on belonging to certain groups) which 
is derived from the process by which individuals categorize people 
into different groups. Basically, individuals are motivated to acquire 
a positive social identity and do so by discriminating against an 
outgroup. One of the consequences of this process is that individuals
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tend to over-évaluâte ingroup characteristics and under-evaluate 
outgroup characteristics in order to maximize the perceived 
differences between the groups. In fact, maximizing the difference 
between the ingroup and outgroup appears to be/stronger motive than 
merely maximizing ingroup gain (Tajfel et al. 1971).
Tajfel (1959, 1972) has distinguished between the inductive and 
deductive functions of the process of categorization. The deductive 
function refers to the process whereby individuals are assigned 
characteristics on the basis of their group membership (for example, 
Scottish people are mean, accountants are boring, males are 
aggressive). On the other hand, the inductive function refers to the 
process by which characteristics are inferred from one or more 
individuals to all members of that category (for example, assuming 
that all estate agents are_deyious from observing a few instances of 
deviousness). Therefore, induction is the process of inferring 
typical group characteristics from experiencing a few group members
while deduction is the process of assigning these typical group /
~  /
characteristics to all group members. Both these processes can be 
observed in the formation of stereotyes. Their effect is that, in 
intergroup situations, there is a tendency for individuals to minimize 
the perceived differences (such as, personality, ability, opinions) in 
members of the ingroup whilst maximizing the perceived differences 
between members of the ingroup and outgroup (Tajfel, 1969).
There is evidence that the stereotyping effects caused by a 
categorization process are exaggerated in situations where ingroup 
membership is made salient (for example, Hensley and Duval, 1976) and 
when ingroup membership is evaluated favourably (for example, Myers, 
1962, Kahn and Ryan, 1972). These researchers show that making group
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membership salient has certain consequences. This can be more 
dramatically observed in studies which have shown that group members 
conform to group norms even in the absence of explicit attempts to 
exert social influence (for example, Charters and Newcomb, 1952;
Doise, 1969). Such work demonstrates that group members have a model 
of the critical group norms which characterise their group and conform
to these in order to obtain a positive group identity.
Turner (1982) has taken this reasoning further and states that "Common
category characteristics are inferred from the available exemplars of 
the category, including oneself, and then automatically assigned, 
along with long-term critical traits, to all members, again including 
oneself" (p.29). In other words, group members are aware of the 
characteristics of a typical group member and assign these 
, characteristics to themselves and other group members.
In order to explain this process Turner has developed the concept of 
Referent Informational Influence (RII) which has links with Deutsch 
and Gerard's (1955) Informational Social Influence. RII can be 
summarized as having three stages; first, individuals define 
themselves as members of a particular group, second, they become aware 
Q  of the typical (or stereotyical) characteristics of that group and
third, they assign these typical characteristics to themselves.
Turner (1982) has examined the difference between RII and Normative 
Social Influence (NI) and Informational Social Influence (II). This 
comparison will be presented here as it is relevant to the discussion 
in the last section which directly examined the suitability of these 
two processes to explain the effects of social categorization and 
social influence.
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"(i) Who is one influenced by?
NI: People with power to reward conformity and punish deviation 
(usually attractive others).
II: Similar people who provide information about physical or social 
reality.
RII: People who provide information about critical norms of one's 
social category.
(ii) What is the vehicle of social influence?
NI• Social communication from group members or group pressure'.
11: Social comparisons with group members.
Rll. Social identification — the process by which one defines oneself 
as a category member, forms a group stereotype on the basis of other 
category members's behaviour, and applies the stereotype to oneself.
(iii) Under what conditions does conformity increase?
NI: When one's behaviour is under surveillance by fellow group 
members.
II: When physical or social reality is ambiguous, complex or 
problematic^^ some way.
(2^  ^11* When one s group membership (self—definition as a group member)
is salient.
(iv) What does one conform to?
NI: The observable behaviour of other group members.
II: Ditto.
RII: One's own beliefs about the appropriate behaviour for all 
category members." (P.31-32).
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4.4 Research into Minority Influence and 
) ^ Social Categorization
Having established the importance of social categorization to the 
) social influence process I shall now turn to review research which has
examined the effects of social categorization upon minority influence. 
One of the first experiments to consider the effects of social 
) categorization upon minority influence was conducted by Nemeth and
Wachtler (1973). Subjects were required to indicate their preference 
between 19 pairs of pictures, one of which was labelled 'Italian' and 
) Q  the other 'German' (the labelling was random). The experiment took
place in a group of five, which consisted of four American subjects 
and one confederate who consistently chose the Italian or German 
) picture throughout the experiment. The confederate was presented as
being of Italian, German or unknown ethnic origin. In addition to 
these six experimental conditions there was also a control condition 
)  ^ where no confederate was present.
Nemeth and Wachtler predicted that when a confederate consistently
) prefered a picture from his/her own country it would be seen as biased
and therefore have little influence. However, their results were 
difficult to interpret as there was an unexpectedly significant 
y pj^ gf0X‘ence for italian pictures in the control condition (that is,
when no confederate was present). Also, to confuse matters even more, 
subjects became more pro-German (compared to the control condition) in 
 ^ every experimental condition.
In a post-experimental questionnaire subjects were required to 
s indicate how biased they thought the other subjects in the group had
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been. The confederates were seen as being more biased than the naive 
subjects. More importantly, when the confederate preferred a painting 
from his/her own country they were seen as having the greatest bias. 
This is supportive of Nemeth and Wachtler's original hypothesis but 
does not explain why this perceived increased bias did not lead to a 
decrease in influence. Nemeth and Wachtler suggest that when a 
confederate showed a preference for pictures from his/her own country, 
he/she may have been seen as having greater knowledge and hence 
competence. "Thus, rather than being a negative quality, this bias on 
the basis of ethnic origin may have made the situation more 
comprehensible and may have suggested knowledge and honesty on the 
part of the confederate". One should treat this explanation with 
caution because, as the experimenters themselves point out, this may 
have been true when the German confederate showed a preference for 
German paintings but not when the Italian confederate showed a 
preference for the Italian paintings since the latter confederate did 
not have superior influence compared to the other conditions.
An important paper published by Maass, Clark and Haberkom (1982) 
addressed some of the issues arising out of the Nemeth and Wachtler 
paper and provided an important distinction which was to have a major 
influence on research in this area. The authors made a distinction 
between a single minority defined as "individuals who deviate from the 
majority only in terms of their beliefs" and double minority which 
"differs from the majority not only in terms of their beliefs but also 
in terms of ascribed category membership".
In their experiment four male subjects discussed the topic of abortion 
or death penalty with either two male (single) or two female (double) 
confederates who argued a minority position. They found that a single
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)minority tended, although not significantly, to have more influence 
than a double minority. A post-experimental questionnaire revealed 
that the double minorities were perceived as having greater 
self-interest in the topic than did single minorities. Maass et al. 
concluded that the attribution of self-interest ma^ "..... offer an 
alternative cause for the minority's deviance and, thus allow the 
majority observers to discount the arguments of the minority". In 
other words, a minority may lose its potential influence if it argues 
in favour of its own position since its arguments may be considered 
biased.
There are a number of problems in the Maass et al. experiment. First, 
since different confederates were employed in each condition, it is 
possible that the effect could have been due to differences in the 
, confederates rather than the single/double minority manipulation.
Second, and more importantly, the single minority always consisted of 
males while the double minority always consisted of females; the fact 
that single minorities had more influence could be due to a greater 
influencing ability of males as opposed to females. A more 
satisfactory design would be to manipulate the sex^^ the subject and 
the minority status, such that both male and female subjects face a 
2^^  single and double minority (this hypothesis is tested in my fourth
experiment, chapter 6). Third, the data for the measurement of 
self-interest was collapsed across the abortion and death penalty 
issues because there was no significant differences between them. 
Whilst it is possible that the minority of females (double) may have 
been seen to have greater interest in the topic of abortion than a 
minority of males (single), it is hard to imagine why the same should 
be true for the death penalty issue.
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Maass and Clark (1983a) have tried to overcome some of these problems 
by having groups of four (presumably heterosexual) female subjects 
discuss the topic of gay rights with two female confederates who 
argued in favour of gay rights. The confederates were either 
presented as 'straight' (single minority) or 'gay' (double minority). 
They found that single minorities caused subjects to become more in 
favour of gay rights than did double minorities thus replicating the . 
findings of the Maass et al. (1982) experiment. Unfortunately no 
measures of self-interest reported, therefore one can only
speculate whether the gay minority was not as influential as the 
straight minority because of a greater perceived self-interest.
The final experiment to be considered was conducted by Mugny, Kaiser 
and Papastamou (1983). The experiment was conducted before a 
referendum in Switzerland_which showed that the majority of Swiss 
people (over 83%) were not in favour of the presence of foreign ' 
workers in their country. The subjects were secondary school pupils
who filled in questionnaires about the presence of foreign workers a
-
few days before the referendum took place. After completing the 
questionnaire they read a text which was favourable to foreign workers 
and was therefore a minority position as only about 16% of the Swiss 
population agreed with it at the subsequent referendum. The text was 
portrayed as being the work of either a Swiss or foreign minority 
group. Subjects indicated on a 7-point scale the extent of their 
agreement with the text. Consistent with previous research, the 
experimenters found that subjects were more influenced by the Swiss 
minority (single) than the foreign minority (double).
In summary, the experiments of Maass et al. (1982) , Maass and Clark 
(1983a) and Mugny et al. (1983) found that a minority which was a
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similar social group as the subjects had greater influence than a 
minority which was from a different social group. Nemeth and Wachtler 
(1973) predicted such a finding but failed to find the effect due to 
an unexpected high preference for Italian paintings in the control 
condition.
4.4.1 Issues arising out of Research Into Social 
Categorization and Minority Influence
Three issues can be noted in these studes which have been taken into 
consideration when devising the main research design of this thesis 
(see section 6.2). First, all the previous experiments employed a 
double minority which had higher self-interest in the topic than the 
single minority. The variables of self-interest and minority status 
have thus been confounded with the result that it is unclear whether 
the double minority had less influence because it was from a different 
social group than the single minority or because it was perceived as 
having a greater self-interest and therefore biased (cf. Maass et al., 
1982). /
Mugny has suggested that there are certain 'ideological barriers' to 
the processes of influence which reduce the potential impact of 
minorities. He calls these barriers 'naturalization' processes which 
result in "destroying the credibility of a minority by imputing its 
consistent behaviours to 'natural characteristics'" (Mugny, 1982). 
One of the most common forms of naturalization is psychologization 
which involves attributing the cause of a minority's behaviour to 
internal personal factors. It is possible that the perception of 
self-interest could be a form of psychologization in that subjects
/
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)attribute the behaviours of the minority to an internal cause, that is 
as being biased.
Therefore, the first aim of my own research was to utilise a topic 
which had equal self-interest for both groups. The issue raised above 
about self-interest is not solely a methodological point, for, 
although there are minorities which espouse positions which are only 
in their own interest (for example. Black Power), there are also 
minorities which argue positions which are in the interests of other 
groups besides themselves (for example, environmentalists). While the 
former may be considered to be a self-interest group the latter can be 
(2) considered a shared interest group.
It is important to stress that the distinction between self- and 
shared interest is not limited to the source of influence. For 
example, Mugny, Perez, Kaiser and Papastamou (1984) conducted an 
experiment where Swiss or foreign subjects received a minority 
communication, arguing in favour of the presence of foreigners, from 
either a Swiss or foreign source of influence. In this situation the 
definition of self-interest can only be conceptualized when 
considering the relationship between the source and target of 
influence (for example, the foreign minority arguing in favour of 
foreigners would be considered a self-interest group to the Swiss 
subjects but a shared interest group to the foreign subjects).
O
The second issue relevant to this field of research concerns the level
at which minority influence is measured. Most of the experiments have
- '
only measured minority influence on public responses. This is 
particularly important as it has been consistently shown that 
minorities tend to have greater influence on a latent or private level
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than upon a manifest or public level (see section 2.4). Therefore, a 
second aim of my own resaerch has been to measure the effects of 
social categorization upon minority influence on a public and private 
level.
The third issue arising out of previous research concerns the 
allocation of individuals into different categories. Recent research 
into intergroup relations by Tajfel and his collègues has shown that 
the mere categorization of individuals into groups is sufficient to 
promote intergroup discrimination (for example, Tajfel, Flament, 
Billig and Bundy, 1971). This results in over-evaluation of the 
ingroup and under-evaluation of the outgroup. Tajfel and Turner 
(1979) suggest that individuals are motivated to gain self-esteem 
through the acquisition of a 'positive social identity' where social 
identity refers to the "individual's knowledge of his membership of 
certain social groups and the emotional and evaluative meaning - 
resulting from their membership" (Tajfel, 1972). A positive identity 
is achieved for the individual by engaging in self-favouring social
/'
. / 
comparisons with other groups so that one's own group is perceived
more favourable than the other group. While the distinction between
single and double minorities is similar to that between ingroup and
2^) outgroup minorities, previous research has used groups that differ in
terms of group membership but do not engage in intergroup
discrimination. An attempt will be-made in my own research to use
groups that actively discriminate against each other.
o
)
4.4.2 Applying Referent Informational Influence to Minority 
Influence
In discussing the concept of Referent Informational Influence, Turner
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was specifically interested in the way individuals conformed to the 
group norm. However, our concern in this thesis is minority influence 
and therefore it is necessary to make RII relevant to this, especially 
as it has been argued that the process of conformity is not suitable 
for explaining minority influence. This analysis has been attempted 
by Mugny (1982) who states that, as a consequence of being influenced, 
individuals change their social identity to match that of the source 
of influence. He has paraphrased Turner's three stages of RII to a 
situation of social influence; "(1) the target-subject defines the 
source of influence attempt as belonging in a particular social 
category; (2) the subject 'knows' the stereotypical characteristics of 
^2) this category; (3) when he adopts or approaches the response of the
source, he assigns to himself not only this response but also the 
stereotypical characteristics of the source" (Mugny and Papastamou, 
1982,p.381).
This analysis suggests that following social influence the target not 
only agrees with the source's response but also becomes part of its 
group and self-attributes the typical characteristics arising from 
membership of the source's group. It follows that social influence is 
) more likely to occur when the image of the source of influence
corresponds with positive connotations than when it corresponds with 
negative connotations. Therefore the extent to which individuals will 
change is determined by the extent to which they have to redefine 
their social identity following social influence. This may explain why 
majorities tend to have more influence than minorities (at least 
publicly) since the latter are associated with more negative 
characteristics than the former and hence would require a greater 
change in terms of identification. The resistance to agree with a 
minority may be due to the fact that self-attributing the negative
1 2 5
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characteristics associated with the minority group involves a certain 
'social cost' (Mugny, 1982) to the individual.
4.5 Social Identification Model of Social Influence
A number of relevant ideas have been presented which have helped in 
understanding the effects of social categorization upon social 
influence. In this section I would like to integrate and develop some 
of these ideas in order to achieve a framework in which to understand 
the processes of minority and majority influence and, in particular,
^ (2) the effects of ingroup and outgroup minorities. This model is based
upon the work of Tajfel, Moscovici and Mugny and focusses upon the 
individual's identity and the consequence to that identity as a result 
of social influence processes. As a starting point, it is necessary 
to examine the consequence of social influence in terms of the 
redefining of social identification. It is this perspective which will 
^ later be tested in the experiments reported in chapters 5-8.
Mugny has used the term 'social cost' to signify the change of 
 ^ identity following minority influence. This term refers to the fact
that when individuals change their social identification they also 
self-attribute the negative connotations associated with minority 
status. As Mugny (1982) states "..... social identification with the 
minority has certain hazards; in fact, to identify oneself with a 
minority is to run the same risks that the minority runs, since this
identification involves attributing to oneself the characteristics of
■ /
the minority" (p.128). The concept of 'social cost' is very useful in 
understanding why individuals resist social influence, however, I 
would like to suggest two alterations to this concept which would
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improve its explanatory power and increase its heuristic value.
First, in discussing the concept of social cost Mugny has not outlined 
"'the defining parameters of the concept, that is, what factors 
contribute to social cost. This may well be due to the fact that the 
concept is a new one and ambiguity is preferable. However, research 
into social identity has often proposed that there also exists,a 
personal identity. Whereas social identity is concerned with 
individuals' knowledge of their group memberships, personal identity 
is concerned with the individuals' knowledge of their unique 
(personal) characteristics. With this in mind, it would be easy to 
make the mistake that social cost refers only to characteristics 
deriving from social identity and not from personal identity.
Therefore I would like to replace the term 'social cost' with 
'psychological cost' to refer to the change in individuals' identity 
(social and personal) as a result of social influence processes. The 
major difference between psychological cost and social cost is that 
the former is a more global concept which incorporates the latter.
O
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Second, in my opinion the concept of social influence leading to a 
(psychological) 'cost' is limited because it implies that the only 
outcome of redefining social identity is one which involves a 
(negative) cost. This focus could be due to the fact that Mugny's 
analysis was limited to minority influence where one would expect 
redefining social identity to incur psychological cost since 
minorities are usually associated with negative characteristics. 
However, one can imagine situations where social influence does not 
lead to changes in identification which result in a psychological 
cost; in fact, there may be instances where such a change has 
psychological benefits. In particular, influence attempts by
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individuals or groups who possess a desirable identification (that is, 
who are associated with positively valued characteristics) would 
result in a change of social identity in the targëtr individliaf 'which 
is perceived as beneficial since they would be self—attributing the 
positive characteristics of the desirable group.
It is the nature of the source of influence which determines whether 
redefining social identity results in a psychological cost or benefit. 
To be more specific, groups which are perceived as having a desirable 
image and would entail the self-attribution of positive 
characteristics would result in a redefinition of social identity 
which would involve a psychological benefit. On the other hand, 
groups which are perceived as undesirable and would entail the 
self-attribution of negative characteristics would lead to a 
redefinition of social identity involving a psychological cost (and 
this is why such groups would be less influential).
At this stage the model can be summarized formally and then applied to 
majority and minority influence. Central to this model is the concept 
of redefining social identity and it is proposed that as a result of 
being influenced individuals redefine their social identity involving 
the self-attribution of the stereotypical characteristics believed to 
be associated with the source of influence's group. It follows that 
influence will vary as a function of the difference between the 
strength of identification the individual has with his or her own 
group and the extent to which the source of influence's group is 
perceived to be different. As this difference increases the 
psychological cost/benefit of redefining social identity is greater 
since the self-attributions become progressively more 
negative/ positive^resulting in a decrease/increase in influence. The
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amount of psychological cost/benefit is determined by (a) the strength 
of identification with own group and (b) the desirability of the 
source of influence. It should be noted that this discussion has 
assumed that groups have an equal self-interest in the topic.
However, when self-interest is not equal, then one has to take into 
^ consideration the relevance of the topic to group membership, such
that, the more relevant the topic is to group membership the greater 
would be the resulting psychological cost/benefit of being influenced.
Whether redefining social identity will lead to a psychological cost 
or benefit depends on the nature of the source of influence and the 
desirability of the characteristics to be self-attributed. In 
general, majorities are associated with desirable characteristics and 
3 therefore being influenced would involve a redefinition of social
identity entailing a psychological benefit. On the other hand, 
minorities.are usually associated with undesirable characteristics and 
3 would therefore require a redefinition of social identity which would
incur a psychological cost.
3 ^22 At this point it is important to consider the relationship between the
psychological cost-benefit dimension and the manifest-latent level of 
influence dimension. I am in agreement with Moscovici's analysis of 
comparison and evaluation processes. According to Moscovici, since 
minorities are perceived to be distinctive (in the sense that they 
have an anti—normative position), individuals are motivated to engage 
in a validation process whereby they cognitively reassess the topic
/
under consideration in an attempt to understand the minority's 
position. As a result of this, if attitude change occurs it is 
unlikely to be on a manifest level, since individuals will not wish to
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s appear 'openly deviant' by publicly agreeing with a minority, but may 
do so on a latent (or private) level where agreement with a deviant 
source is disguised. On the other hand, majorities cause individuals 
to engage in a comparison process whereby they compare themselves with 
the majority and change their attitudes to the majority's view in 
order to be psychologically part of the majority.
The social identification model makes a similar analysis to that of 
Moscovici. However, there is an impor tant difference concerning the 
issue of distinctiveness. Whereas to Moscovici distinctiveness 
concerns attitude distinctiveness, to the social identification model 
distinctiveness concerns the perceived target source of influence 
difference in terms of social identification (identification 
distinctiveness). Of course, to a certain extent, attitudes often 
overlay group membership, such that, individuals from a similar group 
have a similar belief system. The greater the identification 
distinctiveness, the greater the attitude change. However, when 
identification distinctiveness correlates with psychological benefit 
(such as, occurs in majority influence), most attitude change occurs 
on a manifest level (relative to a private level) in order to publicly 
2^) self—attribute the desirable characteristics of the source of
influence. On the other hand, when identification distinctiveness is 
correlated with psychological cost (as in minority influence) most 
attitude change occurs on a private level (relative to a manifest 
level) in order that the individual avoids publicly self—attributing
the undesirable characteristics associated with the source of
influence.
We can turn our attention to answer the question concerning the main 
theme of this thesis, namely the effects of social categorization upon
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minority influence. Drawing upon the above analysis of the social 
identification model of social influence, it is quite clear what 
predictions it would make concerning ingroup and outgroup minorities. 
Since outgroup minorities are associated with a more undesirable image 
(and associated with more negative characteristics) they would impose 
a greater psychological cost on the target group when they come to 
redefine their social identity following influence attempts.
Therefore, outgroup minorities will have less influence than ingroup 
minorities on a public level since individuals will want to avoid 
publicly to self-attribute the negative characteristics of the 
outgroup minority. However, since outgroup minorities will be more 
distinctive than ingroup minorities, they will cause individuals to 
engage in a validation process to a greater extent, resulting in more 
private influence. In short, ingroup minorities will have superior 
influence, compared to an outgroup minority, in public while the 
opposite should be true in private.
4.6 Hypotheses
In this section I shall outline the hypotheses which are tested in the 
experiments presented in chapters 5 to 8. These hypotheses are derived 
from the social identification model described earlier and are 
presented in the order in which they are tested in the experiments.
The first group of hypotheses are concerned with the effects of 
majority and minority influence upon public and private levels and are 
similar to those espoused by Moscovici (1980). These hypotheses are 
tested in experiments 1, 2 and 3 discussed in chapter 5.
Hypothesis 1 - Majority influence should be greater in public than in
131
oprivate. Since majorities are associated with a desirable 
identification, individuals' acceptance of influence represents a 
'psychological benefit' whereby they self-attribute the positive 
characteristics associated with majorities.
Hypothesis 2 — Minority influence should be greater in private than in
public. Since minorities are associated with negative 
characteristics, individuals will resist publicly agreeing with a 
minority in order to avoid self—attributing its negative image. To
publicly accept the influence of a minority would result in a
psychological cost' to theindlvidual However, since minorities are 
distinctive (in terms of attitude and identity) they motivate 
individuals to engage in a 'validation process' whereby they 
cognitively re-evaluate the minority's communication which results in 
a private or latent change.
Hypothesis 3 — There should be an interaction between the nature of 
the source of influence (that is majority or minority) and the level 
of influence (that is, public or private). This follows from 
hypothesis 1 and 2 which predicts a differential effect for majorities 
and minorities upon different levels of influence (that is, majority 
influence will be greater in public than private while the opposite 
effect is predicted for minority influence). ■ -
The next group of hypotheses^^^ concerned with the effects of ingroup 
and outgroup minorities upon public and private levels of influence. 
These hypotheses are tested by experiments 4,5,6 and 7 and discussed 
in chapters 6 and 7.
Hypothesis 4 - Ingroup minorities should have more influence than
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)outgroup minorities. This hypothesis is consistent with previous 
research in this area. The 'psychological cost' associated with being 
influenced by an outgroup minority is greater than that associated 
with an ingroup minority. Therefore, outgroup minorities should have 
less influence than ingroup minorities since individual^iU not want 
to publicly self-attribute the negative identification associated with
outgroups.
Hypothesis 5 - When the categorization dimension concerns sex, ingroup 
minorities should have more influence than outgroup minorities 
regardless of the sex of the minority. This hypothesis is specific to 
Q  a methodological problem noted in an experiment by Maass et_al. (1982)
where male subjects received influence attempts either by an ingroup 
minority consisting of males or an outgroup minority consisting of 
females. The greater influencing ability of ingroup minorities in 
that experiment could have been due to the greater influencing ability 
of males (as opposed to females) rather than due to the fact that it 
represented an ingroup to the subjects (see section 4.4). According 
to the social identification model, a minority of the same sex as the 
subject should have more influence than a minority of the opposite sex 
as the subject for both male and female subjects.
O
Hypothesis 6 - When responses are made in private, outgroup minorities 
should have more influence than ingroup minorities. Since outgroup 
minorities are more distinctive in terms of their identification they 
would impose a greater 'psychological cost' in publicly agreeing with 
them compared to ingroup minorities; outgroup minorities motivate 
individuals to engage in a 'validation process' to a greater extent 
than do ingroup minorities and hence result in greater private change.
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Hypothesis 7 - There should be an interaction between the nature of a 
minority's group membership (that is ingroup or outgroup) and the 
level of influence (that is, public or private). This follows from 
hypotheses 5 and 6 which predict a differential impact of ingroup and 
outgroup minorities upon different levels of influence (that is, 
ingroup minorities should have more influence than outgroup minorities 
in public responses while the opposite should be true for private 
responses).
Hypothesis 8 - In situations where no influence attempts are made, 
changes in attitudes should not be a function of the procedure for 
collecting public and private responses. In control conditons, where 
subjects do not receive a persuasive communication, there should be no 
difference between responses which are made in public and those made 
in private. This result would indicate that any differential influence 
of majorities and minorities observed on different levels of influence 
is due to the influence manipulation itself, and not the response
/
manipulation.
The last group of hypotheses are concerned with the effects of social 
(2) categorization upon minority influence when the social categorization
dimension is based upon relatively trivial criteria. By examining 
ingroup and outgroup minorities which are categorized by a trivial 
dimension it is possible to examine the minimum conditions necessary 
for ingroups to have more influence than outgroups. These hypotheses 
are tested by experiments 8,9 and 10 and discussed in chapter 8.
Hypothesis 9 - Ingroup minorities should have more influence than 
out group minorities when the categorization dimension is based upon
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orelatively trivial criteria. There is a tendency for individuals to
assume that an outgroup has a more negative identification than an
of
ingroup even in the absence^social information to support such a 
conjecture. Even when categorization is based upon trivial criteria, 
individuals will tend to overlay such a dimension with evaluative 
connotations that favour the ingroup and discriminate aginst the 
outgroup. Since 'psychological cost' is associated with the group 
membership of the source of influence, outgroup minorities will be 
associated with more psychological cost' than ingroup minorities even 
when categorization is based upon relatively trivial criteria because 
subjects assume that outgroups have a negative identification 
(compared to an ingoup).
Hypothesis 10 — Minorities which are associated with a desirable image 
(that is, poitively valued characteristics) should have more influence 
than minorities which are associated with an undesirable image (that 
is, negatively valued characteristics). The 'psychological cost' 
incurred when being influenced by a minority with a desirable 
identification should be less than that when being influenced by a ' 
minority with an undesirable identification. In this sense, 
desirability of the identification highlights an intergoup context,
2^) such that undesirable identification acquires an outgroup status.
Hypothesis 11 — The predicted effects of social categorization upon 
minority influence should only appear when the categorization 
dimension is supported by an intergroup context. In other words, when 
individuals are led to believe that group membership is not associated 
with intergroup attributions that favour the ingroup and discriminate 
against the outgroup, there should be no effect of social 
categorization. For example, the effect of ingroup minorities having
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greater influence (at the public level) than outgroup minorities 
should not occur when individuals believe that there is no similarity 
between themselves and other members of their own group.
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PART TWO : THE EXPERIMENTS
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CHAPTER 5
5.1 Introduction to Chapter 5
Chapters 5 ,6,7 and 8 will report on the 10 experiments which were 
conducted in order to test the hypotheses set out in section 4.6.
 ^O Three experiments are discussed in this chapter which were exploratory
in nature and so can be considered to be pilot studies. They are
nevertheless reported here because they contributed to the theoretical
) development of the social identification model and the development of
the research design which is discussed in the next chapter. The first 
two experiments address the hypotheses concerning the differential
 ^ influence of minority and majority influence upon a public and private
level. Three hypotheses concerning the first two experiments can be 
stated. These are described in more detail in the last chapter and 
Q  shall only be briefly outlined here. The first hypothesis states that
majority influence should be greater when responses are made in public 
than when made in private. Contrary to this, minority influence should 
be greater in private than in public (hypothesis 2). Finally, due to 
the differential impact proposed by the first two hypotheses, there 
s h o u l d  be an interaction between the nature of the source of influence
(that is, majority or minority) and level of influence (that is publm
or private).
The third experiment discussed in this chapter was a preliminary
)
138
"investigation into the effects of social categorization upon minority 
influence. The hypotheses relevant to this experiment will not be 
discussed here as the experiment contained a number of flaws 
(nevertheless it was useful for developing the main research design of 
this thesis).
5.2 Experiment 1
5.2.1 Method
O
5.2.11 Subjects and Design
The subjects were 24 (14 males and 10 females) members of staff from 
the Open University. Subjects' occupations ranged from 
administration, secretarial to academic (none of the subjects were 
employed within the Psychology Discipline).
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the majority or minority 
influence conditions. The design was thus a 2(minority v majority) x 
(2) 2(direct v indirect influence) with the first variable being a
between-subject factor and the second variable a witbin-subject 
factor. There were 12 subjects in each condition.
5.2.12 Procedure
The experiment was conducted in two stages with approximately a 
duration of two weeks between each stage.
139
stage 1: Subjects completed a 16 item questionnaire developed by
) Mugny (1982) to measure attitudes towards responsibility for pollution
(see Appendix A). Each item was accompanied by a 9-point scale (from 
1 'Totally Agree' to 9 'Totally Disagree'.
Stage 2: Approximately 2 weeks after stage 1, subjects were asked to 
complete the same questionnaire after they had read a communication 
) which was either alleged to represent viewpoints held by under 10% of
the population (minority influence condition) or by over 90% of the 
population (majority influence condition). This communication 
) (2) consisted of 5 paragraphs, some of which placed total blame for
pollution upon industries (for example, the car industry) while others 
exonerated individuals (for example, farmers). The full text is 
) contained in Appendix B. Note that the 'slogans' used by Mugny to
induce an attribution of a fair or rigid communication were not used
in this experiment.
After completing the questionnaire for the second time, subjects rated 
the image of the source of influence upon four indices of behavioural 
, style: consistent, committed, confident and rigid. Ratings were made
upon 9-point scales.
O
5.2.2 Results
5.2.21 Influence Scores
The questionnaire consisted of four types of statements;
(a) four statements blaming industry for being responsible for
140
pollution,
_ blaiming
(b) four statements ' social categories,
 ^ (c) four statements denying that industry was to blame and,
(d) four statements denying that social categories were to blame.
 ^ Comparison of the questionnaire items with the text reveals that
statements (a) and (d) appear almost verbatim within the 
communication. Any changes on these items will reflect direct 
 ^ influence. On the other hand, statements (b) and (c) do not appear in
the text but are implicit within the text's arguments. Any changes on 
these items will reflect indirect influence. Influence is calculated 
 ^ ss the difference between pre-test and post—test questionnaire scores.
Mean influence scores are given below in Table 1.
O
Table 1
Mean Influence scores as a Function of Source of Influence*
Direct Indirect
Minority Influence 0.42 * 0.31
Majority Influence 0.56 -0.29
[*scores represent mean change on 9-point scales where a positive 
score represents change in the direction of the source of 
influence,n=12]
/
/
The influence scores were subjected to a 2(minority v majority 
influence) x 2(direct v indirect item) ANOVA. Overall there was no 
difference in the amount of influence caused by a minority (X=0.63)
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and a majority (X=0.14) [F<1]. However, there was greater direct 
influence (X=0.49) than indirect influence (X=0.01)
 ^ [F(l,22)=10.54,P<0.004] and, as predicted by hypothesis 3, there was a
significant interaction between the variables [F(1,22)=6.36,P<0.02].
 ^ The condition means were examined using the Newman-Keuls comparison of
means procedure. There was no difference between direct and indirect 
items for minority influence which does not support hypothesis 2.
 ^ However, the first hypothesis was supported as majority influence was
greater on direct items than indirect items (P<0.01). Also, while 
there was no difference between minority and majority influence on 
 ^ Ç \  direct items, minorities caused significantly more change on indirect
items than did majorities (PCO.Ol). Looking at the pattern of the 
means it is clear that the significant interaction between the two 
 ^ main variables is due to the negative influence exerted by majorities
on indirect items.
)O
5.2.22 Image of the Source Ratings
Subjects rated the image of the source of influence on four 9-point 
scales. Mean ratings are given below in Table 2.
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nTable 2
Mean Ratings of the Image of the Source of Influence*
Consistent Committ ed Confident Rigid
Majority^ 7.42 8.09 7.67 7.66
Minority 7.42 8.17 6.59 6.08
t 0.0 0.43 2.18 2.35
P< n.s. n.s. 0.05 0.05
[*scores are means on 9-point scale, higher the score the greater the
possesion of th attribute, unrelated two--tailed t-test, d.f.=22,n=12]
There was no difference of the rating of 'consistent' or 'committed'. 
However, majorities were rated as significantly more 'confident' and 
'rigid' than were minorities.
5.2.3 Discussion of Experiment 1
(2) The results obtained for experiment 1 are similar to those observed by
Moscovici et al. (1981) for their immediate measures of influence.
Like that experiment, there was greater influence on direct items than
)
indirect items. All the condition means are in the predicted 
direction with hypotheses 1 and 3 being supported while hypothesis 2 
was not supported. However, since hypothesis 1 and 2 required a 
comparison between direct and indirect items an important point should 
be stated. Since direct and indirect items are different measures of 
influence, differences between them may merely reflect differences in
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the measuring techniques themselves rather than in the influence 
manipulation.
However, comparisons within an item type are legitimate as the same 
measuring technique is employed. It is interesting to note that 
minorities had significantly more influence than majorities on 
indirect items which could be interpreted as some evidence in favour 
of hypothesis 2.
Experiment 2 uses the similar experimental material as experiment 1 
and addresses^number of problems associated with the research design. 
These can be briefly noted;
(i) the same measure of direct and indirect influence is employed 
,. which enables comparisons to be made between conditions,
(ii) instead of direct and indirect measures of influence, public and 
private responses are taken,
(iii) whereas experiment 1 measured attitudes towards pollution 
before and after subjects had read the text - (within-subjects measure), 
experiment 2 only measures attitudes towards pollution after subjects
Ç) have read a text (between-subjects measure).
(iv) the source of influence manipulation is checked by asking 
subjects to estimate the number of people, they think would agree with 
the text.
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5.3 Experiment 2
O
5.3.1 Method
5.3.11 Subjects and Design
The subjects were 64 (38 females and 26 males) Open University 
) students attending Summer School. Their ages ranged from 26-60 years,
The experiment was a 2(minority v majority influence) x 2(public v 
private response) completely between-subjects design with 16 subjects
) (2) per condition.
5.3.12 Procedure
Subjects were tested in groups of 3-5 individuals. Each subject was 
given a booklet which stated that a national survey had asked 
individuals "to what extent do you place the blame for pollution upon 
industry (for example, automobile industry) and individuals (for 
) ^  example, farmers)?". The subjects were then told that the results of
the survey had shown that either under 10% (minority influence 
condition) or over 90% of individuals (majority influence condition) 
stated that they "placed total blame upon industry and no blame upon 
individuals".
The subjects then read a text which reflected this belief, this was
.  /
the same as for experiment 1 (see Appendix A). After reading the text 
subjects were required to indicate on a 9-point scale the extent to 
which they agreed with the source of influence. At this stage the
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response manipulation was employed. Subjects were either asked to 
remember their response because they would later to required to tell
the other members of the group (public response condition) or they were 
asked to place their response into a sealed 'ballot box' so that no 
one would ever know what they had written (private response 
condition).
All subjects were then asked to indicate "What percentage of
would
individuals in society /( . you expect to agree with the position
advocated by the passages?". The experiment ended at this point, 
subjects in the public response condition did not have to reveal their 
response.
5.3.2 Results
5.3.21 Source of Influence Manipulation
Subjects were asked to indicate the percentage of individuals in 
society they believed would agree with the authors of the text. The 
purpose of this was to chack that the source of influence manipulation 
Q  had been successful. The data from this was subjected to a 2(minority
V majority influence) x 2(public v private response) between—subjectS' 
ANOVA. Mean percentage estimates are given below in Table 3.
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Table 3
Mean Percentage Estimates of Agreement with the 
Source of Influence*
Minority Influence
Majority Influence
Public
39.4
(24.2)
65.0
(12.9)
Private
50.3
(23.2)
67.8
(19.8)
[*scores refer to mean estimates of percentage, numbers in brackets 
are standard deviations,n=l6]
O
As expected subjects estimated that more people would agree with the 
text in the majority condition (X=66.4) than when in the minority 
condition (X=44.8),[F(1,60)=17.65,P<0.0001]. Also, there was no 
difference when subjects were in the public (X=52.2) or in the private 
(X=59.1) response conditions [F(1,60)=1.79] nor was there a 
significant interaction between the variables [F<1].
The evidence from the ANOVA strongly suggests that subjects believed' 
that more people would agree with the text when informed that it 
represented a majority viewpoint that if told it represented a 
minority viewpoint. This finding was not affected by the response 
condition subjects had been in. Therefore one can conclude that the 
source of influence manipulation had been successful.
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5-3.22 Influence Scores
3
3
'o
Subjects were asked to indicate on a 9-point scale the extent to which 
they agreed with the text. These scores were analysed using a 
2(minority v majority influence) x 2(public v private response) 
between-subjects ANOVA. It should be noted that this experiment was 
different from experiment 1 as only a post influence score was. taken, 
therefore scores directly correspond to their attitudes and do not 
represent change caused by the text. Mean scores are given below in 
Table 4.
Table 4
Mean Influence Scores as a Function of Influence 
and Response Condition*
Public Private
Minority Influence 5.06 5.81
(2.04) (1.79)
Majority Influence 6.37 _ 5.12
(1.54) (2.14)
[*numbers refer to mean scores on 9-point scale, the higher the.score 
the greater the agreement with the source of influence, numbers in 
brackets ^cfer to standard deviations,n=16]
The ANOVA shows that there was no difference between the minority 
(X=4.56) and majority (X=4.25) influence conditions [F<1] nor between 
the public (X=4.28) or the private (X=4.53) response conditions [F<1],
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However, as predicted by hypothesis 3, there was a significant 
interaction between the variables [F(1,60)=14.31,P<0.04]. The 
experimental means were compared using the Newman—Keuls comparison of 
means procedure. Although all the means are in the predicted 
direction, none of the means are significantly different from each 
other.
3
O
5.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 2
The results of experiment 2 support only hypothesis 2, although all 
the condition means are in the predicted direction. However, 
experiment 2 does show that subjects believe the experimental 
manipulation concerning the nature of the source of influence. We 
can, therefore, be confident that when informing subjects that a 
communication represents a view of under 10% of the population, they 
will perceive it as being a minority position. This experiment has 
revealed the inadequacy of the between—subjects method of measuring 
influence (that is, only taking post-test scores). The problem is 
that all the variance which occurs between-subj ects is included within 
the influence scores. Therefore, to show any significant effects
(2) between conditions, the experimental manipulations must be strong
enough to overcome the general variance between subjects. Although 
none of the means were found to be significantly different, this could
)
be due to high between-subject variance rather than the effects of the 
experimental manipulations.
) /
Having noted the problem concerning the between-subjectsjtechnique of
measuring influence, the remaining experiments in this thesis will
employ a within-subjects measure of influence, that is, subjects make
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both pre-test and post-test scores and influence is taken as the 
difference between these scores. Since influence scores represent the 
2) difference between pre— and post—test, between—subjects variance is
removed (or at least controlled). However, it is important to show 
that the differences between pre— and post—test scores represent 
2) influence and not anything else, for example, changes over time. To
test this, control conditions can be used where subjects make pre— and 
post-test scores without receiving a communication to see if there are 
^ any changes over time.
Many subjects in experiment 2 reported difficulty in understanding the
2) text as it was ambiguous (a similar comment was made by subjects in
^périment 1 who also had the same text). This could be due to the
f^ ct that the questionnaire and text was developed in Switzerland and
 ^ therefore there may be probl-ems—in its use because (a) the topic of
pollution may not be as salient, in the minds of British perople as it
is for the Swiss (b) the questionnaire and the text has lost some of
\ its meaning in translation (c) there is a cultural difference between'
the two countries which affects individuals susceptibility to social 
. r:^  these -
influence processes. Due to • problems, the topic of pollution
 ^ has not been used in the remaining experiments of this thesis.
The hypotheses relevant to experiment 3 will not be outlined at this 
 ^ po^ i^ t because it was a pilot study which was associated with many
problems. However, the problems associated with this experiment formed 
an important basis from which the main paradigm of this thesis was 
developed.
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5.4. Experiment 3
) O
)O
5.4.1 Method
5.4.11 Subjects and Design
The subjects were 92 male and female pupils from a secondary school 
in Milton Keynes. All the subjects were in their fourth year and aged 
14-15 years. 14 subjects were excluded because they were unavailable 
for the second part of the experiment. The final subject number was 
reduced to 72 (34 males and 38 females) in order to obtain a balanced 
design by randomly omitting 6 subjects. The experiment was a 
3(ingroup v outgroup v control minority) x 2(public v private 
response) completely between-subj ects design with 12 subjects per 
condition.
5.4.12 Procedure
The experiment consisted of two stages with approximately one week 
between the stages.
Stage 1: Subjects were informed that the experimenters were
interested in people's attitudes towards capital punishment and that 
their responses would be treated in confidence (see Appendix C). The 
first stage consisted of two tasks. In the first task subjects were 
asked to rate the extent they believed a typical comprehensive school 
(CS) and a typical public school (PS) pupilpossess three personality
I
characteristics; friendly, tolerant and mature. Each personality
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dimension was to be scored on two 7-point scales one each for CS and
t
PS. In the second task subjects were required to complete a 4-item
: /
questionnaire concern^ngcapital punishment. They were required to
 ^ I
indicate the extent they agreed or disagreed" ^^th four statements 
concerning capital punishment. Two of these statements were in favour 
 ^ of capital punishment ("If an individual commits murder they do not
deserve to live themselves" and "Capital punishment would provide 
suitable revenge for the murdered victims' family") while two were 
 ^ against capital punishment ("The idea that society can take someone's
life even in the name of justice is as barbaric as murder itself" and 
"Capital punishment is not a succesful deterant for crime").
) O
Stage 2: This stage took place about one week after stage 1.
Subjects were asked to read four passages which had been allegedly
r . obtained from a previous survey. The passages portrayed a position
which was totally in favour of capital punishment and was attributed
to be held by under 10% of those surveyed (see Appendix D). The
categorization variable was manipulated by telling subjects that the 
> - 
^ passages were obtained from; CS pupils (ingroup), PS pupils (outgroup)
or pupils in general (control). In other words subjects were informed
that the passages represented a position held by "under 10% of
(3 comprehensive school pupils" (ingroup minority condition), "under 10%
of public school pupils" (outgroup minority condition) or "under 10% -
of pupils in general" (control minority condition).
)
After reading the passages the response manipulation was employed. In 
the 'public response condition' subjects were informed that, as a
)
continuing part of the research, groups consisting of both CS and PS 
pupils would discuss the topic of capital punishment. If they were 
asked to take part in a discussion, then the members of the group
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3would see each other's position concerning capital punishment. It was 
therefore stressed that they would be identified with their response 
(see Appendix Ea). In the 'private response condition' subjects were
^ ...
told that in order that the experimenter would not know individual 
pupil s answers they were required to put the final questionnaire into 
a sealed box. It was stressed that their responses would remain
3
anonymous and that it would not be possible for the experimenter to 
identify a questionnaire with any particular individual (see Appendix 
 ^ Eb). In fact, since the coding pattern on each questionnaire was
different it was possible to identify the authors of particular 
questionnaires. After reading the response information subjects again 
completed the four item questionnaire on capital punishment.
Finally, subjects were required to indicate on three 9-point scales 
the extent they believed the authors of the passages were; consistent, 
committed and confident in portraying their position on capital 
punishment.
5.4.2 Results
O  5.4.21 CS andPS Personality Ratings
I
Mean ratings for the three personality dimensions are given below in 
Table 5.
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Table 5
) Mean Ratings of Personality of CS and PS Pupils*
Friendly Tolerant Mature
) CS 5.27 4.95 4.73
PS 4.40 4.45 4.80
t 4.66 2.65 0.19
) P< 0.001 0.02 n.s.
[*scores refer to mean ratings on 7-point scale, higher scores reflect 
) O  greater possesion of the attribute, related t-tests,d.f=71,n=12]
O
3
3
3
3
As can be seen from Table 5, subjects rated CS pupils to be 
significantly more friendly and tolerant than PS pupils while there 
was no difference on maturity. This clearly shows that subjects 
tended to favour their own group compared to PS pupils.
5.4.22 Influence Scores
Influence scores are calculated as the difference between pre-test and 
post-test scores on the four item questionnaire on capital punishment. 
Mean influence scores are given below in Table 6.
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oTable 6
Mean Influence Scores as a Function of Minority
and Response Condition*
Public Private
Control Minortiy 0.21 0.31
Ingroup Minority 0.19 0.13
Outgroup Minority 0.15 0.23
[*scores represent mean differences on 9-point scale on
between pre- and post-test, higher the score the greater the change in 
) (2) the direction of the source of influence,n=12]
The influence scores were subjected to a 3(control v ingroup v 
outgroup minority) x 2(public v private response) x4(individual 
statements) ANOVA with the first two factors being between-subjects 
while the last being wit hin-subj ects. The ANOVA showed that there was 
not a main effect for minority, response or statement variables (all 
F<1) nor any two-way interactions. The only significant finding was 
) the three-way interaction [F(6,198)=2.47,P<0.025]. However,
inspection of the means does not provide a clear understanding of this 
effect.
From looking at the data it was noticed that while subjects were 
influenced in the direction of the source of influence some subjects 
changed in the opposite direction (that is, negative influence 
scores). The effect of this is that the final influence scores appear 
very small when infact, ther^'®^® large changes in subjects attitudes.
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oTo examine this, subjects scores were analysed irrespective of whether 
they had changed in the direction of the source of influence, that is, 
their absolute change score. Mean absolute change scores are given in 
Table 7 below.
Table 7
Mean Absolute Change Scores as a Function of Minority 
) and Response Condition*
Public Private
) (3 Control Minority 1.42 1.42
Ingroup Minority 1.94 1.38
Outgroup Minority 1.15 1.69
)
[*scores represent mean absolute change on 9—point scales across 4 
items, higher the score the greater the change,n=12]
The mean absolute change scores were subjected to a 3(control v 
) ingroup V outgroup minority) x 2(public v private response) x
4(statements) ANOVA. While there was no main effect for any of the 
three main variables there was a significant two-way interaction 
between the minority and response variables [F(2,66)=2.66,P<0.07]. 
Finally the three-way interaction was not significant [F(6,198)=1.38] . 
None of the means in the minority/response interaction were found to 
be significantly different using the Newman-Keuls comparison of means
/
procedure, although the means in the ingroup and outgroup minority 
conditions are in the predicted direction.
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5.4.23 Image of the Source of Influence Ratings
Subjects rated on 9-point scales how consistent, committed and 
confident they believed the source of influence to be. Each of these 
ratings was subjected to a 3(control v ingroup v outgroup minority) x 
2(public V private response) completely between-subjects ANOVA. There 
was no main effect on any of the dimensions for the response variable 
nor an interaction between the two main variables. Therefore the data 
was collapsed into the three minority conditions and the means are 
given below in Table 8.
Table 8
Mean Ratings of the Image of the Source of Influence 
as a Function of Minority Condition*
Consist ent Committed Confident
Control Minority 7.25 7.42 7.91
Ingroup Minority 7.55 7-. 59 7.5
Outgroup Minority 7.35 7.2 7.28
F 2.65 2.57 2.84
P< 0.08 0.08 0.07
[*scores represent means 
greater the possessionof
on 9-point scales, higher the 
the attribute,n=24]
score the
The means were examined using the Newman-Keuls comparison of means 
procedure. There was no significant difference between any of the
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conditions for any of the dimensions. However, looking at the means 
it can be seen that ingroup minorities tended to be rated higher than 
outgroup minorities on all the dimensions.
5.4.3 Discussion of Experiment 3
A number of problems from experiment 3 can be noted which were 
important in developing the main paradigm of the thesis.
(a) It is possible that the topic of capital punishment was not 
important to school children and therefore hearing opinions from other 
pupils did not interest them. To avoid this in future experiments, a 
topic will be employed which is of direct relevance to the pupils.
T
(b) Although CS pupils discriminated against PS pupils on the 
personality dimensions, there is no evidence that this discrimination 
occurs in real life and is not an artifact of the experimental 
procedure. It could be argued that individuals will discriminate 
against any group if they are asked to compare it with their own 
group. To overcome this problem, an attempt will be made to employ 
groups which actively discriminate against each other in real life.
(c) Another problem associated with the CS-PS dimension concerns the 
status differential between the groups. Typically, PS pupils are 
perceived as having a higher status than CS pupils which may have 
affected CS pupil's interpretation of the PS pupils views. Although 
outgroup membership is usually associated with lower status, in this 
experiment the out group may have had a high££status than that of the 
subject's own group.
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(d) It can be recalled that subjects were informed that the position 
in the text was held by under 10% of CS pupils (ingroup), PS pupils 
(outgroup) or all pupils (control). These instructions are misleading 
as they imply that a minority of the ingroup or outgroup held the 
deviant position which is not the same as an ingroup or outgroup 
minority. The latter would be represented by the instructions that 
the position in the text was held by under 10% of people surveyed and 
that these consisted of either ingroup or outgroup members.
(e) The experiment obtained measures of influence from questionnaires 
which are not, theoretically, suitable for parametric statistics (such 
as, ANOVA) because the data is only nominal (that is, unequal 
differences between the points on the scale). This was also true for 
experiments 1 and 2. To avoid this in future experiments, influence 
scores will be obtained from measures which yield data which is at. 
least interval in nature (that is, has equal differences between 
points on the scale).
The failure of this experiment has been, in part, due to the reasons 
given above. These points have been taken into consideration when 
(2) developing the main paradigm of the thesis which is explained at the
begining of the next chapter.
5.5 Discussion of Chapter 5
The three experiments described in this chapter were exploratory in 
nature but nevertheless have provided some useful insights. Referring 
to the hypotheses stated in section 5.1, there has been evidence to
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support hypothesis 1 (experiment 1) and hypothesis 3 (experiments 1 
and 2). The lack of support for hypothesis 2 may be because the 
3 post-test scores were measured soon after subjects had read the text.
In fact, Moscovici et al. (1981) who developed the research design, 
found a similar pattern of results with immediate post-test measures 
} but found the expected pattern when there was a delay of three weeks
between reading the text and post-test measurement. There was also 
evidence in this chapter that minorities are perceived as more 
3 confident and rigid than majorities (experiment 1). These results
taken together offer some support for the idea that minority and 
majority influence have different effects on differnt levels of
3 (2) influence.
Although the results of experiment 3 were disappointing, it provided a 
3 basis for the main paradigm of the thesis. This paradigm is discussed
at the begining of the next chapter which also contains two 
experiments.concerning the effects of social categorization upon 
) minority influence.
) O
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CHAPTER 6
)
6.1 Introduction to Chapter 6
The aim of this chapter is to discuss two experiments which have 
examined the relationship between minority influence and social 
O categorization using sex as the categorization dimension. Since these
experiments use a similar categorization as first employed by Maass et 
al. (1982) the terminology of single/double minority will be employed. 
It should be noted that single/double minority should be taken as 
analogous to ingroup/outgroup minority. The first hypothesis to be 
tested is a*general hypothesis that single minorities should have more 
influence than double minorities (hypothesis 4). Confirmation of this 
hypothesis would be consistent with previous research in this area.
The second hypothesis has been developed to test a methodological 
problem noted in the Maass et al. experiment discussed in section 4.4. 
In their experiment male subjects either were exposed to a male 
minority (single) or a female minority (double) influence attempt.
The problem with this experiment was that the greater influencing 
ability of the single minority, as compared to the double minority, 
cannot be established due to the single minority being part of the 
ingroup or because it was composed of males. An alternative 
explanation for their results may reside in a 'male superiority 
effect'. However, in terms of social identification, one would expect 
single minorities to have more influence than double minorities
O
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regardless of the sex of the minority (hypothesis 5).
Since all the remaining experiments in this thesis have used the same 
research design, a general outline will be given here while individual 
variations will be described in each experimental report. This design 
will be refered to as the "sixth-form grant" design. The problems 
associated with the experiments reported in chapter 5 and summarized 
in the discussion section were taken into consideration when planning 
the subsequent experiments.
6.2 The Sixth-fora Grant Research Design
6.2.1 Subjects
The subjects in these experiments were male and female pupils from 
Comprehensive Schools in the Swindon area. They ranged in ages from 
13 to 16, most subjects were in their fourth year. The reason for 
using school children was two-fold; firstly, it gave access to a large 
subject population and, secondly, it allowed easy construction of an 
influence topic which was of relevance to them.
6.2.11 Subjact Recruitment
Since the experiments involved investigations into social influence 
processes great care was taken when conducting the experiments.
/
Typically a school representative was approached by the author 
(usually the headmaster) and the experimental rationale explained. 
Also a copy of all the experimental materials were made available to
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the school. If the school agreed to take part in the experiment it was 
stressed that the subjects' responses would be treated in strict 
confidence and that no data for individual pupils would be made 
available to the school. Later, the school was informed whether the 
general hypotheses had been supported.
Having noted the problem the author discovered in running experiment 3 
(see section 5.4.3) , , it was decided that
the experiments should be run by the class tutor. It should be noted 
that the teacher was not required to give any experimental 
instructions for t h e s e c o n t a i n e d  in the experimental material. 
There were two advantages in using the class tutor; firstly, the 
experiment would be conducted by someone the pupils were familiar with 
and secondly, it enabled large scale testing.T ^
The experimental materials took the form of booklets which were placed 
into a folder, one folder for each class. The teacher was simply 
asked to give each.subject a booklet and collect them when they had 
been completed. He/she was also asked to give pupils the opportunity 
to withdraw from the experiment if they so wished. The front page of 
the booklet in all experiments asked the subjects to give their name 
and sex. Also there was the following introduction:
"Dear Pupil,
I am conducting research into young people's attitudes from schools in 
the Swindon area. The research consists of two stages. The first 
stage is contained in this booklet, the second stage will be given to 
you in a couple of weeks' time. I would like to assure you that what
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you write in this booklet will be treated in confidence and will not 
be made available to the school. I am asking for your name merely so 
that I can match your answers to this stage with those of the second 
stage. If you do not wish to take part, either inform the teacher or 
hand back an empty booklet.
Please read the instructions for each question carefully.
Thank-you for taking part,
Robin Martin (Open University)"
6.2.2 Influence Topic
It was decided to use a topic which was of relevance to the subject 
population and the topic chosen concerned the establishment of a 
sixth-form grant. To appreciate the relevance of this topic to pupils 
one needs to understand the British educational system.
6.2.21 The British Educational System
Within the British educational system pupils may leave school at the 
age of 16 if they wish. At the age of 16 they may enter full-time
employment or they may register for social security (a state benefit ,
!
for those people who have no means to support themselves). However, 
pupils may remain in school beyond the age of 16 normally up until 18 
to take further qualifications. It is the years between 16 and 18
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)which are referred to as the sixth-form as pupils will have already 
spent five years at the school prior to this. There is a growing trend 
in the educational system to create establishments specifically 
designed to cater for sixth-formers. These "sixth-form colleges" 
represent the middle position betweenpre—gixch—form and University in 
their style and attitude towards education. For example, no school 
uniform is required at sixth-form colleges and tutors usually use the 
lecture/seminar format employed at university rather than the formal 
classes found in schools.
In summary, there is a great feeling that pupils who stay to the 
sixth—form are young adults who are actively choosing to remain in 
education and should be treated differently from younger pupils for 
whom education is compulsory (that is, the first five years in 
secondary schools).
It is worth noting that, at the age when pupils can decide to enter 
the sixth—form (that is, 16), their first claims to autonomy are alsO/ 
granted. Although their parents have responsibilty over them, they 
can lawfully engage in sex, get married, sign legal documents and at 
the age of 17 they can drive a car. However, those individuals who 
23 enter the sixth—form are financially dependent upon their parents and
receive no money from the state. Unfortunately some pupils are unable 
to go into the sixth—form as their parents are not prepared to support 
them.
Since pupils at the age of 16 acquire a certain amount of autonomy 
there is growing dissatisfaction with the fact that they are 
financially dependent upon their parents. Such a dissatisfaction is 
&§§^&vated by the fact that young people of the same age as
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sixth-formers can claim social security for being unemployed when 
sixth-formers get no assistance for staying on in full-time education. 
Recently there has been much debate about the introduction of a 
sixth-form grant to all those people who remain in full-time education 
beyond the age of 16. From this brief summary of the British 
educational system it is clear that the topic of a sixth-form grant is 
relevant to British pupils.
6.2.3 Experimental Design
All the experiments used a pre-test/post-test design, that is, 
subjects attitudes towards a sixth-form grant were measured before and 
after reading a communication (the text). Differences between the 
pre-test and the post-test were attributed as being caused by the 
text. All the experiments employed a between-subjects design which 
meant that different subjects were employed in each experimental
condition (similar to experiment2). Finally there was usually an
— / 
interval of approximately two weeks between pre-test and post-test.
6.2.31 Attitude Measurement
Subjects were asked to indicte whether or not they believed 
sixth-formers should receive a grant. If they did, they were asked to 
indicate how much they thought they should receive in pounds per week. 
The experimental instructions are given in full in Appendix F.
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6.2.311 The Text .
) ^Initial research showed that most pupils believed that the sixth-form
grant should be about #15 to #20 per week. A communication was 
constructed which argued that the grant should be higher than this and 
) so represented a minority position since few people were as extreme as
this. Since the text was favourable to a sixth-form grant, it was in ' 
accord with the 'Zeitgeist’ that is, prevailing views.
)
The text consisted of four passages each of which was contained within 
quotation marks to give the impression that they were four separate 
) 22 quotes (see Appendix G). The first passage argued that sixth-formers
should not be dependent upon their parents and indicated how much 
money the grant should be. The second passage compared a sixth-former 
) with an apprentice and argued—that while the latter receives a wage,
the former does not. The third passage argued that a grant of between 
#15 to #20 or #21 to #25 (according to pre-test, see below) was 
) insufficient to meet the expenses of a sixth-former. Finally the
"" fourth passage compared sixth-formers with university students and
noted that the latter get state grants but the former do not.
'o
6.2.32 Controlling the Target — Source Difference
)
As noted earlier, research into social influence has generally not
controlled the difference between the target and the source of
j influence's attitudes. Some attempt was made in these experiments to
achieve this. Subjects' pre-test responses generally fell into two 
categories, either a belief that the sixth-form grant should be #15 to 
j #20 or #21 to #25. It was decided that the text would argue for a
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)grant #15 more than the maximum of the response category subjects fell
■ r  '
into. That is, those subj ects * g pre-test score was between #15 to 
#20 had a text advocating a grant of #35 whilst those subjects 
advocating a grant of between #21 to #25 received a text arguing for a 
grant of #40 (note that the text was exactly the same in every other 
aspect). The effect of this was that all subjects read a text which 
argued for a grant which was at least #15 more than their pre-test 
response.
6.2.4 Debriefing
The amount and type of debriefing varied across schools and the type 
of experiment. Each school was given the opportunity of having two 
detailed debriefing sessions, one for the staff and the other for the 
pupils. Few accepted one of these invitations, none accepted both. A 
short note was sent to each teacher with brief details of the research
and they were asked to read it out to the pupils. In the schools in
_  /
/
which I gave a debriefing talk to the pupils I was satisfied that the 
experiment had not harmed the pupils. It must be noted that whereas 
there was only mild interest in the research from the staff, there was 
22 almost total apathy from the pupils.
It should also be recorded that some of the pupils decided not to take
are
part in the research and details of this • given for each experiment. 
Finally, a donation of #50 (from the author's research budget) was 
given to to the school fund of each school who participated in the 
research as a sign of gratitude.
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6.3 Experiment 4
)O
6.3.1 Method
6.3.11 Subjects and Design
The subjects were 78 male and female pupils from a comprehensive 
school in Swindon, All the subjects were in their fourth year and 
) were aged between 14 to 15 years. The subject number was reduced to
67 (6 were unavailable for the second stage, 5 did not believe in a
sixth-form grant). 7 subjects were randomly ommitted in order to
) 22 obtain a balanced design.
The experiment was a 2(male v female subjects) x 2(single v double 
) minority) completely between-subjects design with subjects being
randomly allocated to one of four experimental conditions. The 
experiment employed the sixth-form grant research design and there 
\ were 15 subjects per condition.
6.3.12 Procedure
The experiment took place in two stages with approximately 2 weeks 
interval between the stages.
Stage 1 : Subjects were asked to indicate how much grant sixth—formers
should receive per week (pre-test). They were also asked to indicate .
I
how confident they were of their response on a 7-point scale.
Stage 2: This took place about two weeks after stage 1 and consisted
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of two parts. In the first part subjects were asked to read a 
communication which advocated a position more extreme than their own 
^ (the sixth-form grant text, see Appendix G). This was either
attributed as being held by "under 10% of male pupils" (for male 
subjects a single minority while for female subjects a double 
^ minority) or by "under 10% of female subjects" (for male subjects a
double minority and for female subjects a single minority). In other 
words, male and female subjects received either a single or a double 
^ minority. After reading the text they were asked to indicate, again,
the amount of grant they believed sixth-formers should receive 
(post-test) and to indicate how confident they were of their response 
on a 7-point scale.O
In the second part subjects were required to rate the extent to which the 
source of influence was consistent, committed and persuasive. They
were also asked to what extent ".... it is likely that the authors
(of the passages) would believe in a position different to the
majority on another topic" (this is referred to as the generalisation /
-— /
rating). All ratings were on 9-point scales.
6.3.2 Results
6.3.21 Influence Scores
The influence scores were calculated as the difference between 
pre-test and post-test scores. Preliminary analyses showed that the 
influence scores were not affected by whether subjects had indicated 
that they intended to enter the sixth-form or not nor did this factor 
interact with the dependent variables (all F<1). Therefore influence
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scores were subjected to a 2(male v female subject) x 2(sing,le v 
double minority) completely between-subjects ANOVA. Mean influence 
for each experimental condition is shown below in Table 9.
3
Table 9
Mean Influence as a Function of Sex of the Subject and Minority
Condition*
Male Subj ects
Female Subj ects
Single
Minority
5.13
(4.00)
7.47
(4.48)
Double
Minority
1.10
(3.26)
2.06
(3.84)
3
o
[*scores represent differences between pre-test and post-test,in 
pounds, with positive scores indicating influence in the 
direction of the source of influence, numbers in brackets refer 
to standard deviations, n=15]
The ANOVA reveals that there was no difference between the Male 
(X=3.12) and Female (X=4.77) responses [F(l,56)=2.627,n.s. ]. However, 
as predicted by hypothesis 4, single minorities (X=6.3) had 
significantly more influence than double minorities (X=1.58)
/
[F(l,56)=21.468,P<0.0001]. Also there was not a significant 
interaction between the variables (F<1).
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The experimental conditions were examined using the Newman-Keuls 
comparison of means procedure. As expected there was no difference 
between male and female subjects for single and double minorities. 
Also, hypothesis 5, that single minorities would have more influence 
than double minorities was supported for both male (P<0.01) and female 
(P<0.05) subjects.
6.3.22 Number of Subjects Influenced
A further test of hypothesis 4 was achieved by applying a chi-squared 
analysis on the number of subjects who had been influenced in the 
direction of the source of influence. The number of individuals who 
were influenced in the direction of the source of influence for each 
condition is given below in Table 10.
Table 10
Number of Individuals Influenced in the Direction of the Source
— _ / 
Influenceas a Function of Sex of Subject and Minority
Condition*
23 Single Double
Minority Minority 
Male Subjects 11 6
Female Subjects 14 4
[*number of individuals influenced in the direction of the source 
of influence n=15]
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The results of the chi-squared showed that there was no difference 
between males and females (X2=0»06,d.f,=1) but that more subjects in 
3  the single minority conditions had moved towards the source of
influence than in the double minority conditions
(X2=13.44,d.f.=1,p<0.001) thus supporting hypothesis 4. The results 
3  of the chi-squares support the results of the influence scores.
3
)O
6.3.3 Ratings of Confidence
Subjects rated how confident they were of their pre-test and their 
3 post-test responses on a 7-point scale. Mean ratings are given below
in Table 11.
Table 11
and Minority Condition*
Male Female
SM DM SM DM
Pre-Test 5.87 5.87 5.47 5.4
Post-Test 6.07 5.94 5.27 5.6
[^numbers refer to ratings on a seven point scale, higher the number 
the higher the perceived confidence in the response, SM=single 
Minority, DM=double minority]
A number of related t—tests revealed that there was no difference
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between any pre-test and post-test ratings. This could be due to a 
'ceiling effect 'caused by the high pre-test scores (X=5.66) resulting 
in little room for movement.
^ 6.3.4 Image of The Source Rating
The subjects rated the sorce of influence on four dimensions using 9 
 ^ point scales. Each dimension was examined using four 2(male v female
subject) X 2(single v double minority) ANOVA. There was no difference 
on any of the ANOVA's for sex of subject (all F values less than 1).
 ^ 23 Therefore single and double minority conditions were collapsed over
the sex variable and mean ratings are given below in Table 12.
Table 12
Mean- Ratings of the Image of the Source of Influence as a 
Function of Minority Condition*
Consistency Committed Persuasive Generalization
) ^ SM 7.53 7.1 7.07 6.3o
DM 6.53 7.34 6.87 6.6
F 11.31 0.627 0.561 0.633
) P< 0.001 n.s. n.s. n.s.
[*scores refer to means on 9-point scale, the higher the score the
) greater the possesion of that attribute,n=15]
) From Table 12-it can be seen that the only significant difference
174
concerns the consistency rating where single minorities were rated as 
more consistent than double minorities
An alternative hypothesis which could be proposed is that male 
minorities are rated more positively than female minorities. Note 
that there is a difference between sex of the subject and sex of the 
minority in this experiment. Table 13 below demonstrates this 
difference.
Table 13
Relationship Between Sex of Subject and Sex of Minority
Single Double
Minority Minority
Male Subjects Male Female
Minority Minority
O
Female Subjects Female Male
Minority Minority
The hypothesis that male minorities might be rated more positively 
than female minorities would be supported by an interaction between 
the sex of subj ect and the minority condition variables. There was no 
significant interactions with consistent and committed ratings (F
f
values less than 1) however, the interactions on the persuasive and 
generalization ratings was sufficiently significant to warrant further 
investigation [persuasion F(l,56)=5.05,P<0.03; generalization
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F(1,56)=2.82,P<0.1]. Mean ratings for sex of minority are given below 
in table 14 (note that 'male minority' consists of the male 
subject/single minority condition and female subject/double minority 
condition while 'female minority' consists of male subject/double 
minority and female subject/single minority conditions).
Table 14
Mean Ratings of Image of Source of Influence as a Function of Sex
of the Minority*
Consistency Committed Persuasive Generalization 
Male Minority 7.14 7.3 7.27 6.77
Female Minority 7.0 7.14 6.67 6.14
t 0.42 0.57 2.31 1.7
P< - n-s. n.s. 0.05 0.1
[* scores refer to means on 9-point scale, the higher the score the 
greater the possesion of that attribute,n=15]
From the above table it can be seen that the only significant 
difference concerned the persuasive dimension with male minorities 
being rated as more persuasive than female minorities. This could be 
taken as supportive of the male superiority explanation of Maass et 
^l.'s experiment . However, subsequent analyses did not show a
/
significant correlation between persuasion rating and influence.
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6.3.5 Discussion of Experiment 4
The results of experiment 4 support the hypotheses stated in the 
introduction. Single minorities caused greater attitude change than 
double minorities (hypothesis 4) regardless of the sex of the minority 
which does not support the male superiority explanation (hypothesis 
5). Another important finding was that there was no difference in the 
extent male and female subjects were influenced. This debunks the 
much held popular belief that females are more susceptible to being 
influenced than are males.
Due to the confounding of the sex of the subject and sex of the 
minority, analysis of the image of the source data was problematic.
The results did not show a clear pattern although single minorities 
, . were rated as being more consistent than double minorities. Although
male minorities were rated as more persuasive than female minorities, 
there was no relationship between the 'persuasive rating' and 
influence.
) ^ ■ , /:
The next experiment is a partial replication of this experiment, that
is, male and female subjects receive either a same sex minority
)
23 (single) or an opposite sex minority (double) communication. There
are three main differences between experiment 5 and this one. • First-; 
a "control Minority" is included where the sex of the minority is not
)
disclosed so that it will be possible to examine the effect of 
categorizing a minority. Second, there was a male and female 
condition. Third, due to the problems with the source of influence 
ratings, a new technique was developed.
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6.4 Experiment 5
3 6.4.1 Method
6.4.11 Subjects and Design
The subjects were 127 male and female pupils from a comprehensive 
school in Swindon. All the subjects were in the fourth year and aged 
between fourteen and fifteen years. The subject number was reduced to 
108 (10 were unavailable for the second stage, 9 did not believe in a 
sixth-form grant). 12 subjects were randomly ommitted in order to 
^ obtain a balanced design.
The experiment was a 4(control minority v single minority v double 
3 minority v control) x 2(male v female subjects) completely
between-subjects design with subjects being randomly allocated to one 
of four experimental and two control conditions. There were 12
3 subjects per condition. The experiment employed the sixth-form grant
paradigm. ,
6.4.12 Procedure
The experiment took place in two stages with approximately three weeks 
interval between the stages. The procedure was the same as for 
experiment 4 except:
(a) no rating of confidence was taken, '
(b) a control minority condition was included which did not make any
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reference to males or females, that is, the text was attributed to 
"under 10% of pupils".
(c) a control condition was included where subjects made judgements 
about the sixth-form grant without reading the text.
(d) the measures of behavioural styles were replaced by a measure 
designed to determine how subjects perceived themselves compared to 
the outgroup. Subjects were asked to rate on four dimensions 
themselves,a typical- member of the ingroup and a typical member of the 
outgroup. The ingroup and the outgroup were dependent upon the sex of 
the subject, for example, a male subject would rate himself (male), a 
typical member of the ingroup (male) and a typical member of the 
outgroup (female). The dimensions were; trusting-suspicious, 
courageous-cowardly, moral-immoral and selfish-generous. Each 
dimension was accompanied by three 7-point scales, one each for self, 
ingroup and outgroup.
6.4.2 Results
)
23 6.4.21 Influence Scores
The influence scores were calculated as the difference between the 
pre-test and post-test scores. Preliminary analyses showed that the 
influence scores were not affected by whether subjects intended to 
enter the sixth-form nor did this factor significantly interact with 
the dependent variables. Therefore influence scores were subjected to 
a 4(control minority v single minority v double minority v control) x 
2(male v female subjects) completely between-subjects ANOVA. Means
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for the influence scores are given below in Table 15.
D
O
Table 15
Influencescores as a Function of Minority and
Conditions
Male Female
Control Minority 8.2 6.6
(2.9) (1.97)
Single Minority 5.87 5.04
(5.13) (4.63)
Double Minority 0.87 0.33
(3.87) (3.66)
Control 0.16 0.62
(5.3) (3.43)
) ■
O
[*scores represent differences between pre-test and post-test in 
pounds, positive scores represent change in.the direction of the 
source of influence, numbers in brackets refer to standard 
deviations,n=1 2]
The results of the ANOVA showed that there was no difference between 
sex of the subject [F<1] nor was there a significant interaction 
[F<1]. Therefore the scores were collapsed across the sex variable. 
However, there was a highly significant difference between the 
minority conditions.
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3The experimental means were compared using the Newman—Keuls comparison 
of means procedure. This showed that single minorities had more 
influence than double minorities (P<C0.01) which supports hypothesis 4. 
Also, hypothesis 5 was supported as the effect of single minorities 
having more influence than double minorities was found for both male 
^ 3.nd female subjects. From these results it can be concluded that the
effects found in experiment 4 have been replicated. Although the 
difference between the single minority and the control minority was in 
^ the predicted direction, the difference was not significant. Finally,
whereas the control minority and single minority had significantly 
more influence than the control, there was no difference between the 
 ^O control and the double minority conditions.
)o
6.4.22 Number of Subjects Influenced
The number of subjects who moved in the direction of the source of 
iiifluence was examined using a number of chi—squared analyses. The 
number of subjects who were influenced in the direction of the source 
of influence is shown below in Table 16.
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Table'16
• C -
Number of Subjects Influenced in thep^rection of the Source of
Influence*
Male Female
Control Minority 12 12
Single Minority 10 g
Double Minority 5 5
Control 5 4
[*number of subjects influenced in the direction of the source of 
influence,n=1 2]
/
 ^ The analyses reveal that there was no difference between male and
female subjects (chi—squared=Q,18)• However, there was a significant 
difference between the source of influence conditions 
 ^ (chi—squared=27#1,d.f.=3,P^O.001) showing that more subjects were
-■ influenced in the single and control minority conditions than in the
double minority and control conditions. The analysis of the number of 
subjects who moved in the direction of the source of influence 
parallel those found for the influence scores.
6.4.3 Image of the Source Ratings
Subjects were required to rate themselves (self rating), a typical 
member of their own sex (ingroup) and a typical member of their 
opposite sex (outgroup) on four dimensions; trusting (TR), Courageous 
(COUR), Moral (MGR) and Generous (GEN). For each comparison dimension 
there were three 7—point scales one each for the self, ingroup and
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outgroup ratings. In other words subjects were asked to compare 
themselves with their ingroup and outgroup.
The rating scores for each comparison dimension was subjected to a 
3 (self V ingroup v outgroup) x 4 (control minority v single minority v 
outgroup minority v double minority v control) x 2 (male v female 
subject) MANOVA with the first factor being within-subjects variable 
and the second and third factors being between-subjects variables. 
Table 17 below contains a summary of the findings of these MANOVA"'s.
Table 17
Summary of Results of MANOVA^s for each Comparison Dimension*
df TR COUR MOR GEN
F P< F P< F P< F P<
Between-Subjects Factors
C 3 <1 n.s <1 n.s. 1.61 n.s. <1 n.s
S 1 <1 n.s. 4.42 0.04 <1 n.s. 2.12 n.s.
CxS 3 <1 n.s. 3.51 0.02 1.44 n.s. 3.76 0.02
Within-Subjects Factors
R 2 17.9 0.001 5.22 0.006 32.7 0.001 31.1 0.001
CxR 6 1.05 n.s. 2.6 0.02 3.53 0.003 <1 n.s.
SxR 2 8.93 0.001 42.3 0.001 3.86 0.02 13.99 0.001
GSR 6 3.42 0.003 1.33 n.s. 5.29 0.001 3.53 0.003
[*C=minority categorization, S=sex, R=ratings and df=degrees of 
freedom]
./
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From Table 17 it can be seen that there were very few significant main 
effects for the between-subjects factors (that is, the categorization 
and sex of subject variables). Only two out of the eight main effects 
and two out of the four 2—way interactions were significant. 
Furthermore, these effects were not in any systematic direction. On 
the other hand, there was a highly significant main effect for the 
within—subjects factor (that is, ratings) on all four comparison 
dimensions. Also, two out of the four 2—way interactions of CxR were 
significant as were all the 2-way interactions of the SxR 
interactions. Finally, three out of the four 3-way interactions 
(CxSxR) were significant.
^significant is
The finding that the SxR interaction is) probably due to the fact that 
there was a confounding of_the sex of the subject and the sex of the 
minority in the experimental design. This most probably accounts for 
the signficant 3-way interactions. A similar effect was observed in 
experiment 4 (see section 6.3.4). For subjects in the single and 
double minority conditions, male subjects either received a minority 
composed of males (single minority) or females (double minority) while 
female subjects either received a minority composed of male subjects 
(double minority) or females (single minority). Because of the above 
problem and due to the reasons below the rating scores were collapsed' 
across the sex of subject variable:
(a) The pattern of influence scores for male and female subjects did 
not differ in this experiment (the same was true for experiment 4 ).
(b) If the rating data is rearranged, as in experiment 4, the main 
findings are similar. Such a rearrangement would provide only a
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* in the ingroup and outgroup minority conditions the sex of the minoritv 
differed for each sex of subject, e.g. an outgroup minority for male
subjects was composed of females while for female subjects was composed 
of maless
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partial analysis of the experimental data as the confounding of the 
sex of the subject and the sex of the minority occurs in the single 
and double minority conditions and not the control minority and the 
control conditions.
(c) No systematic effects were observed in experiment 4 for the sex 
of the minority on perceived behavioural styles (in other words, both 
male and female minorities are perceived similarly).
(d) Comparisons across sex of subject, although interesting within 
their own right, are not of theoretical value to the aims of this 
thesis.
Table 18 below contains the mean ratings of Self, Ingroup and 
Outgroup across sex of subject and minority condition, for each of 
the comparison dimensions.
Table 18
Mean Ratings of Self, Ingroup and Outgroup as a Function of
Comparison Dimension*
TR COUR MOR GEN
s 4.99 4.84 4.96 4.86
I 4.56 4.71 4.73 4.55
0 4.23 4.43 4.25 3.97
N-K
Sxl P< 0.01 n.s. 0.05 0.01
IxO P< 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01
SxO P< 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
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[*S=self,I=ingroup,0=outgroup,N-K=Newman-Keuls,mean ratings on a 
7-point scale,the higher the rating the greater the possesion of the 
dimension,n=96]
From Table 18 it can be seen that there was a similar pattern of 
results for each of the comparison dimensions, that is, subjects rated 
themselves higher than the ingroup and the ingroup higher than the 
outgroup. A Newman-Keuls comparison of means procedure was performed 
for each comparison procedure showing that, with one exception, all 
the comparisons for each dimension were significantly different. 
4^though an ingroup > outgroup difference is predicted (especially- 
with such a potent intergroup categorization as sex) the fact that 
subjects rated themselves-higher-than their ingroup is perhaps 
surprising.
The summary of the-MANOVA results in Table 17 shows that there were / 
significant 2-way interaction between CxR for two out of the four 
comparison dimensions. Since the categorization effects are the 
particular focus of interest in this thesis, some attention will be 
paid to this data. Mean ratings of self. Ingroup and outgroup across 
minority conditions is shown below in Table 19.
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Table 19
5 Minority Condition for each Comparison Dimension*
CM SM DM CON F P
) S 4.88 4.9 4.97 4.88 0.09 n.s.
I 4.63 4.68 4.62 4.62 0.05 n.s.
0 4.33 4.00 3.96 4.6 3.73 0.01
[* One-way ANOVA across minority conditions, S=self, I=ingroup,
O=outgroup,means are ratings on 7-point scale,the higher the rating 
the greater the possesion of the attribute,n=24]
i _  . , . . .  . . .
From the above table it canTe seen the minority variable had no 
effect on how subjects rated themselves or the ingroup. However, this 
was not true for the outgroup ratings. In this situation, subjects 
rated the outgroup"significantly lower when exposed to a single or 
double minority than when to a control minority or in the control 
condition. It appears that confronting a single or double minority 
devalues the perception of the outgroup, perhaps by making the 
intergroup relations salient. Such an interpretation is supported by 
the fact that the outgroup was devalued to such an extent for subjects 
in the control minority and control conditions where no reference is 
made to the intergroup context.
6.4.4 Discussion of Experiment 5
The results of experiment 5 have replicated those found for experiment
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‘"^4, namely, ingroup minorities had more influence than outgroup
minorities (hypothesis 4) and that this was true regardless of the sex 
of the subject (hypothesis 5). Whereas control minorities tended to 
have more influence than single minorities, this difference was not 
significant. However, contrary to expectations, there was no 
difference between the double minority and the control condition. It 
appears that attributing the text to an outgroup had the same effect 
as not receiving the communication.
The results from the image of the source ratings are very interesting. 
A surprise finding was that individuals tended to rate themselves as 
significantly more desirable than the ingroup while, as expected, the 
ingroup were rated more favourably than the outgroup. This finding 
may be due to the fact that while people desire to belong to a group 
they often want to be considered to be unique individuals and 
therefore not 'typical" group members.
When examining the effect of the experimental conditions on the 
ratings an interesting finding emerged. Whilst there was no 
difference between the conditions on the self and ingroup ratings, 
there was a significant difference on the outgroup ratings. In this 
2^) situation, the outgroup was rated less positively when subjects had
been exposed to a single or double minority then when exposed to a 
control minority or had been in the control condition. This shows 
that making the intergroup situation salient (as did the single and 
double minority) leads to discrimination against the outgroup (note 
that the intergroup context is not made salient for the other two 
conditions).
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6.5 Discussion of Chapter 6
The experiments discussed in this chapter confirm the two hypotheses 
stated in the introduction (see section 6.1)• Single minorities had 
more influence than double minorities (experiments 4 and 5) which 
tsplicates the previous research in this area. Also, the greater 
influencing power of single minorities compared to outgroup minorities 
was found for both male and female subjects (experiments 4 and 5) 
which does not support the "male superiority explanation" of the Maass 
experiment (see section 6.1). A further interesting finding 
was that labelling a communication as representing an outgroup 
position had no more influence than if they had not received the 
communication (a control conditon). This suggests that when 
individuals receive a communication they totally resist change (in 
fact, in some cases a negative influence occured where individuals 
polarized their existing attitudes away from the position advocated by 
the double minority).
O
The two experiments discussed in this chapter employed different 
methods to assess the image of the source of influence. Experiment 4 
employed the typical method using rating scales to measure various 
(3 aspects of the source of influence's behavioural style. Apart from
^T^ding that single minorities are perceived to be more consistent 
than double minorities, no clear pattern of result emerged. This may 
have been partly due to the confounding of the sex of the subject with 
the sex of the minority.
In contrast to the above technique, experiment 5 used a system which 
was designed to compare individuals' ratings of themselves with a 
typical member of their ingroup and outgroup. Two important findings
189
3emerged. First, individuals rated thanselves higher (or moic 
desirable) than the ingroup which was rated higher than the outgroup.
^ This demonstrates that individuals discriminate against the outgroup
and also desire to be differentiated from the 'typical' examples of 
their own group. The latter strategy may be an attempt to remain 
unique within their ingroup membership. Second, the outgroup was 
discriminated to a greater extent when the intergroup context had been 
made salient than when it had not.
D
In the next chapter, two experiments are discussed which examine the 
effects of social categorization upon public and private influence.
^ This is an important issue to examine as much research into minority
influence has highlighted the fact that minorities tend to have more 
influence in private than they do in public (see section 2.4). Also,
^ an attempt is made, in one of the experiments, to examine social
categorization based upon real groups which are known to discriminate 
against each other. These are termed ingroup and outgroup minorities 
but can be considered to be analogous to single and double minorities.
O
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7.1 Introduction to Chapter 7
The aim of this chapter is to present two experiments which examine 
the effects of social categorization upon minority influence on public 
and private responses. The choice of the social categorization 
dimension differs between the experiments. In the first experiment an 
attempt has been made to employ a categorization dimension which 
subjects actively use as a basis for discrimination. In order to 
achieve this, pupils were asked which schools, from their area, they 
would most like to beat and least like to be beaten by in a 
hypothetical competition. The results of this, backed up with other 
evidence, revealed a school which pupils considered to have outgroup 
status, that is a school they compare themselves with and perceived to 
have negative charcteristics.
The second experiment discussed in this chapter is similar in design 
to the first experiment except that a control condition has been 
included where subjects gave estimates of the sixth-form grant but did 
not read a minority text. The social categorization dimension, in
this experiment, concerned sex, that is, male and female subjects
'
either received a same sex minority (single) or a different sex 
minority (double) communication. Although single/double similar to 
ingroup/outgroup minority, the former classification is used so as to
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be consistent with the other experiments in this thesis which 
developed out of Maass et al.'s (1982) original conception.
A number of hypotheses can be made concerning these experiments:
) Hypothesis 4 - On public responses, ingroup minorities should have
more influence than outgroup minorities. This is the same hypothesis 
as that in chapter 6 and therefore the logic behind it will not be 
) stated again.
Hypothesis 2 - Minority influence will be greater when responses are 
) (2) made in private than when made in public. This is the conversion
hypothesis stated in chapter 5.
) Hypothesis 6 - On private responses, outgroup minorities should have
more influence than ingroup minorities. This follows from the 
reasoning that outgroup minorities are more distinctive, and therefore 
) impose a greater psychological cost when agreeing with them, than do
ingroup minorities. Since the level of psychological cost determines 
the extent of public influence, one would expect outgroup minorities 
) nevertheless to cause greater private change than ingroup minorities
because of their greater psychological distinctiveness.
Hypothesis 7 - Since the effects of social categorization predict a 
pattern of results for public and private influence which is in 
different directions, one would expect an interaction between the 
social categorization variable (that is, ingroup/outgroup minority)
- ■ ■ ■ I
and level of influence (that is, public and private response). 
Hypothesis 8 - In the control condition (that is, when subjects do hot
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receive a communication) there should be no difference between 
responses which are made in public with those made in private. This 
is an important hypothesis because if any differences are observed 
then it would imply that the response manipulation itself could be the 
cause of greater private influence and not any experimental 
manipulation.
7.2 Experiment 6
7.2.1 Method
7.2.11 Subjects and Design
The subjects were 86 fourteen and and fifteen year old male and female 
pupils from a comprehensive school in Swindon. 14 subjects were 
excluded (S because they were unavailable for the second part of the 
experiment and 6 because they did not believe in a sixth-forh grant). 
The subject number was further reduced to 68 (35 male and 33 female) 
in order to achieve a balanced design by randomly omitting 4 subjects.
The experiment was a 2(ingroup v outgroup minority) x 2(public v 
private response) completely between-subj ects design with 17 subjects 
per condition. Subjects were randomly allocated to one of four 
experimental conditions.
This experiment is discussed in Martin (1987a).
7.2.12 Procedure
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The experiment employed the sixth-form grant^ (^j#scussed in chapter g 
The experiment consisted of two stages with approximately three weeks 
between each stage.
Stage 1 ; In the first part of the booklet a measure was obtained of 
how much subjects believed the sixth-form grant should be (pre-test)  ^
and a measure of how confident they were of their response on a 
7—point scale. The second part of the booklet was designed to reveal 
schools which the subjects considered to have outgroup status. To 
accomplish this they were asked three questions concerning the outcome 
of a hypothetical competition between schools in the Swindon area.
The first question simply asked whether they would prefer their own 
school or another school to win the competition. The second question 
asked which school would ^ ou "most like your school to beat ?" while 
the third question asked which school would you "least like your 
school to be beaten by ?".
Stage 2 : The subjects were given a booklet which contained three
parts. The first part required subjects to' compare a typical pupil 
from their own school with a typical pupil from an outgroup school 
(2) (determined from the first stage). Comparisons were made on four
dimensions; Friendly/Unfriendly, Reliable/Unreliable, Mature/Immature 
and Good/Bad Friend. Each dimension was accompanied by two 7-point 
scales, one for the subjects' own school and one for their own school.
In the second part, subjects were asked to read the sixth—form grant 
text and informed that it represented a view held by under 10% of 
people. Subjects were told that these 10% of pupils either came from 
their own school (ingroup minority condition) or from an outgroup
194
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school (outgroup minority condition). Before subjects were asked to 
indicate for the second time how much grant sixth-formers should 
receive (post-test), the response manipulation was employed. In the 
'public response condition' subjects were told that the class would be 
participating in a discussion about sixth-form grants. In order that 
everyone would know the position taken by the other pupils, their 
answers would be shown to the other members of the class. It was 
therefore stressed that they would be identified with their response. 
In the 'private response condition' subjects were told that to ensure 
that no one would ever know their response they would put their 
réponse into an envelop and place it into a 'ballot box'. It was 
stressed that their response would remain anonymous and it would not 
be possible to identify a response with any particular individual. In 
fact, by employing a different system of numbering the pages of the 
booklet it was possible to jmatch the reponses with their authors.
In the third and final part, subjects made five ratings concerning the 
image of the source of influence. They indicated how consistent, 
committed, confident and persuasive they thought the authors of the 
passages were on 9-point scales. They also indicated the likelihood 
that the authors of the passages would hold a minority position on a 
different topic on a 9-point scale (the generalization measure).
/
/
7.2.2 Results
7.2.21 Outgroup School Choices
In the first stage subjects were asked three questions designed to 
reveal which schools they considered to have outgroup status. Every
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osubject responded that they would prefer their own school to win a 
competition rather than another school. It should be noted that there 
are approximately 14 secondary schools in the Swindon area and 
therefore subjects had a wide range to choose from. Table 20 below 
shows the percentage of occasions each school was chosen for the 
^ second and third question.
) o
o
Table 20
Pe^r cent age of Occasions Each School was Chosen For Second and
Third Question
School Most Like Least Like to Total
to Beat be Beat en by
No. % No. % No. %
W 34 48.5 48 70.5 82 60.2
0 - 4 5.8 4 5.8 8 5.8
P 5 7.35 2 2.9 7 5.1
H 8 11.7 5 7.35 13 9.5
J 9 13.2 3 4.4 12 8.8
C 4 5.8 2 2.9 6 4.4
M 1 1.4 0 0.0 1 0.7
MY 1 1.4 0 0.0 1 0.7
HW 1 1.4 2 2.9 3 2.2
D 0 0.0 1 1.4 1 0.7
K 1 1.4 1 1.4 2 1.4
It can be seen from Che above table that to the question which school 
would you "most like to beat 48.5% of subjects Indicated one
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Dparticular school (codename W). There were nine other choices to this 
question with the next highest school receiving 13.2% of the 
3  responses. To the question which school would you "least like to be
beaten by ?", school W was the most popular choice with 70.5% of 
subjects chosing it, the other choices was spread over eight schools 
3 with the next highest school receiving 7.35% of choices. Summarizing
over the two questions, school W received 60.2% of the choices, the 
remaining responses covered ten other schools with the next highest 
3 school receiving 9.5% of choices.
From these results it is quite clear that school W was considered to 
3 (3 be the school subjects compared themselves with. This was not a
surprising finding as the school had been rivals with school W for 
many years. Hostility towards school W was easily evoked whenever the 
3 school was mentioned (furthermore abusive graffiti directed towards
school W were displayed on many walls around the school).
o
7.2.22 Own School/Outgroup School Comparisons
In the second stage subjects made comparisons between a typical pupil 
from their own school and from school W (chosen from the first stage) 
Mean ratings are given below in Table 21.
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Table 21
Mean Ratings for Own School and Outgroup School on Comparison
Dimensions*
Friendly Reliable Mature Good Friend
) , Own School 5.11 5.03 5.15 5.28
School W 3.84 3.74 4.12 4.03
t 9.01 7.23 5.96 7.02
> P< 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
) O
[*scores represent means on 7-point scales, higher the score the 
greater the possesion of the attribute, related t-tests with 
d.f,=66,n=68]
O
The results are very conclusive. On every dimension subjects rated 
pupils from their own school significantly more favourably than pupils 
from school W, that is, pupils from subjects' own school were seen as 
more friendly, reliable, mature and as a better friend than pupils 
from school W. In fact across all the dimensions, out of a possible 
272 comparison (68 subjects each made 4 comparions) in only 5 
comparisons (1.83%) was school W rated more favourably than the 
subjects' own school.
The results from the outgroup school choices and the own 
school/outgroup school comparisons strongly suggests that school W 
was treated as having outgroup status, that is, one which subjects 
actively chose to compare themselves with and rated less favourably ‘ 
than themselves.
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7.2.23 Influence Scores
Subjects indicated how much grant sixth-formers should receive before 
and after reading the influencing text. Differences between these two 
measures indicate the amount of influence caused by the text. Mean 
influence scores are shown below in Table 22.
) O
Table 22
Mean Influence as a Function of Minority and Response
Condition*
Ingroup Minority
Outgroup Minority
Public
4.03
(4.55)
1.08
(3.28)
Private
5.58
(4.58)
7.23
(5.08)
o
[*scores represent difference between pre-test and post-test in 
pounds, positive scores represent change in the direction of the 
source of influence, standard deviations are in brackets, n=17]
Preliminary analyses showed that the influence scores were not 
affected by sex of the subject nor by subjects' intentions to enter 
the sixth-form. Furthermore, these factors did not significantly 
interact with the dependent variables. Therefore a 2(ingroup v 
outgroup minority) X 2(public v private response) completely 
between-subjects ANOVA was performed on the influence scores. There
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was no significant difference between ingroup (X=4.81) and outgroup 
(X=4.16) minorities [F<1]. However, there was greater change in 
private (X=6«41) than in public (X=2«55) responses
[F(1,64)=11.99,P<0.001] supporting hypothesis 2. Also there was a 
significant interaction between the minority and response variables
> [F(1,64)=4.25,P<0.04] which supports hypothesis 7.
The condition means were examined using the Newman-Keuls comparison of 
!) means procedure. This showed that in the public response condition,
hypothesis 4 was supported, that is, ingroup minorities had 
significantly more influence than outgroup minorities (P<0.05).
) (2) However, hypothesis 6 was not supported as there was no difference in
the private response condition. Also, in the ingroup minority 
condition, there was no difference between public and private 
 ^ responses while outgroup minorities had significantly more influence
on private responses than on public responses (P<0.01).
7.2.24 Number of Subjects Influenced
"\ The number of subjects who changed in the direction of the source of
O  .
influence is shown below in Table 23.
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Table 23
Number of Subjects Influenced as a Function of Minority and
Response Conditions*
Public Private
^ Ingroup Minority 11 14
Outgroup Minority 6 15
^ [*number of subjects influenced in the direction of the source of
influence,n=17]
From Table 23 it can be seen that there was no difference between the 
number of subjects influenced in the ingroup and ougroup minority 
conditions (chi-squared=0.605,d.f.=1). However, as predicted, more 
subjects were influenced in the private response condition than in the 
public response condition (chi-squared=8.13,d.f.=1,p<0.01). Therefore 
the number of subjects influenced is compatible with the pattern of 
results observed with the influence scores.
7.2.25 Confidence Scores
Subjects indicated how confident they were of their pre— and post—test 
responses on a 7-point scale. Mean ratings are given below in Table 
24.
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Table 24
Mean Ratings of Confidence as a Function of Minority and Response
) Condition*
Public Private
) Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup
Pre 5.0 4.89 5.3 5.36
Post 5.65 5.53 5.36 5.65
) t 2.864 2.09 0.17 1.09
P< 0.02 0.1 n.s. n.s.
[*scores represent means on 7-point scales the higher the score the 
greater the confidence, related t-tests,d.f.=16,n=17]
As can be seen from the table, ingroup minority/public response 
condition showed a significant increase in confidence after reading 
the text. This was the only significant difference.
O 7-2.26 Image of the Source Ratings
Subjects rated on 9-point scales how consistent, committed, confident 
and persuasive they thought the source of influence to be. Mean 
ratings are shown below in Table 25.
/
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1Table 25
Mean Ratings of the Image of the Source of Influence as a 
Function of Minority and Response Conditions*
Con Com Cof Per
PUBLIC
Ingroup Minority 6.76 6.18 7.00 6.29
Outgroup Minority 6.00 6.41 5.82 5.76
PRIVATE
Ingroup Minority 6.82 7.00 7.06 6.82
Outgroup Minority 6.82 7.12 6.82 6.00
^scores represent mean ratings on 9-point scale, Affher the score the
greater theP^ssession of the attribute,n=17]
Each rating dimension was subjected to a 2(ingroup v outgroup 
minority) x 2(public v private response) between-subjects ANOVA. None 
of the ANOVA s showed a significant interaction between the minority 
and response variables. Table 26 below shows mean ratings for the 
public and private response conditions.
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3Mean Ratings of
Table 26 
Image of Source as a Function of Response
3 Conditions*
Con Com Cof Per
3 Public 6.38 6.29 6.41 6.03
Private 6.82 7.06 6.94 6.41
F(l,64) 4.23 7.36 3.32 1.05
3 P< 0.05 0.009 0.08 n.s.
[*scores represent mean ratings on 9--point scale , the higher the
3 (2) the greater the possession of the attribute,n—34]
3 From the above table it can be seen that the source of influence was
rated as significantly higher on the consistent, committed and 
confident dimensions when subjects were in the private response 
condition than when they were in the public response condition. This 
is surprising as each condition had exactly the same procedure. 
However, while it was made clear that only their response concerning 
y  ^  the amount of sixth-form grant would be seen by others (public
response condition) or placed into a 'ballot box (private réponse 
condition), subjects may have believed that this was also true for the 
ratings. If this is true, then it is not surprising that subjects in 
the public response condition did not rate the minority as highly as 
in the private response condition since subjects would not want to
a g r e e  openly with a deviant minority. Table 27 below shows mean
. . /
ratings as a function of minority condition.
O
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Table 27
Mean Ratings of the Image of the Source as a Function of
3  Minority Condition*
Con Com Cof Per
Ingroup Minority 6.79 6.59 7.03 6.56
Outgroup Minority 6.41 6.76 6.32 5.88
F(1,64) . 3.18 0.39 5.9 3.3
D 0.08 n.s. 0.02 0.08
[*scores represent mean ratings on 9-point scale, the higher the score 
]) (2) the greater the possesion of the attribute,n=34]
O
3 From Table 27 it can be seen that ingroup minorities were rated higher
on consistent, confident and persuasive dimensions than outgroup 
minorities.
The results from Table 26 and Table 27 suggest that subjects rated the 
source of influence higher when in the private response than the 
3 public response condition and when it was an ingroup rather than an
outgroup. The means for each dimension were examined using the 
Newman-Keuls comparison of means procedure. The results were similar 
across the dimensions. For the consistent, committed and confident 
ratings subjects in the public response condition rated ingroup 
minorities significantly higher than outgroup minorities (all P<0.05)
and outgroup minorities were rated significantly higher when responses
f
were made in private than in public (all P<0.05). Although there was 
no significant difference in the rating of persuasion, the means are 
in the same direction as the other dimensions.
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These results show that outgroup minorities in the public 
response condition were rated lower than in the other conditions. One 
possible explanation for this is that subjects in the public response 
condition may have believed that other people would see their ratings 
and so have given lower ratings to avoid publicly agreeing with an 
outgroup. In other words, subjects may have employed a face-saving 
Strategy.
7.2-27 Relationship Between Image of the Source and Level of 
Influence
In order to examine the relationship between the image of the source 
of influence and the extent to which individuals were influenced, a 
number of standardised regressions were conducted. The consistent, 
committed, confident and persuasive ratings were combined to form a 
four item scale with a Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient of 0.73 
(note, the exclusion of any of the items did not increase the scale 
alpha). This scale is termed 'behavioural style' (BS). Table 28 
below contains the results of a number of regressions using the 
influence scores as the dependent variable.
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3Table 28
Regression Analyses between Influence Scores and 
3 Independent Variables*
Overall Ingroup Outgroup Public Private
3 F P< F P< F P< F P< F P<
RES 9.17 .003 <1 n.s. 14.53 .0006
CAT <1 n.s. 7.06 .01 <1 n.s.
3 BS <1 n.s. <1 n.s. <1 n.s. <1 n.s. <1 n.s.
[*Individual Standardized Regressions with the influence scores as the 
3 0  dependent variable with the response, categorization and behavioural
style score as the independent variables. Analyses are done for all 
conditions]
3
O
From the above table it can be seen that, in all of the conditions, 
perceived behavioural style was not a significant predictor of 
influence. In the overall analyses, it should be noted that the 
response variable (public/private) was a significant predictor of 
influence while the categorization variable (ingroup/outgroup) was 
not. The other significant findings are consistent with the influence
scores.
7.2.3 Discussion of Experiment 6
minorities had more influence than outgroup minorities (supports 
hypothesis 4) while there was no difference on private responses which
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3does not support hypothesis 6. However, as predicted by hypothesis 2, 
there was greater private change than public change and a significant 
D interaction between the variables (supports hypothesis 7).
The image of the source ratings indicated that outgroup minorities 
D were rated lower than ingroup minorities, particularly so when
subjects were in the public response condition. Such a finding
suggests that subjects may have been using a face-saving strategy of
D not wanting to be seen to evaluate a minority positively. Such an
interpretation is consistent with the social identification model's 
account of public responses, that is, the more negative is the image 
D (2) of a source of influence, the less likely individuals will publicly
agree with it.
3 The following experiment is similar to the present experiment except
that the social categorization dimension concerns sex. Also, there is 
a control condition for comparative purposes. The main aim of this 
y  experiment is to replicate the findings of experiment 6.
1 7.3 Experiment 7O
7.3.1 Method
7.3.11 Subjects and Design
The subjects were 131 male and female pupils from a comprehensive
/
school in Swindon aged fourteen to fifteen years. 14 subjects were 
excluded (6 because they did not believe in a sixth-form grant and 8 
because they were unavailable for the second stage). A further 9
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subjects were randomly ommitted to obtain a balanced design.
D The experiment employed the sixth-form grant research design and was a
3(single minority v double minority v control) x 2(public v private 
response) completely between-subjects design with 18 subjects per 
3 condition.
This experiment is discussed in Martin (1987b, experiment 2).
7.3.12 Procedure
The procedure was exactly the same as for experiment 6 with two stages 
and approximately three weeks between the stages. There were three 
3 main differences between this experiment and experiment 6 (note that
this experiment was conducted in a different school than the one for 
experiment &).
(a) Instead of the outgroup school choices method employed in 
experiment 6, the social categorization dimension concerned sex (like 
experiment 5). Male subjects either received a male minority (single 
minority) or a female minority (double minority) while female subjects 
either received a female minority (single minority) or a male minority 
(double minority). However, due to the fact that some classes did not 
complete the rating data, because of lack of time, this section of 
their data was incomplete and therefore not analysed.
(b) A control condition was included where subjects made pre- and 
post-test estimates about the sixth-form grant without reading the 
text (like experiment 5).
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7.3.21 Influence Scores
Influence scores were measured as the difference between pre- and 
post-test scores. Mean influence scores are given below in Table 29
Table 29
Mean Influence Scores as a Function of Minority and Response
Condition*
Public Private
Single Minority 5.22 6.88
■ - (3.31) (4.47)
Double Minority 1.61 8.25
(3.28) ;(4.2) ::
Control 0.13 0.44
(0.81) (4.02)
[*scores represent the difference between pre-test and post-test
pounds, positive scores represent change in the direction of the
source of influence, standard deviations are in brackets,n=18]
Influence scores were examined using a 3(single minority v double 
minority v control) x 2(public v private response) between-subjects 
ANOVA. This revealed a highly significant main effect for the
210
3influence conditions [F(2,102)=26*81,P<0.0001] and for the response 
condition [F(l,102)=17.75,P<0.0001]. The latter result shows that 
^ subjects were more influenced when they made their responses in
private than when they made them in public which confirms hypothesis 
2. Finally, as predicted by hypothesis 7, there was a significant 
^ interaction between the variables [F(2,102)=7.98,P<0.0006].
The condition means were examined using the Newman-Keuls comparison of 
^ means procedure. Within the public response condition, hypothesis 4
was supported because ingroup minorities had significantly more 
influence than outgroup minorities (P<0.01) and the control condition 
^ CZ) (P<0.01). There was no difference between the outgroup minority and
the control. Within the private response condition, hypothesis 6 was 
not supported as there was no difference between ingroup and outgroup 
^ minorities. However, both ingroup and outgroup minorities had
significantly more influence than the control (both P<0.01). 
Comparisons between the public and private response conditions showed 
 ^ that the only significant difference concerned the outgroup minority
(P<0.01). Finally, hypothesis 8 was supported, that is, there was no
difference between the control conditions when responses were made in
) public or private.O
7.3.22 Number of Subjects Influenced
The number of subjects who were influenced in the direction of the 
source of influence is shown below in Table 30.
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Table 30
Number of Subjects Influenced as a Function of Minority and
Response condition*
Single Minority 
Double Minority 
Control
Public Private
16 16
10 17
2 9
in the direction (
influence,n=18]
A number of chi-squared analyses showed that more subjects were 
influenced in the private response condition than in the public 
response condition (chi-squared=6.84,d.f.=1,p<0.01).
7.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 7
O  The results from this experiment are similar to those found for
experiment 6. On public responses, single minorities had more 
influence than double minorities which confirms hypothesis 4.
)
Although double minorities tended to have more influence than single 
minorities on private responses, this difference was not significant, 
However, as predicted by hypothesis 8, there was a significant
)
interaction between the minority status variable and the level of 
influence variable. Finally, in the control condition, mode of 
response (public/private) made no difference to the extent of
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3influence achieved. This is an important finding as it shows that the 
differences in the influence scores observed between the level of 
J  influence variable cannot be attributed just to the diffferent
measurement techniques.
O
7.4 Discussion of Chapter 7
D The results from the two experiments discussed in this chapter are
consistent with those observed in the last chapter and confirm four 
out of the five hypotheses stated in the introduction (see section 
D (2) 7.1). On public responses, ingroup minorities had more influence than
outgroup minorities (experiments 4, 5, 6 and 7) which supports 
hypothesis 4. Although in both experiments 6 and 7, outgroup 
3 minorities had more influence than ingroup minorities when responses
were made in private, in neither case was this difference significant. 
Therefore hypothesis 6 has not been supported. This point is 
} considered in in the Discussion (chapter 9).
Both experiments discussed in this chapter supported hypothesis 8,
) that is, that there would be a significant interaction between the
minority status and the level of influence variables. Finally, an
interesting finding was that there was no difference between the 
double minority and the control in experiment 7 (this replicates the 
finding observed in experiment 5). This shows that labelling a 
communication as being the position of an outgroup minority has the 
same effect (at least on public responses) as not receiving the
/
communication.
An attempt was made to assess the image of the source of influence in
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Dboth the experiments discussed in this chapter. Due to practical 
problems, the rating data was incomplete for experiment 7 and 
3 therefore was not analysed. However, the ratings from experiment 6
showed that outgroup minorities were rated lower (less desirable) than 
ingroup minorities on a number of measures of behavioural style when 
3 subjects had been in the public response condition. It should be
noted that the rating measure was the same for all subjects and not 
made in public or private. This suggests that subjects may be 
3 following a face-saving strategy of not wanting to be seen publicly to
rate an outgroup favourably.
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CHAPTER 8
8.1 Introduction to Chapter 8
)
In the research discussed in chapters 5,6 and 7 group membership was 
manipulated on what might be considered to be a relevant social 
) (2) dimension, that is, on the basis of school preferences (experiment 6)
or gender (experiments 4,5 and 7). In this sense the term 'relevant'
is being used to denote a categorization with which individuals are
,. themselves
). familiar and which they use to -differentiate / from other people.
A
According to the social identification model one would expect ingroups 
to have more influence than outgroups (at least on public responses)
) even when the categorization is based upon relatively trivial /
criteria. This holds as long as individuals assume that their own 
group membership is associated with more desirable characteristics than 
the outgroup.
O
Three experiments are discussed in this chapter which have examined 
the effects of trivial social categorization (that is, categorization 
which is not based upon a meaningful dimension) upon minority 
influence. Three hypotheses can be stated which test the above ideas. 
First, consistent with hypothesis 4, ingroup minorities should have 
more influence than outgroup minorities even when the social 
categorization is trivial (hypothesis 9). Second, minorities which 
are associated with a desirable image should have more influence than
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Minorities which are associated with an undesirable image (hypothesis 
10). Third, the superiority of ingroup minorities over outgroup 
minorities should dissappear when the categorization dimension is not 
based upon similarity (hypothesis 11). In other words, the predicted 
effects of social categorization should only occur when the 
categorization dimension supports an intergroup context, such that, 
individuals can favour their own group and discriminate against an 
outgroup.
Tvrobmebh'ods are employed in these experiments to measure the image of 
the source of influence. In experiment 8 the self, ingroup and 
outgroup rating system employed in experiment 5 is used. While in 
experiment 10 the more conventional method of rating behavioural 
styles employed in experiment 4 is used.
8-2 Experiment 8
8.2.1 Method
8.2.11 Subjects and Design
The subjects were 58 fourteen and fifteen year old male and female 
pupils from a comprehensive school in Swindon. 6 subjects were 
excluded (4 because they were unavailable for the second part of the 
research, and 2 because they did not believe in a sixth-form grant). 
The subject number was further reduced to 48 (22 male and 26 female) 
in order to achieve a balanced design by randomly omitting 4 subjects
The experiment was a 3(trivial ingroup minority v trivial outgroup
216
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minority v control) completely between-subjects design with 16 
subjects per condition. Subjects were randomly allocated to one of 2 
experimental conditions or a control condition.
This experiment is discussed in Martin (1987b, experiment 3).
8.2.12 Procedure
The experiment employed the sixth-form grant design discussed earlier 
(section 6.2). The experiment consisted of two stages with 
approximately four weeks between the stages.
Stage 1: In the first stage subjects were asked to indicate whether
they believed sixth-formers should receive a grant and if so, how much 
this should be per week (pre-test). They were also asked to indicate 
whether they intended to enter the sixth-form (yes, no, don't know). 
Finally they were asked to estimate how many pupils attended secondary 
schools in the Swindon area.
) Stage 2: In this stage subjects were told that "In the first stage you
were asked to estimate the total number of pupils attending schools in 
Swindon. We have found that there tend to be two types of answers, 
pupils either overestimate (they think the number is larger than it 
actually is) or they underestimate (they think the number is smaller
than it actually is). You are an _________________". Subjects
were either told that they were over estimators or under estimators
/
(this allocation was random).
After this, subjects read the minority text which was either
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attributed to the subjects' same estimator group (ingroup) or 
different estimator group (outgroup). They then indicated again how 
much the sixth-form grant should be (post-test). The control 
condition was the same as above except that, after being told which 
estimator group they were in, they gave their post-test réponse 
without reading a minority text. Following this, all subjects rated 
themselves, ingroup and outgroup on four dimensions (this is the same 
procedure as employed in experiment 5).
8.2.2 Results
8.2.21 Influence Scores
Influence was calculated as the difference between pre- and post-test 
scores. Preliminary analyses showed that the influence scores were not 
affected by the sex of the subject (F<1), whether they believed in a
sixth-form grant (F=1.78, n.s.) or the estimator group they were in
—  ” . . .  /' 
(F=2.86, n.s.). Furthermore, none of these variables significantly
interacted with the minority condition variable. Mean influence scores
as a function of experimental condition^^® given below in Table 31.
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Table 31
Mean Influence Scores as a Function of Minority Condition*
Ingroup Minority 7.59
(6.94)
Outgroup Minority 3.53
(3.47)
Control 0.68
(2.62)
[*scores represent the difference between pre-test and post-test in 
Q  pounds, positive scores represent change in the direction of the
source of influence, standard deviations are in brackets,n=16]
A one-way ANOVA was done on the influence scores which revealed a 
significant effect for the minority condition variable 
[F(2,45)=8.6,P<0.0007]. The condition means were subjected to the 
Newman-Keuls comparison of means procedure. This showed, as expected 
by hypothesis 9, that ingroup minorities had more influence than 
) outgroup minorities (P<0.05) and the control condition (P<0.01).
Surprisingly, there was no significant difference between the outgroup 
minority and the control although there is a large difference in the 
means (this is a similar finding as in experiments 5 and 7).
O
8.2.22 Image of the Source Ratings
Subjects rated themselves, typical ingroup and typical outgroup on 
four dimensions; trusting, courageous, moral and generous - this is
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the same comparision procedure as used in experiment 5.
O
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The rating scores for each dimension were subjected to a 3(self v 
ingroup v outgroup) x 3(ingroup minority v outgroup minority v 
control) MANOVA with the first factor being a within—subjects variable 
and the second factor being a between-subjects variable. Table 32 
below contains a summary of the statistics from these MANOVA's.
Table 32
Summary of Results of MANOVA's for each Comparison Dimension*
TR COUR MOR G
F P< F P< F P< F P<
c <1 n,s. 1.7 n,s. 1.7 n,s, <1 n,s.
R <1 n,s, 1.67 n,s, <1 n,s. 4.86 0.01
CxR <1 n,s. <1 n,s. <1 n.s. 1.2 n,s.
[*C=conditions, R=ratings]
2^) From Table 32 it can be seen that only one significant main effect
was observed, that is, for the rating variable on the generous 
dimension. Furthermore, none of the two-way interactions were 
significant. Table 33 below contains the mean ratings of self, 
ingroup and outgroup as a function of comparison dimension.
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Table 33
Mean Ratings of Self, Ingroup and Outgroup as a ;
)
of Comparison Dimension*
TR Cour MOR GEN
)
S 4,81 4,87 4,79 4,89
I 4,48 4,56 4,54 4,83
0 4,58 4,27 4,43 3,95
)
N-K
Sxl P< n,s, n,s, n,s. n,s,
IxO P< n,s, n,s. n,s. 0,01
SxO P< n,s, n,s, n,s. 0,05o
[*S-self ,I-ingroup,0=outgroup,N-K=Newman-Keuls ,means ratings on a
7-point scale, the higher the rating the greater the possesion of the 
dimension]
■ . _ / 
Since the MANOVÂ's had revealed only one main effect for the rating
variable for the generous rating it is not .surprising to find that the
only significant difference concerned this dimension. The results
)
showed that subjects rated outgroup minorities lower on the generous 
dimension than they did for the self and ingroup rating.
It is clear from Tables 32 and 33 that there is a similar pattern of 
results accross the dimensions and therefore these were combined to 
form a single scale. The four item scales for the self, ingroup and 
outgroup ratings had alpha reliability coefficients of 0,6, 0,72 and 
0.83 respectively. In none of the scales was the alpha coefficient 
increased by ommitting one of the items from the scale. In Table 34
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below is shown the mean ratings of S,I and 0 as a function of minority
condition.
Table 34
Mean Ratings of Self, Ingroup and Outgroup as a Function 
of Minority Condition*
O
s
I
0
MANOVA
F
P<
N-K 
Sxl P< 
1x0 P< 
SxO P<
Ingroup Outgroup Control F P<
4.93 5.15 4.43 5.59 0.007
4.57 4.73 4.00 0.016 n.s.
4.26 4.26 4.41 0.005 n.s.
<1 2.97 <1
n.s. 0.06 n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s.
0.05 0.05 n.s.
O
[*one-way ANOVA's on mean ratings across combined dimensions, N-K= 
Newman-Keuls]
As can be seen from Table 34 the only difference across the minority 
variable concerned the S ratings, showing that ratings of the self
were significantly higher when subjects had been exposed to an ingroup
/
or outgroup than when they had been in the control condition.
Although the ratings of S,I and 0 followed the pattern observed in 
experiment 5 (that is, S>I>0), this pattern was only significant for
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those subjects who had been in the outgroup condition. The condition 
means were examined using the Newman-Keuls procedure and showed that 
subjects rated themselves significantly higher than the outgroup when 
in the ingroup and outgroup minority conditions. None of the others 
comparisons were significant.
8-2.3 Discussion of Experiment 8
The results of this experiment support hypothesis 9 stated in the 
introduction of this chapter; namely, even with a trivial 
categorization ingroup minorities had significantly more influence 
than outgroup minorities. Surprisingly there was no difference 
between the outgroup minority and the control although there was a 
very large difference between the means (which less conservative 
statistical tests than the Newman-Keuls would pick up). The latter 
finding is consistent with that found in experiments 4 and 7 .
Some interesting findings were found with the rating dimensions. It 
is worth noting that subjects were categorized into their groups on a 
relatively trivial dimension (estimation of number of pupils in 
2^) secondary schools). One can be sure that subjects had not
categorized- themselves in this way before and therefore did not 
correlate group membership which any particular characteristics. Any 
results which emerged can be attributed to the experimental 
manipulations.
Three important results emerged. Like experiment 5, there was a 
tendency for subjects to rate themselves higher than the ingroup which 
in turn was rated higher than the outgroup (although this was only
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significant for one dimension). The fact that this result was as 
strong as that observed in experiment 5 is most probably due to the 
fact that the categorization dimension in that experiment was a very 
salient one (sex). Second, subjects rated themselves higher than the 
outgroup when they had been in the ingroup and outgroup minority 
conditions than when they had been in the control condition. This 
highlights the effect of making the intergroup context salient- 
(subjects in the control condition were categorized but received no 
text). Third, following from the last finding, subjects rated 
themselves higher when in the ingroup and outgroup minority conditions 
than when they had been in the control condition.
These results are compatible with those found for experiment 5. It 
shows that, even with a trivial social categorization, subjects 
discriminated between the different groups and when the intergroup 
context was made salient they rated themselves higher and the outgroup 
lower than when the intergoup context was not made salient.
8.3 Experiment 9
8.3.1 Method
8.3.11 Subjects and Design
The subjects were 86 fourteen and fifteen year old male and female 
pupils from a comprehensive school from Swindon. 9 subjects were 
excluded (because they were unavailable for the second stage of the 
research and 1 because they did not believe in a sixth—form grant). 
The final subject number was reduced to 72 (35 male and 37 female) in
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order to achieve a balanced design by randomly ommitting 5 subjects
The experiment was a 2(ingroup v outgroup minority) x 2(positive v 
negative image) completely between-subjects design with 18 subjects 
per condition. Subjects were randomly allocated to one of four 
experimental conditions.
8.3.12 Procedure
The experiment employed the sixth-form grant design discussed earlier 
(see section 6.2). The experiment consisted of two stages with 
approximately two weeks between the stages.
Stage 1: In the first stage subjects were asked to indicate whether
they believed sixth-formers should receive a grant and if so, how much 
this should be per week (pre-test). They were also asked to indicate 
whether they intended to enter the sixth-form (yes, no, don't know). 
Finally they were asked to estimate how many pupils attended secondary 
schools in the Swindon area. This stage was. exactly the same as stage 
1 in experiment 8.
Stage 2: This stage was the same as for experiment 8 in that subjects, 
were informed which estimator group they belonged to (either 
overestimator or underestimâtor). However, after this, the image of 
the minority manipulation was applied. The image of the source 
manipulation consisted of informing subjects that membership of a 
particular estimator group was associated with either desirable or 
undesirable characteristics. For example, "We know from previous 
research that overestimators tend to be friendly, reliable, and
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3intelligent while underestimators tend to be•unfriendly, unreliable 
and not as intelligent. We should stress that these differences do 
^ not apply to everyone, although we are confident that overestimators
tend to be associated with more desirable characteristics than do 
underest imat ors". Therefore, according to the subjects's estimator 
^ group, they either recieved a minority communication from their own
estimator group (ingroup) or from the other estimator group 
(outgroup). Also, subjects were led to believe that the minority 
^ either had a desirable or an undesirable image in terms of its
characteristics.
■o
8.3.2 Results
3 8.3.21 Influence Scores
Influence was calculated as the difference between pre-test and 
3 post-test scores. Since preliminary analyses showed that there was no
difference between sex of the subject, intention to enter the 
sixth-form or estimator group, the influence scores were collapsed 
3 across these factors. Mean Influence scores as a function of
experimental condition are shown below in Table 35.O
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Table 35
Mean Influence Scores as a Function of Minority and
Desirable Conditions*
Positive Negative
Ingroup Minority 4.11 0.5
(3.32) (2.75)
Outgroup Minority 6.88 0.36
(3.65) (2.22)
■ [*scores represent the difference between pre-test and post-test in 
^ (3 pounds, positive scores represent change in the direction of the
source of influence, standard deviations are given in brackets,n=18]
The influence scores were subjected to a 2(ingroup v out group 
minority) x 2(positive v negative image) completely between-subjects 
ANOVA. There was no significant main effect for the minority variable 
[F(l,68)=2.99,P<0.09], whilst there was an extremely significant main 
effect for the image of the source variable, which supports hypothesis 
10, such that, a positive image caused more influence than a negative 
image [F(1,68)=44.1,P<0.0001]. Contrary to expectations, the 
interaction between the variables approached significance 
[F(1,68)=3.65,P<0.06].
The experimental means were examined with the Newman-Keuls comparison 
of means procedure. The analysis showed that both ingroup and
/
outgroup minorities had significantly more influence when they had a 
positive image than when they had a negative image (both P<0.01).
Also, whereas there was no difference between the minority groups when
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they had a negative image, contrary to expectations outgroup 
minorities had more influence than ingroup minorities when the image 
was positive (P<0.05). The latter finding is particularly surprising 
as it is in direct conflict with hypothesis 4. However, an 
explanation for this result can be put forward if one looks at the 
instructions given for the each experimental condition in more detail.
The experimental instructions not only gave information concerning the 
image of the source of influence but also information concerning the 
image of the target of influence (that is, the subjects). The 
relationship between the images for the source and target of influence 
(3 is shown below in Table 36.
O
Table 36
Relationship Between Image of Source and Target of Influence*
Image
Desirable Undesirable
(in) (out) (in) (out)
Ingroup Minority + - — +
Outgroup Minority - + + _
[*instructions assigning desirable (+) or undesirable (-) 
characteristics to own (ingroup) and other (outgroup) estimator 
groups]
The instructions which directly refer to the source of influence have
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ueen printed in bold. If only this information had been given to each 
condition then the experimental manipulation would have been 
3 satisfied. However, the inclusion of information concerning the other
group has led to a confounding such that it is impossible to determine 
whether influence is due to the image of the minority, the image of 
3 the other group or an interaction between them. From examing the
instructions it can be seen that the ingroup/desirable and 
outgroup/undesirable conditions both recieved the same information (+
3 -) while the ingroup/undesirable and outgroup/desirable conditions
also had the same instructions (- +). The significant interaction in 
the influence scores between these variables shows that subjects were 
more influenced when they were told that their own group was 
undesirable while the outgroup was desirable (that is, - +). This 
suggests that subjects were more influenced towards a group which had 
a more desirable image than_Xheir own group.
)o
8.3.3 Discussion of Experiment 9 /'
/
The aim of this experiment was to explore the role of the image of the 
minority when it has been defined as either an ingroup or an outgroup. 
Unfortunately, problems arising from the experimental instructions 
preclude confidence in the results and this limits the testing of 
hypothesis 10. However, it should be noted that minorities had far 
more influence when they had a desirable image than when they had an 
undesirable image. When the image of the minority was undesirable 
very little change occured. The effects of the desirability variable 
appears to override those of the categorization variable, although it 
should be noted that the salience of the desirability variable is much 
stronger (desirable characteristics compared to trivial group
229
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membership).
3 An attempt was made in this experiment to tease apart the effects of
desirability and categorization. These variables are often assumed to 
be linked such that ingroups are associated with more desirable 
3 characteristics than outgroups. It is the desirability of the
characteristics of the ingroup which motivates individuals to publicly 
agree with them (in order to self-attribute these characteristics).
3
Perhaps the most important finding from this experiment has been that 
subjects were most influenced by a group which had a more desirable 
]) image than their own group. This shows individuals' motivation to
assign themselves to groups with desirable characteristics.
8.4 Experiment 10
8.4.1 Method
8.4.11 Subjects and Design
The subjects were 120 fourteen and fifteen year old male and female 
pupils from a comprehensive school in Swindon. 14 subjects were 
excluded (6 because they were unavailable for the second part of the 
research and 8 because they did not believe in a sixth-form grant). 
The final subject number therefore was 106 (59 male and 47 female).
/
The experiment was a 3(cat alone v cat+sim v cat+dis) x 2(ingroup v 
outgroup minority) completely between-subjects design with between 16 
to 20 subjects per condition. Subjects were randomly allocated to one
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of six experimental conditions.
^ This experiment is discussed in Martin (1987b, experiment 4)
8.4.12 Procedure
The experiment employed the sixth-form grant design discussed earlier 
^ (section 6.2). The experiment consisted of two stages with
approximately five weeks between the stages.
Stage 1: In the first stage subjects were asked to indicate whether 
they believed sixth-formers should receive a grant and if so, how much 
this should be per week (pre-test). They were also asked to indicate 
whether they intended to enter the sixth-form (yes or no). Finally 
they were asked to estimate how many pupils attended secondary schools 
in the Swindon area.
Stage 2: Like experiments 7 and 8 subjects were informed that pupils 
tended to either overestimate or underestimate the number of pupils 
in secondary schools. They were then informed which estimator group 
they belonged to (assignment was random). At this point the 
similarity variable was administered. Subjects in the similarity 
condition read the following "We have found that there tends to be 
differences between overestimators and underestimators in their 
personality, abilities, intelligence, interests etc.. In fact, we 
would expect pupils from the same group to be very similar to each
■
other". The aim of these instructions was to cause subjects to 
believe that there is a real difference between overestimâtors and 
underest imat ors and that people from the same group are similar to
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each other . Note that it is not stated that there is any positive
value to belonging to the group. On the other hand, subjects in the
dissimilarity condition read the following "We have found that there
tends to be. no difference between overestimators and underestimators
in their personality, abilities, intelligence, interests etc.. In
fact, we would expect pupils from the same group to be very different
from each other". The aim of these instructions was to cause subjects
to believe that there is no difference between the two groups nor that
there is any similarity between an individual and other members of
their own group. Finally, subjects were asked to re-estimate the number 
of pupils in their area and to allocate themselves to one of three 
groups; overestimator, underestimator or between.
8^4.2 Results
8.4.21 Influence Scores — —
Influence was measured as the difference between the pre- and 
post-test scores of-subjects' estimate of the level of the sixth-form 
grant. Preliminary analyses showed that the influence scores were 
unaffected by the sex of the subject, whether they wished to enter the 
sixth-form or whether they subsequently changed their categorization 
(all F's<l). However, there was a significant minority conditon x 
changed categorization interaction which will be discussed latter.
None of the other two-way interactions were significant. The 
influence scores were then subjected to a 2(ingroup v outgroup 
minority) x 3(cat alone v cat+sim v cat+dis) completely 
between-subjects ANOVA. Mean influence scores as a function of 
minority and category relevance is given below in Table 37.
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^  Table 37
and Cat egory Relevance*
Cat Alone Cat+Sim Cat+Dis
Ingroup Minority 5.40 6.27 1.61
(5.40) (5.89) (3.77)
Outgroup Minority 2.21 2.07 1.75
(2.70) (3.36) (4.34)
[^scores represent the difference between pre— and post—test in 
 ^ Q  pounds, positive scores represent change in the direction of the
source of influence, standard deviations are in brackets]
Preliminary analyses showed that the influence scores were unaffected 
by the sex of the subject, whether they intended to enter the 
sixth-form or if they changed . • identification (all F's<l).
Furthermore, only one two-way interaction between these variables and 
the independent variables were significant." This is considered i^ter 
in this section. The ANOVA revealed main effects for the
O categorization variable [F(l,79)=6.1 2,P<0.015] showing that ingroup
minorities (X=4.36) had more influence than out group 
iss (x=2 • 00) , and for the relevance variable 
[F(2,79)=2.7,P<0.07] showing that subjects in the cat alone and 
cat+sim (X=3.8 and X=4.41) were influenced'more than those in the 
cat+dis (X=1.68). The final finding from the ANOVA was no significant 
interaction between the category and relevance variables 
[F(2,79)=2.22,n.s.].
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3The experimental means were examined using the Newman—Keuls comparison 
of means technique. Since there vias different number of subjects in 
-s. each condition a version of the Newman-Keuls procedure suggested by
Keselman, Murray and Rogan (1976) was employed (due to the fact that 
the difference in the number of subjecst in each condition was small,
^ the harmonic mean for all conditions was used instead of those for the
two conditions being used).
The results of the Newman-Keuls showed that the ingroup minority had 
significantly more influence than the outgroup minority in the cat 
alone condition (this replicates experiment 8 and supports hypothesis 
9) and in the cat+sim condition (both P<0.05). As predicted by 
hypothesis 10 there was no difference between ingroup and outgroup 
minorities in the cat+dis condition. Whilst there was no difference 
for the outgroup minority across the relevance conditions, ingroup 
minorities had more influence in the cat alone and cat+dis conditions 
than the cat+dis condition (both P<0.05). This pattern of results
suggests that there was a reduction of influence caused by an ingroup
—  /" 
minority when it was in the cat+dis condition.
The two way-interection between the categorization and the 
identification change variables will now be examined. It should be 
remembered that at the end of the experiment subjects were asked to " 
re-estimate the number of pupils they believed went to secondary 
schools in their area (it was their first estimate which they believed 
formed the basis of their group membership). They were then asked to 
indicate which group they now belonged to; either overestimator, 
underestimator or between. Their group (re-)allocation was scored as 
follows; 1 if they gave the same group membership as they had been 
assigned to, 2 if they changed their group membership to the other
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estimator group and 3 if they changed to in between. Mean influence 
scores as a function of degree to which subjects changed their 
identification is given below in Table 38.
Table 38
Mean Influence Scores as a Function of Degree of 
Identification Change*
SAME CHANGED BETWEEN
Ingroup Minority 5.89 2.76 4.30
(9) (7) (40)
^utgroup Minority 0.41 1.47 2.63
> (9) (10) (31)
[*scores represent the difference between pre- and post-test in 
pounds, positive scores represent change in the direction of the 
source of influence, number of subjects in each condition are shown in 
brackets]
The above table shows that most subjects changed their group 
membership to be between the two groups (67%) irrespective of which 
minority condition they had been in. The number of subjects in the 
other conditions are very similar. The means were subjected to the 
Newman-Keuls comparison of means procedure which showed that, subjects 
who did not change their group identity (same), were more influenced 
by an ingroup minority than by an outgroup minority (P<0.01). Also, 
ingroup minorities had more influence when subjects did not change 
their i^^^^ity (san;^ ) than when they did (change) (P<0.05). None of
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“*^the other comparisons were significant. Therefore the typical
superiority of ingroup minorities over outgroup minorities (at least 
on public responses)was only found when subjects retained the same 
identity; when they changed (changed and between) there was no 
difference.
8.4.22 Image of the Source of Influence
The image of the source of influence was measured on four 7-point 
scales. The measures were consistent, committed, confident and 
persuasive. Each dimension was analysed by a 2(ingroup v outgroup 
minority) x 3(cat alone v cat+sim v cat+dis) ANOVA. The results of 
these ANOVA's are contained below in Table 39
Table 39
Summary of ANOVA"s Conducted on Image of the Source Ratings*
CON COM COF PER
F P< F P< F P< F P<
CAT <1 n.s. 3.68 0.06 <1 n.s. <1 n.s.
R <1 n.s. <1 n.s. 6.59 0.002 <1 n.s. -
CATxR 1.18 n.s. <1 n.s. <1 n.s. 1.87 n.s.
[*cat=categorization, R=rating]
From the above table it can be seen that the only main effect for the 
categorization variable concerned the committed rating while the only
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Dmain effect for the relevance variable concerned the confident rating. 
None of the two-way interactions were significant. In Table 40 below 
are contained the mean ratings as a function of experimental 
conditions.
3
3
Table 40
Mean Ratings as a Function of Categorization 
and Relevance Conditions*
3 O
Cat Alone 
Ingroup Out group 
CON 5.75 5.56
COM 6.13 5.75
COF 5.31 5.37
PER 5.00 5.37
Cat+Sim 
Ingroup Outgroup
5.95 5.62
6.25 5.93
6.30 5.93
5.25 4.56
Cat+Dis 
Ingroup Outgroup
5.50 5.77
5.95 5.83
5.95 5.94
5.00 5.38
3 [*scores represent means on 7-pont scales, the higher the score the 
greater the possesion of that attribute]
O
The means were examined using the Newman-Keuls comparison of means 
procedure which did not show a clear pattern of results across the 
dimensions (all effects are P<0.05) . For the cat alone condition, 
outgroup minorities were seen as more confident and persuasive than 
ingroup minorities (although the opposite effect was observed for
commited). For the cat+sim condition, ingroup minorities were seen as
/
more commited, confident and persuasive than outgroup minorities.
This was the most consistent finding. There was no difference between 
ingroup and outgroup minorities in the cat+dis condition. Within the
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ingroup minority condition, cat+sim tended to have higher ratings than 
the other conditions on all dimensions (although significant only on 
last two). In the outgroup minority condition, no clear pattern 
emerged. These results suggest that the effects of cat+sim were to 
accentuate the perceived difference between ingroup and outgroup 
minorities, an effect not observed in the other two conditons.
8.4.3 Discussion of Experiment 10
The results of this experiment replicate those found for experiment 8 
and support hypothesis 9, namely, ingroup minorities have more 
influence than outgroup minorities even when the categorization 
process is relatively trivial (cat alone and cat+sim). Furthermore, 
as predicted by hypothesis 11, ingroup minorities did not have more 
influence than outgroup minorities when subjects believed they were 
dissimilar to members of their own group (cat+dis). This shows that 
the superior influencing ability of ingroup minorities (compared to 
outgroup minorities) is dependent upon information which supports 
intergroup discrimination, that is, leads individuals to favour their 
own group at the expense of the outgroup.
Since in the absence of relevant information individuals automatically 
assume that they are similar to members of their own group, it is not 
surprising that there was no difference between the cat alone and 
cat+sim conditions. The effect of knowing that one is similar to a 
group makes ingroup identity salient and promotes differentiation from 
other groups. Furthermore, knowledge of similarity with one's own 
group reinforces the feelings of dissimilarity with the outgroup and 
highlights the negative consequences which would result from
238
33
self-attributing those characteristics. In the case of cat+dis there 
is no basis from which to determine the desirability of the 
characteristics associated with each group.
Since subjects were required to indicate their group membership, at 
^ the end of the experiment it was possible to determine whether
subjects had changed their identification as a result of receiving a 
minority communication. The predicted superiority of ingroups only 
^ occured when subjects did not change their identification. When they
changed their identification there was no significant difference 
between ingroups and outgroups. Presumably, subjects who kept the 
^ O  same identification had a stronger identification with their group
than those who changed. Therefore, one would expect the stronger the 
ingroup identification the greater will be the difference in influence 
^ between ingroup and outgroup minorities.
Finally, the image of the source of influence was measured on four 
3 attributes. The results were dissapointing as no clear picture
emerged. However, there was a tendency for outgroup minorities to be 
rated higher on the attributes than ingroup minorités in the cat alone 
3 conditon while the reverse, and expected effect, was true for theu
cat+sim condition.
Discussion of Chapter 8
The aim of this chapter was to explore the relationship between 
ingroup and outgroup minorities when the social categorization 
dimension derived from a relatively trivial basis. This is a 
different approach to previous chapters which have used a socially
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relevant categorization dimension (that is school preference or sex). 
The purpose of looking at a trivial categorization is to seek the 
'minimal' conditions necessary to observe the superior influencing 
ability of ingroups over outgroups. The search for the minimal 
conditions provides valuable insights into the cause of the 
3 phenomenon.
The results show, as predicted by hypothesis 9, that ingroup 
3 minorities have more influence than outgroup minorities even when the
categorization process is based upon a relatively trivial dimension 
(experiments 8 and 10). Also, there was evidence to suggest that the 
desirability of the image of the minority (in terms of ascribed 
characteristics) plays a role in determining influence. More 
specifically, there was some evidence to support hypothesis 10 
(although problems in the design should be noted) that minorities with 
a desirable image have more influence than minorities with an 
undesirable image (experiment 9).
Finally, in the last experiment (experiment 10) it was shown that the 
superior influencing ability of ingroup minorities only appears when 
3 subjects either assume or are led to believe that an intergroup
context exists, that is, one which leads individuals to favour their
own group over the outgroup. When individuals believe there is no 
basis for an intergroup relationship between ingroup and outgroups 
there should be no difference in their ability to exert influence 
(hypothesis 11).
;
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PART III : DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION
9.1 Introduction to Chapter 9
The aim of this chapter is to review the results of the experiments
presented in chapters 5 to 8, discuss whether the research aims have
(2) been met, consider methodological and theoretical' problems with the
research design and reflect on the directions future research should 
take.
)O
9.1.1 Review of Results
-  /
/
This section is divided into three parts. First, an examination of the 
experimental findings in terms of the hypotheses stated in chapter 4. 
These hypotheses are concerned with the amount of attitude change 
caused by majority and minority influence. Second, an examination of 
additional findings which were not covered by the hypotheses and are 
of interest to the aims of this thesis. Third, an examination of the 
image of the source of influence.
The
9.1.11 Hypotheses Deriving from^Social Identification Model
In section 4.6 ten hypotheses were stated which concerned the
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relationship between the nature of the source of influence (majority v 
minority), social categorization (ingroup v outgroup) and the level of 
influence (public v private). These hypotheses were derived from the 
social identification model of social influence (see section 4.5) and 
tested by 10 experiments (discussed in chapters 5 to 8). The evidence 
for each of these hypotheses will now be considered.
Hypothesis 1 - majority influence should be greater in public than it 
is in private. This hypothesis was supported in experiment 1 but not 
in experiment 2.
Hypothesis 2 - minority influence should be greater in private than in 
public. This hypothesis was not supported in experiments 1 and 2 
(pilot experiments) but was supported in experiments 6 and 7.
Hypothesis 3 - there should be an interaction between the nature of 
the source of influence (majority v minority) and the level at which 
influence is measured (public v private). This hypothesis was 
supported in the two experiments where it was tested. Experiment 1 
found such a relationship when level of influence was measured using 
direct and indirect items while experiment 2 used public and private 
responses.
Hypothesis 4 - single minorities should have more influence than 
double minorities on public responses. If one makes an analogy 
between single/double and ingroup/outgroup minorities, then the 
evidence for this hypothesis is very consistent. In all the 
experiments which tested this hypothesis it was found that minorities 
from the same social category as the subjects had more influence than 
minorities from a different social category (experiments
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4,5,6,7,8,9,10). This effect was observed when the social 
categorization dimension concerned sex (experiments 4,5 and 7), school 
membership (experiment 6) and trivial group membership (experiments 
8,9 and 10).
Hypothesis 5 - there should be no difference between control 
conditions both when responses are made in public and in private.
This hypothesis was supported in the only experiment in which it was 
tested (experiment 7).
Hypothesis 6 - the greater influence of single minorities over double
(2) minorities (on public responses) is true for male and female subjects.
This hypothesis was supported in the two experiments where it was 
tested (experiments 4 and 5). Furthermore, no significant sex 
• • differences were observed jji any of the experiments.
Hypothesis 7 - on private responses, outgroup minorities should have 
more influence than ingroup minorities. In the two experiments where/ 
this was tested there was a tendency for outgroup minorities to have 
more influence than ingroup minorities but in neither case was this 
difference significant (experiments 6 and 7).O
Hypothesis 8 - there should be a significant interation between social 
categorization (ingroup v outgroup minority) and level of influence 
(public V private). This hypothesis was supported in the two 
experiments where it was tested (experiments 6 and 7).
Hypothesis 9 - ingroup minorities should have more influence than 
outgroup minorities (on public responses) even when the categorization 
process is based upon a relatively trivial dimension. This hypothesis
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was supported in experiments 8,9 and 10.
3 Hypothesis 10 - minorities with a desirable image should have more
influence than minorities with an undesirable image. This hypothesis 
was supported by experiment 9 although a severe methodological problem 
3 associated with this experiment precludes confidence in this finding.
Hypothesis 11 - the greater influence of ingroup minorities over 
3 outgroup minorities should not occur when subjects believe that there
is no relation between group membership and similarity. This 
hypothesis was supported in experiment 10.
In general it can be concluded that the hypotheses drawn from the 
social identification model of social influence have received support 
from the experimental research described in this thesis. The only 
hypothesis which does not receive strong support is hypothesis 7 
(although in both experiments the difference was in the predicted 
direction). A possible explanation for the failure to support this 
hypothesis is discussed below in section 9.3.
9.1.12 'Additional' Findings
A number of additional findings concerning the amount of attitude 
change were observed in these experiments. An interesting finding was 
that in a number of studies there was no difference between the amount 
of change caused by an outgroup minority and a control condition
/
(where subjects did not read a persuasive communication) when 
responses were made in public (experiments 5 and 7). Since the 
difference between pre- and post-test scores was insignificant for
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both outgroup minority and control subjects, this suggests that 
outgroup minorities had no effect on changing subjects' attitudes.
3 _
Another interesting observation was that a control minority (that is, 
one where the minority's group membership was not made salient) had 
^ slightly more influence than an ingroup minority (although this
difference was not significant). The conception of control minority 
is analogous to the conception of 'minority' in most experimental 
 ^ research, that is, as a group of people whose group membership is not
made salient. This finding seems to suggest that subjects may 
consider a minority to be constituted by members of their ingroup 
 ^ Q  unless information is given to the contrary. This is, of course,
speculation.
). -
9.1.13 Image of the Source Findings
Although none of the hypotheses focused on the image of the minority 
) . -
 ^ this is an important consideration as Moscovici argues that minority
influence is caused by the minority's behavioural style. The
relationship between psychological cost and behavioural style is
O  expanded upon later (see section 9.4).
/
Two main methods of measuring the image of the source were used in the 
experiments. The first method involved subjects reporting their view 
of the source on a number of attributes on Likert scales. This is the 
commonest method employed in research such as this. The second method 
was designed to examine the relationship between subjects' views of 
themselves, their ingroup and their outgroup. This involved subjects 
rating themselves, ingroup and outgroup on a number of attributes upon
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Likert scales. Since the minority was either an ingroup or outgroup, 
this provided an opportunity to examine how subjects compare the 
source s image with their own. This is a new type of measure for this 
kind of research and should be considered exploratory in nature.
The results fall into three categories :
(1) There was evidence to show that minorities tend to be seen as 
more confident and rigid than majorities (experiment 1). This is 
consistent with previous research. This highlights that minorities 
are often seen as determined because they stand up to the majority.
(^ ) Ingroup minorities were seen as more consistent, committed and 
confident than outgroup minorities (experiments 4 and 6). If one 
considers these characteristics to be desirable, then this finding 
also implies that outgroup minorities are perceived with a less 
-desirable image than ingroup minorities. This was especially 
noticeable when subjects gave their influence score in public rather / 
than in private (experiment 6), suggesting that there may be an 
element of a face-saving strategy in operation. When people think 
that others will see their ratings they tend to favour their own group 
over an outgroup to a greater extent than when they believe no one 
will see their ratings. Such a view is totally consistent with the 
social identification model. This predicts that public influence will 
be determined by the amount of psychological cost (in terms of the 
image which is self-attributed) resulting from being influenced.
Another interesting finding emerging from experiment 4 was that male 
minorities were perceived as more persuasive than female minorities, 
irrespective of the sex of the subject. Whilst this may reflect
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3traditional attitudes towards the influencing abilities of males this 
was not associated with a corresponding difference in the amount of 
influence (in fact, none of the experiments reported sex differences 
in the influence scores).
(3) The last set of results refers to subjects' ratings of 
themselves, ingroup and outgroup on four dimensions (trusting, 
courageous, moral and generous). Since the results were consistent 
across attributes they will be considered as one. In experiment 5, 
two important findings emerged. First, subjects consistently rated 
themselves more positively than their ingroup which in turn was rated 
higher than the outgroup (that is, self > ingroup > outgroup). This 
s^ws that, not only do individuals diffferentiate their group from 
the- outgroup, but they also differentiate themselves from both groups. 
The former is a negative differentiation, the latter is positive. This 
suggests that the motive to discriminate is matched by a need to be 
seen as an individual. Second, outgroups were rated lower when 
subjects had received a minority communication which made the 
intergroup context salient (SM or DM) as compared to when they were in 
a condition that did not make reference to the intergroup context (CM 
or control). This shows that intergroup differentiation is stronger 
when such a context is made salient.
In experiment 8 the results were not as clear cut as they were for 
experiment 5. However, subjects rated themselves higher than the 
outgroup when they had received influence attempts from an ingroup or 
outgroup minority but not when they were in the control condition.
This adds some support for the above findings and confirms that 
differentiation is linked to the salience of the intergroup context.
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3One may wonder why the results for experiment 8 were not as significant 
as they were for experiment 5. Although the measurement technique was
 ^ the same, the experiments used different social categorization
dimensions, that is, sex (experiment 5) and trivial group membership 
(experiment 8). This difference between an important and a relatively 
 ^ trivial difference may explain why the latter study did not yield
results as significant as the former. -
 ^ Although these results do not directly relate to the hypotheses they
give an insight into the role the image of the source has on social 
influence processes.
O
'O
/
9.2 Methodological Research Aims
Whilst the primary aim of_this thesis has been to derive a model of 
social influence which could explain the effects of social 
categorization upon minority influence, an important additional aim 
has been to comment upon and develop a satisfactory experimental 
design. The two aims are linked for one has to be satisfied with the 
validity of the experimental design before one can be confident of the 
findings which it yields.
In order to develop a satisfactory design, previous research in this" 
area was considered to establish potential methodological problems 
(see section 4.4). As a result of this review a number of important 
issues werg- identified which needed to be taken into consideration 
when developing a suitable design to examine the experimental 
hypotheses (see section 4.4.1). Three main issues were identified and 
subsequently incorporated into the main experimental design (see 
section 6.2).
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The first issue concerned the relevance of the topic to the ingroup 
and outgroup. Previous research had used topics which were of greater 
interest to the outgroup than the ingroup. Therefore, the inferior 
influence of the outgroup minority (compared to the ingroup minority) 
may not have been due to the fact that it was from a different social 
group than the subjects but that it argued a position in its own 
favour and was seen as biased. In the experiments described in this 
thesis the topic concerned a sixth-form grant which was equally 
relevant to the ingroup and outgroup, whether social categorization 
concerned sex (experiments 4,5 and 7), school preferences (experiment 
6) or trivial criteria (experiments 8, 9 and 10). In other words, the 
topic was of equal interest to all groups as it concerned all pupils 
at the schools.
The second issue concerned the level at which social influence is 
measured. Previous research into minority influence has shown that 
 ^ minority influence tends to be greater on a latent or private level
than at a manifest or public level. This is important as it shows 
that the true impact of minorities cannot be assessed by public 
 ^ 2^^  responses alone. In general, research into minority influence and
social categorization has only measured influence on public responses. 
In this thesis the effects of social categorization upon minority 
 ^ influence has been measured on public and private responses
(experiment 6 and 7).
 ^ The third issue concerned the nature of the categorization dimension
!
which has been used to distinguish between ingroup and outgroup. In 
previous research this usually has been achieved using sex or 
 ^ nationality as a categorization dimension. While these dimensions
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undoubtedly relate to ingroup and outgroup membership, researchers 
have failed to establish that such a categorization leads to intergroup 
discrimination. In this thesis an attempt has been made to use real 
groups which actively engage in intergroup discrimination (experiment 
6 ) .
It can be seen from the above that the three main issues which arose 
from a consideration of previous research in this area have been taken 
into consideration when planning the experimental design used in this 
thesis.
9.3 Methodological Issues
First, it could be claimed that the results of these experiments have 
no implications for actual group interaction because subjects merely 
filled in questionnaires and did not interact with other individuals. 
This is an important point because research has shown that interaction 
in groups can have powerful effects on attitude change (consider, for 
instance, the research of Lewin, 1958). If is important, therefore, 
to note that most of the research into minority influence and 
intergroup relations, like my own, has not been conducted in groups. 
However, the dilemma facing subjects in experiments is comparable to' 
that facing a subject in a group. Whether or not a subject is in a 
face-to-face group, he/she is confronted by the influencing attempts 
of a source and the issue is whether to agree or disagree with the 
source of influence. Either way, the dilemma is similar, though the 
normative pressures are greater when people interact face-to-face and 
with the source of influence (Levy, i960).
251
The second issue concerns the possibility of a bias in subjects' 
responding due to the design of the experiments. Since the minority 
always advocated a grant level which was higher than the subjects' 
original response, it is possible that the subjects agreed with the 
minority in order to maximize potential gain. They may have thought 
that the chance to obtain a higher grant outweighed the fact that 
they would be agreeing with a minority. ^
There are a number of reasons why it is unlikely that such a strategy 
can account for the results. Although subjects thought that the topic 
of a sixth-form grant was relevant to them, they were fully aware that 
Q  the introduction of such grants was unlikely to occur during the time
they would be at school. Therefore subjects knew that they were not 
going to gain personally from a higher grant but that their successors 
might. Also, if subjectsjiad used a strategy of financial gain one 
would expect the strategy to have been applied regardless of the 
experimental manipulations, yet there were significant differences in 
the amount of influence between the various conditions. Furthermore,/ 
in some experiments there was no difference in the level of influence 
between some of the experimental and control conditions, showing that 
reading the text did not always lead to subjects giving a higher grant 
level (experiments 5,7 and 8).
The third issue concerns the method employed to measure public and 
private responses. In the 'public response condition' subjects were 
told that other individuals would see their response while in the 
'private response condition' subjects placed their responses into a 
'ballot box', thus stressing that it would remain anonymous. The main 
difference between these two conditions is the degree of normative 
pressure, this pressure being higher in the public response condition
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than in the private response condition.
.y." .
While this method has been successfully employed by previous 
researchers (for example, „ Maass and Clark, 1983b), the
present research differs from previous research using manifest and 
latent measures of influence (for example, Moscovici and Personnaz, 
1980; Moscovici et al., 1981; Wolf, 1979), in at least two important 
ways. First, in my experiments, the public/private response 
manipulation was employed as a between-subjects variable (that is 
different subjects were in each condition) as a preferred method. 
Previous research, by contrast, used the manifest/latent measures as a 
(2) within-subjects variable (that is, both measures are taken for each
subject). The problem with this approach is that one cannot eliminate 
the possiblity that the measurement at one level of influence might 
affect the measurement of_the other. For example, a measurement taken 
in private might be affected if the subject had first given a réponse 
in public (or vice versa). A possible way to overcome this problem
would be to changenthe order in which subjects make the public and /
/
private responses. Second, in the research in this thesis the actual 
method for measuring influence was the same in the public and private 
response conditions while previous research, using manifest and latent 
influence, typically employed different measures. The advantage of 
having the same measure for both public and private responses is that 
it makes it easier to make comparisons between the two conditions.
A fourth issue concerns the method of measuring private influence. 
Previous research has measured latent influence by devising ingenuous 
methods for obtaining influence on dimensions unlinked to the measure 
of manifest influence. My own research has employed private responses 
which I have used as interchangeable with latent influence. Although
253
).
these two concepts are similar, they differ in at least one important 
aspect. Private responses, as operationally defined in these 
experiments, represent unconscious attitude change. It is possible 
that the failure to show a difference on private responses between 
ingroup and outgroup minorities (as predicted by hypothesis 7) could
be due to the insensitivity of this method. It may be that the
predicted difference would emerge if minority influence were measured ■ 
on a dimension which represents unconscious attitude change, such as, 
latent influence (Moscovici and Personnaz, 1980) or indirect influence 
(Mugny, 1982).
(2) A fifth issue concerns the use of a pre- and post-test method of
measuring influence. In this situation the same measure of an 
attitude (in this case, the sixth-form grant level) is used before and 
' • after subjects receive a persuasive communication designed to change
their attitude. Any changes between these two measures is attributed 
to the persuasive communication. However, it is usual to have a delay
between the two stages to increase the chance that subjects will /
/
forget their first response and stop them repeating it in order to 
appear consistent (and consciously avoid changing their attitudes).
This delay is usually two or three weeks. Even though there are 
problems with this method it should be noted that there was no 
difference found between pre— and post—test measures when subjects 
were in the control condition and did not receive a communication 
(experiments 5,7 and 8). This shows that subjects did not change 
their attitudes simply due to the passage of time and this finding 
increases one's confidence that the observed attitude changes were due 
to the experimental manipulations rather than the pre- and post—test 
measure.
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^sixth issue concerns the nature of the influence data. Previous
research has usually measured influence on attitude rating scales
^ which give ordinal data which are not strictly suitable for certain
types of statistics. In the research design used in this thesis the
influence scores can be considered to be ratio data (that is, they
have a zero point and the intervals between points of the scale are
equal) and therefore are suitable for parametric statistics (such as ,- 
ANOVA).
The seventh issue concerns problems which are specific to the research
design itself and the influence scores which are derived from it.
(2) Preliminary analyses of the influence scores revealed the level of
influence was not affected by (i) the sex of the subject (experiments
6,7,8 and 10; also true for experiments 4 and 5 where it was a
dependent variable); (ii) whether subjects intended to enter the
sixth-form (experiments 4,5,6,7,8 and 10); and (iii) whether they had
been assigned to a particular estimator group (experiments 8 and 10).
Furthermore, in none of these experiments were these factors found t o /  
'—  /
" interact significantly with the dependent variables.
O The eigth issue concerns the subject population. The results are 
unlikely to be due to any particular feature of the subject population 
because pupils from a wide range of academic abilities were used. 
Furthermore, the observed results are unlikely to be due to a school 
effect as five schools were used to conduct the experiments.
9.4 Theoretical Issues
A number of theoretical issues have emerged as a result of the
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research area which is discussed in this thesis. I would now like to 
discuss a number of these.
First, the relationship between psychological cost and behavioural 
style has not been considered in detail in this thesis. This was not 
studied extensively because the main analysis focused on the influence 
scores. However, the term psychological cost has been used in a 
global sense as refering to any factor which contributes to an 
individual's awareness of the consequences of being influenced. The 
major factor appears to be the perceived deviancy of the source of 
influence, that is, the more deviant the source of influence the 
2^2 greater would be the psychological cost of being influenced. In this
scenario behavioural style could be considered to be a factor which 
affects psychological cost. More specifically, behavioural style can 
either reduce or increase ^ e  level of psychological cost according to 
whether it leads to attributions of a desirable or undesirable image.
I am arguing that behavioural style is a component of psychological 
cost and cannot on its own be a causal factor in social influence.
)O
The difference between Moscovici's theory and the social 
identification model is best shown when considering how each of these 
theories could account for the results observed in my own research. 
Moscovici's theory could account for the findings if it was assumed ' 
that outgroup status is associated with attitude extremity resulting 
in individuals engaging in a validation process to a greater extent 
than they would for an ingroup minority. While Moscovici's 
explanation relies upon individuals assuming that outgroups are 
associated with attitude extremity, the social identification model 
makes the assumption that individuals assume that outgroups have a 
social identity different from their own group and therefore have
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different attitudes. Since outgroups are usually discriminated
. . . .  . ■C
^S^inst, individuals will tend to believe that the attitudes of the
^ outgroup will be evaluated less favourably than those of their own
group. The emphasis here is that attitude differentiation is a 
consequence of intergroup dynamics. A prediction from this would be 
 ^ that outgroups may influence individuals if the perceived difference
in their social identifications is reduced.
 ^ Second, as a result of the research discussed in this thesis, we are
now in a position to consider some additional theoretical issues 
relevant to the social identification model. The first point is that 
 ^ 2^^  there is some evidence to suggest that psychological cost appears to
be related to public responses while identification distinctiveness 
(perceived difference in social identification of the target and the 
source) appears to be more related to private influence (see 
experiment 6 in particular). Since there is a positive correlation 
between psychological cost and identification distinctiveness, one
would expect the more distinctive the source of influence the more
' - . /
likely influence will occur on a private level than on a public level. 
This is a tentative conclusion and warrants -further research. The 
second point is that, if psychological cost affects public responses, 
it portrays individuals as rational decision makers (this does not 
apply to private responses which may be governed by an unconscious "
process). Although there is no evidence to support this claim, it is 
consistent with my experiences in conducting the experiments.
Subjects in the public response condition were very aware of the 
consequences of others knowing their position and it would not 
surprise me if they used a face-saving strategy. In a sense the 
experience of psychological cost is not dissimilar to that of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).
O
257
The third issue concerns the way individual differences have been 
treated in research. Most experiments into social influence have been 
characterised by large differences in the extent to which individuals 
are influenced in any given condition. This is also true of the 
experiments discussed in this thesis. Current explanations of social 
influence processes have largely ignored individual differences and 
therefore require extra assumptions in order to account for them. For 
example, according to Moscovici's explanation of minority influence, 
the more the source of influence is perceived as having a consistent 
behavioural style the more likely it will have influencej however, in 
2^  ^ order to account for individual differences, it must be assumed that
individuals vary in their perception of behavioural styles. Although 
this may help us to understand individual diffferences, it does not 
•' • explain why individuals ^ ij^er in their perceptions of behavioural
styles nor what effects these differences will have.
The above problem arises when explanation of social influence, such as'
/
conversion theory (Moscovici, 1980) and social impact theory (Latane 
and Wolf, 1981), are based upon factors which are exclusively
outside the target of influence. The social identification model can 
overcome this problem, to a certain extent, because it relies upon 
factors which are inside and outside the target of influence.
The fourth and final point I would like to raise concerns the 
relationship between social influence research and the attitude change 
literature in general. These two fields have tended to be treated as 
independent and little integration has occured. This is surprising as 
social influence theories are also theories of attitude change but 
specific to majorities and minorities. I see no reason why an
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integration would not be fruitful, especially with the work of
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Festinger (1957) on cognitive dissonance and Bern (1972) on balance 
^theories.
Likewise, research into social influence has become 'detached' from 
theiiterature group processes. This is partially due to the 
rigours of scientific exploration with the need to strip the social 
context to the bare minimum. Social influence is a group process, it 
is the transfer of group held beliefs (majority or minority) to the 
individual. More consideration of other group processes, such as 
attitude polarization, leadership etc. would provide a fuller 
understanding of majority and minority influence.
9.5 Future Research Directions
In this section a number of suggested future research directions are 
discussed. These have been developed out of issues arising out of
/
this thesis. The ordering is for ease of presentation only and does 
not imply degrees of importance.
The first issue concerns the measurement of the image of the minority, 
Most research in this area has used a limited number of concepts 
believed to be important to behavioural style (such as consistency, 
committment etc.). Two important future directions emerge from this. 
First, wider coverage of concepts to measure the image of the 
minority. Mugny and his colleagues (Mugny et al., 1983) have taken 
active steps towards this end. They have measured the image of the 
source upon a number of dimensions and through the use of factor 
analysis have reduced this down to a number of scales. Second, the
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role of attributions arising from the minority's behavioural style has
r
been treated as independent from the influence scores. This is 
surprising as Moscovici's theory stresses the direct relationship 
between minority influence and its behavioural style. Much ground 
could be covered here through the use of (moderator) multiple 
regressions (see Maass and Clark, 1984). In my view, there appears to 
be a change in emphasis in recent research in that post-experimental 
measures are becoming much more important in experimental designs.
The second issue is relevant to the first issue and concerns the 
measurement of social identification. Recent work by Oaker and Brown 
Q  (1984) has developed a technique of measuring an individual's strength
of identification with a group. At first sight this appears a 
promising development and would be of benefit in social influence 
research. In particular, the_social identification model predicts that 
influence should be accompanied with a corresponding change in 
identification. This could be tested by measuring subjects strength 
of identification before and after influence has taken place.
The third issue concerns testing further hypotheses from the 
literature on intergroup relations which are relevant to social 
influence processes, for example, one would predict that individuals 
will tend to minimise the difference within a minority and a majority 
while maximizing the perceived difference between them. In this area 
I would suggest the use of in— and out-groups which are based upon 
trivial criteria. This would allow the investigation of the minimal 
conditions neccesary for influence to occur. Following from the 
research in this thesis the next logical progression would be to 
examine the effects of trivial group membership upon private 
responses.
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The fourth issue concerns the concept of 'psychological cost'. This 
concept has not been extensively explored in this thesis as the main 
level of analysis has been the influence scores. Future research 
should be directed at this concept as it has a central role in the 
social identification model. There is a large body of psychological 
and sociologcal literature on the concept of identity. A starting 
point could be Turner's distinction of personal and social identity, 
the former refers to knowledge of individual (or unique) 
characteristics while the latter refers to kowledge of group 
characteristics. It is possible that the psychological cost 
associated with a source of influence could be related to personal 
and/or social identity depending on which are made salient by the 
cont ext.
The fifth and final issue is the perennial cry for more applied 
research in the area of social influence. Maass and Clark (1984) note 
that there has not been one field experiment in the literature of 
minority influence. It would be tempting to explain this in terms of 
researchers not wanting to leave the safety of the laboratory for the 
 ^ unpredictabe 'real world'. To a certain extent this is true, field
experiments take a long time to set up and have many risks associated 
with them. However, to the defence of researchers, there are also 
conceptual and ethical concerns here. Conceptual difficulties in 
translating the appropriate concepts to a 'real life' situation and 
ethical concerns associated with deliberate attempts to change
attitudes. Nonetheless, these can be overcome, as shown by Wiegman s
/
(1985) remarkable study, which looked at attitude change caused by 
Dutch politicians.
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oI believe research into social influence is now at a stage when 
fruitful field studies can be made. Two principal suggestions are 
made here. First, the use of naturally occuring events, such as, 
campaigns designed to change attitudes (for example, the recent 
campaign concerning AIDS), the effects of political deviants within 
their party (for example, the effect Tony Benn had within the Labour 
Party before the formation of the SDP) , the effect of deviants within 
a group (for example, the miners who defied the majority of their 
collègues and broke the strike). These are a few of the endless 
suggestions which could be made. Second, the designing of experiments 
to include as many 'real life' variables as possible. Most research 
has not used face-to-face groups, used relatively trivial issues 
concerning one topic and used immediate measures of influence, etc..
To a certain extent this is necessary to meet the stringent demands of 
experimentation, that is, to eliminate as many extraneous variables as 
possible. More attention could be paid, however, towards designing 
experiments to parallel the 'real life' situation, such as group 
interaction, multifaceted communications covering many issues, 
expression of both viewpoints, delayed measures of influence, etc..
9.6 Conclusions
The aim of this thesis has been to consider social influence processes 
from the viewpoint of intergroup relations. In particular the effects 
of social categorization have been examined in relation to minority 
influence. Previous research in this area had left many unresolved 
practical issues which needed consideration along with the theoretical 
issues. The consideration of an intergroup perspective consisted of 
two complementary stages; first, a detailed examination of
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contemporary theories of social influence which revealed their
I
inadequacy in explaining the'effects of social categorization and, 
second, the testing of a number of hypotheses directly relating to an 
intergroup perspective. The results of the experiments supported the 
intergroup perspective and raised further important issues which have
been dealt with earlier in this chapter.
Although the ideas presented in this thesis are in their formative 
stage, and no doubt will be revised in the light of future research, 
they provide an insight into the intergroup dynamics which occur 
between minorities and majorities. Finally, while many issues have 
been considered in the thesis many remain which await attention. It 
is my belief that good research should not only answer the questions 
it has set for itself but also act as a heuristic to future research.
It is my hope that this thesis has achieved this.
/
/
263
'o
APPENDICES
264
Appendix A
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o
Questionnaire Measuring Responsibility for Pollution
Items taken from Mugny (1982) P.58-59.
(1) Householders are very much to blame: they use washing powders and 
the most polluting detergents in a completely inconsideràte manner,
(2) Car manufacturers take active and effective steps against 
pollution: they invest enormous sums in producing the cleanest 
possible cars.
(3) It is completely unrealistic to blame washing powder 
manufacturers, because their products are not harmful if they are used 
according to the instructions given.
(4) The problem of pollution will never be solved as long as
 ^ motorists cannot even be induced to switch off their engines during
prolonged stops, at red traffic lights, etc..
(5) Supermarkets and the manufacturers of chemical fertilizers have 
no scruples about denaturing natural products.
(6) How long can we blame farmers when we know perfectly well that if 
they don't use chemical fertilizers, even against their will, they 
will be forced out of business?
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(7) People who blame picnickers and day-trippers for the degradation 
of nature are only trying to deflect attention from the real problems 
and the real guilt.
(8) Factories built in the countryside are always at a carefully 
spaced distance from each other, so as to avoid concentrations; this 
shows a real respect for nature.
(9) The automobile industries are only concerned with profit : not 
only do they refuse to take part in the struggle against pollution, 
but by insisting on increasing their output they are amongst those 
most responsible for it.
(10) It must be acknowledged that chemical fertilizer manufacturers 
have spent large sums in research to find products which increase 
yield while conserving the natural qualities of agricultural produce.
(11) Day-trippers, with their careless attitude and behaviour, have a 
grave responsibility for the slow but irreversible deterioration of 
nature.
(12) Farmers, in their short-sighted and selfish use of more and more 
chemical fertilizers, are giving us poorer and poorer quality produce.
(13) Washing powder manufacturers must accept the reponsibility for 
continuing to sell (and advertise) products whose harmful properties 
they are fully aware of.
(14) It is simply lying to accuse drivers of being the most to blame 
for pollution.
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(15) We should resist the attempts made to blame householders, when 
they are in fact only the victims of glossy advertizing which conceals 
the harmfulness of the products sold.
(16) Heavy industries recognize only criteria of profit and 
convenience in siting their factories, while nature is damaged by the 
fumes and dust they disgorge.
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Appendix B
Text Employed in Pollution Experiment
From Mugny (1982)
We know what harm is done by exhaust fumes (a car leaves about 5000 
cubic meters of polluting fumes and 10 kg of dust for every 1000 km it 
travels). The automobile industry is willing to poison the air of 
 ^ C3 towns and even the countryside, using outrageous advertising
techniques to push products designed only to rake in profits.
Motorists are helpless in this situation. Cars could easily be 
 ^ equipped with antipollution filters which could fit simply on the
exhaust system, yet manufacturers refuse to do this because it would 
cost them money.
Attempts have been made to blame picnickers and day—trippers for 
pollution, by launching clean-up and litter campaigns. But these are 
only ways of hiding the true culprits. How can we compare a few bits 
of litter and empty containers left behind by day-trippers with the 
tons of fumes, toxic gas and dust belched out over huge areas by 
factories ?
Householders are frequently and wrongly accused of polluting water.
We should not overlook the fact that the washing powders they use are
/
made by a chemical industry which takes little interest in the harm 
they do as long as they wash whiter and faster and are used as much as 
possible. The race for profits pushes industry into making more and
268
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more products that they are obliged to sell by any means possible, 
such as dishonest advertising, and "biîTga±ïi" of?®rb*^hat 'deceive
consumers•
Farmers are just as often blamed for using too much chemical 
fertilizer in order to increase their yields. But they are obliged to 
do this if they want to keep their livelihood. The real 
responsibility lies with the supermarket chains and the fertilizer 
producers, who have no scruples about denaturing food products (in 
other words sacrificing quality to financial gain).
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Appendix C
Instructions for Experiment 3
I am conducting research into young people's attitudes concerning 
capital punishment (that is, the death penalty). I have been using 
young people from a comprehensive school (very similar to this one) 
and from a public school (that is, a fee paying school). The research 
consists of two stages. The first stage is included in this booklet 
and is composed of two tasks. The second stage will be given to you 
next week.
I would like to assure you that what you write in this booklet will be 
treated in confidence and will not be made available to the school.
The purpose of asking for your name is so that I can match your 
answers to this stage with that of the second stage.
Please read the instructions for each task carefully.
Thank you for taking part,
Robin Martin (Open University)
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Appendix D
Text used in Experiment 3
3 The number of murders in this country is increasing dramatically, more
and more innocent people are being killed needlessly. We hear daily 
on T.V. reports of cold blooded murders, such as terrorists' actions 
^ in Northern Ireland where bombs are designed to kill as many as
possible. Similarly, not long ago, the Yorkshire Ripper was caught 
and the horrors of his crimes revealed. Many members of our police 
^ (2) force are killed trying to stop crimes such as these being committed.
If a person is prepared to kill his fellow human beings he cannot be 
 ^ considered to be a human being himself, since murderers break all the
rules of society (religious, ethical and moral). It's no use sending 
these people to prison in the hope "they'll learn their lesson" and 
 ^ lead a normal life when released: many murderers have murdered again
when let out from jail. Anyway, why should society give these people 
a second chance, their victims can't have a second chance.
The effects a murder has on the victim's family should also be 
considered. To have an innocent member of one's family needlessly 
killed must cause a permanent emotional scar. This sorrow can only be 
intensified if the family know that the murderer may one day be free, 
perhaps to kill again. The victim's family have the right to know 
that the murderer receives the same treatment he gave to the innocent 
victim.
At the moment many murderers can expect to be released after a
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relatively short prison sentence. This is an inadequate punishment 
for one who has denied someone his or her life and would not deter a 
would-be-murderer. Capital punishment would make people think twice 
before committing a murder and would also protect society from these 
wicked and vicious people.
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Instructions for Public and Private Response Manipulations 
(A) PUBLIC
I would now like you to complete the questionnaire on capital 
punishment on the next two pages. Please answer the questionnaire as 
honestly as you can. As a continuing part of my research I shall be 
gathering groups of pupils (from comprehensive and public schools) to 
discuss the topic of capital punishment. It is possible that you will 
be asked to take part in such a discussion group. If you are asked 
then your answers to the following questionnaire will be shown to the 
other members of the group (you will of course see their answers to 
the questionnaire). The purpose of this is so that everyone in the 
group will* know the position of all others'concerning capital 
punishment.
PRIVATE
I would now like you to complete the questionnaire on capital 
punishment on the next two pages. Please answer the questionnaire as 
honestly as you can. To ensure that your answers remain anonymous 
detach the two pages of the questionnaire from this booklet and place 
them into the "ballot box" provided (give the rest of the booklet back 
to the teacher). By doing this I will not be able match the 
questionnaires to any particular individual, in fact your answers will 
remain complet ely privât e.
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>
Pre-Test and Post-Test Sixth-Form Grant Measurement Information
2 has often been suggested that pupils who continue their education
into the sixth form should receive a grant « At present , pupils can 
leave school at the end of the fifth form and claim supplementary 
 ^ benefit if they fail to find employment. The current rate of benefit,
for young people living with their parents, is #16.50 per week which 
is expected to cover their rent, food, clothes etc.. If pupils wish 
 ^ continue into the sixth form they are financially dependent upon
their parents.
 ^ Do you think that pupils who stay on in the sixth form should receive
a grant ? (please tick the appropriate answer below)
Yes
No
O If you answered 'Yes' to the above question, how much grant do you 
think that pupils who continue into the sixth form should receive per 
week ? Please indicate how much grant they should receive per week in
I think that sixthformers should receive # per week.
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Sixth-Form Grant Text
Differences in the #40 version of the text are shown in brackets.
"I believe that pupils who continue their education into the 
sixth-form should not be dependent upon their parents. They should 
receive a grant which covers their living costs and this should be at 
least #35 (#40) per week".
"Since sixth-formers are trying to gain qualifications which could get 
them a job which is of use to society they should not be treated as 
children but like adults. I have a friend who left school at 16 and 
is now doing an apprenticeship at a company and is getting paid for 
it, if I choose to stay on into the sixth-form I'll get nothing.
After all, isn't sixth-form study a kind of apprenticeship where 
pupils are trying to gain qualifications in order to get jobs?".
"It could be argued that a grant of between #15-20 (#20-25) per week 
is sufficient for someone living with their parents but I think this 
is very small compared to someone who has got a job. Since being in 
the sixth-form is a kind of job sixth-formers should receive a 
comparable amount of money to someone who has a job and is of the same 
age, that is about #35 (#40) per week".
• / 
"I do not think there is any difference between sixth-formers and
University students, both have decided to continue their education
which is needed in obtaining a job. University students get grants,
275
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so why shouldn't sixth-formers?".
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